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1. INTRODUCTION
In many western states the preference for policy implementation by core government 
agencies has changed in favour of alternative arrangements such as contracting out, 
privatization or the creation of quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations. 
This study focusses on the proliferation of these so-called quangos (Barker, 1982). 
LeGrand and Bartlett (1993:7) predict that, from 1990 on, the provision of public 
goods and services will be very different than in earlier decades. Under the 'old' 
system governments owned, funded and provided public services through government 
bureaucracy. In the 'new' system, although still paying for the services, governments 
will no longer provide them. Quangos will be charged with this task, operating at 
arm's length of the government. Instead of a bureaucracy, we will have a quangocracy, 
hence the term quangocratization1 in the title of this book, by analogy to bureau- 
cratization (Hood, 1984).
Quangocratization can be viewed as one of the most recent stages of state 
development in the western world. Modern-day government is characterized by the 
replacement of the central, hierarchical structure with a complex network of organiza­
tions with which governments jointly develop, implement and evaluate policies.
This chapter gives an introduction to quangocratization. Section 1.1 offers a 
theoretical perspective on the rise of this phenomenon. Section 1.2 presents a defini- 
tion of what a quango is. Section 1.3 analyses the assumptions underlying politicians' 
preference for quangos, as opposed to government bureaucracy. Section 1.4 discusses 
some previous research findings and theories on quangos. Section 1.5 concludes this 
chapter with a presentation of the research questions and the outline of this study.
1.1. State development and quangocratization
According to North (1981:20-32), no analysis of state development can be meaningful 
if no attention is paid to the distribution (i.e., the allocation) of property rights (see 
also Hardin, 1997). Property rights are broadly defined as the right to use assets and 
resources m any way actors see fit (Eggertson, 1990:33-40). The right to walk about 
freely, to earn an income, to own a house or land, to be safe from violence in the 
streets, to get an education, and to speak one's mind all can be considered examples of 
the rights individuals have in contemporary western societies.
1 The Dutch equivalent 'v e rz elfs ta n d ig in g  literally means 'autonomization'. While this term implies more 
autonomy, this need not always be the case. Kickert e t al. found that in a number of cases autonomization 
actually led to less autonomy because of increased restrictions and regulations placed on an organization after 
it was put at arm's length of the government. This was labelled the 'myth of autonomization' (Kicken e t al., 
1998:161).
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However, the enforcement of rights is not always easy. Take, for example, the 
right to safety, for which an army and a police force are necessary. Such provisions are 
difficult, if not impossible, to establish by an individual alone. Also, rights are often 
difficult to realise for all individuals at the same time, because advantages to one indi­
vidual may mean a disadvantage to another. Collective goods, such as national security, 
will not be optimally provided by the market, due to two properties of these goods 
(Mueller, 1989:11). First, jointness of supply, which means that production costs are 
more or less fixed. Addition of one consumer will not lead to additional production 
costs. And second, non-exclusiveness which means the impossibility to exclude indivi­
duals from consumption of the good.
A well-known example to illustrate the properties of collective goods is national 
defence (see Stiglitz, 1988:75). The cost of defending a country of one million 
individuals or a country of one million and one are the same (jointness of supply), and 
when national defence is successful all inhabitants benefit from it (non-exclusiveness). 
This example also shows why individuals are not easily prepared to invest in collective 
goods. If you invest, others who do not invest may benefit as well. You can also 
acquire these goods without investing in them, therefore, individuals are disinclined to 
invest. This phenomenon is known as the free-rider problem (cf. Hendrikse, 1993:144) 
or the problem of collective action (see Olson, 1965; Coleman, 1990:937-938; Ostrom 
& Walker, 1997). However, no investments means no provision of collective goods 
and no enforcement of citizens' rights.
One way to solve the problem of collective action is to establish an overarching 
authority (a 'ruler'; North, 1981), for example, a sovereign or a group of representati- 
ves. Today's overarching authority is usually referred to as the government. It acts on 
behalf of all individuals ('constituents'; North, 1981) and establishes the conditions that 
enable people to exercise their rights. The following example illustrates this (for more 
examples see De Swaan, 1989):
"In the Netherlands in the nineteenth century, waterworks and sewerage were initially 
constructed by private entreprises commissioned by prosperous citizens. However, these 
citizens found out - although the chance of infection with cholera was reduced - that risks 
of infection still existed, because the poor were not connected to the waterworks and 
sewerage and kept using non-purified water. Therefore, they supported plans of the city 
council to oblige every citizen to connect to the waterworks and sewerage. The citizens had 
discovered that besides one’s own health national health exists as well. And when national 
health is bad, one's own health is in danger, in spite of what measures already may have 
been taken” (Ultee, Arts & Flap, 1992:255 [my translation, SvT]).
In the course of time the government's activities have expanded. Modern welfare states 
provide goods such as education, social security and national health besides the more 
traditional goods such as national defence and the tax system (Den Hoed, 1992). These 
goods are not all purely collective goods as they do not always have the two 
forementioned characteristics. Therefore, they are usually referred to as impure or 
quasi-collective goods or publicly provided private goods.
Nowadays, in most western democracies citizens pay taxes and give votes to 
political parties, in exchange for which elected politicians will pass legislation to 
implement citizens' rights. An executive is charged by the politicians with the 
implementation of policies. Thus a cascade o f  principals and agents (Moe, 1984:765;
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Coleman, 1990:146-156; Pratt & Zeckhauser, 1991) is created (see box 1.1). Voters are 
the principals of politicians (the agent) when they give politicians the right to act on 
their behalf. Politicians become principals in their turn, when they charge an executive 
agent with policy implementation.
VOTERS = = > POLITICIANS
(principal) (agent)
POLITICIANS = = > EXECUTIVE AGENT
(principal) (agent)
Box 1.1. The political processes in a democracy as a cascade of principals anc
agents.
The relationship of exchange between citizens and politicians, and between politicians 
and executive agents can be seen as a contractual agreement (North, 1981). The state 
will seek to maximize the opportunities for citizens to exercise their rights, in 
exchange for which politicians are given the right to exercise power (e.g. by the use of 
force). Politicians are also allowed to restrict citizens' use of rights, for instance by 
attenuation (to avoid damage to the rights of others) and parxitioning of rights (i.e., 
dividing scarce assets or resources) as long as restrictions agree with social norms 
(Eggertson, 1990). Politicians can transfer part of their rights to an executive agent.
Such differentiation of rights is typical of the development of western democra- 
cies. Max Weber labelled it rationalization o f  the state (Ultee et al., 1992:241). As a 
result of this differentiation, most contemporary western states are characterized by a 
political system - a democracy - in which legislature and the executive are independent 
powers, charged with tasks by a constitution (Coleman, 1990:374-375).2 In most states 
the executive has developed into a large bureaucracy, which explains why Nonet and 
Selznick (1978:22) call this stage in the development of western societies the 'bureau­
cratie' stage.
According to Weber, bureaucracy is the most effective, efficient, and rational 
form of organization (Van Braam, 1969:157-166; Coleman, 1990:422). Bureaucrats are 
empowered by politicians to implement policies, but have no rights of production. For 
example, they do not determine the size of production (input, output), budgets or 
prices, nor are they allowed to retain surpluses. They are expected to be neutral actors, 
not acting in their own interest but in the general interest of all individuals, 
implementing policies that support the enforcement of individuals' rights. This concep- 
tion of bureaucrats is known as the classical political Science perspective (Breton & 
Wintrobe, 1982:2).
In recent research, however, some scholars - following ideas originated by 
Niskanen (1975) and Downs (1965) - have emphasized that bureaucrats do have indivi-
! There is yet another independent power: the judiciary. This third power falls outside the scope of this 
s tu d y .
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dual interests that shape their behaviour (e.g., Mueller, 1989:250-259; Dunleavy, 1991: 
147-173). Following a similar line of reasoning, North (1981) claims that the delegation 
of power to executive agents will lead to an inefficient distribution of property rights. 
In the absence of competition, citizens have no substitute supplier of collective goods. 
Exit (emigration to more efficient states) or voice (threating to oppose the ruling 
authority) are not realistic options for individual citizens. In democracies, tension 
between dissatisfied constituents and governments will cause political instability, dilu- 
tion of authority and political pluralism. To maintain its authority and legitimacy, it is 
the gov ernm en t that will initiate institutional reform (North, 1981: 28-32).
North's model can easily be applied to quangocratization. The rapid expansion of the 
activities and expenditures of government bureaucracy in many western states, 
especially after the Second World War, raised questions with regard to it's legitimacy 
and effectiveness (see, for example, Schuyt & Van der Veen, 1990). The drawbacks of 
bureaucracy as an instrument of rational action, such as inflexibility, red tape and 
logrolling, facilitated the evolution of western states into a new stage: the post-bureau- 
cratic stage, which is characterized by a diffusion of authority (Nonet & Selznick, 
1978:22) and dilution of control (North, 1981). In this stage, the implementation of 
policies is no longer automatically trusted to core government agencies, but other 
arrangements such as privatization, contracting out and the setting up of quangos 
become more popular. These changes are part of what has become known as New 
Public Management (NPM) or the reinvention paradigm (Pollitt, 1999).
"Effectively NPM has become a generic label for a group of policy and admini- 
strative solutions emphasizing competition, disaggregation and incentivization" (Dun­
leavy, 1994:38). In public sector reforms throughout the western world, a preference 
for market mechanisms is coupled with a shift from input- towards output-driven 
management, downsizing, a separation of policy and administration, and an emphasis 
on customer orientation (Pollitt, 1999). New (types of) organizations, such as quangos, 
are established to which the government transfers part of its right to implement 
policies and (some of) the accompanying production rights. As a result, the institutio­
nal context of central governments has become more and more complex (Leeuw, 
1992). Section 1.3 will elaborate on the political motives underlying these reforms.
Quangocratization can thus be considered as one of the most recent stages in the 
development of western states. An interesting question in this respect is whether 
quangocratization is the next step in the process of rationalization3 as described by 
Weber in terms of ongoing specialization and differentiation, or whether it is a form 
of de-rationalization, considering that it replaces bureaucracy, which, according to 
Weber, is the most rational form of government organization. I shall return to this 
question in chapter 6. But the first question to be dealt with is: what is a quango?
3 Blau and Meyer (1987:183-184) ended their book on bureaucracies with a discussion on the diffusion of the 
multi-divisional organizational form (M-form) in the private sector. Blau and Meyer considered this diffusion 
an example of rationalization, which they believed public sector organizations could never adopt, because of 
the absence of a real market mechanism in the public sector. However, the similarities between the establish­
ment of quangos and the creation of holdings (parent departments) and divisions (quangos) can be said to 
prove Blau and Meyer wrong.
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1.2. Definition of a quango
In this study, quangos are defined as organizations which, as their main task, are char- 
ged with the implementation of one or more public policies, and which are funded 
publically but operate at arm's length of the central government, without an 
immediate hierarchical relationship existing with a minister or a parent department4 
(Leeuw, 1992). A more precise definition is hard to find, and different researchers and 
practitioners list different types of organizations as quangos (see, for example, the 
debate in the United Kingdom between Hogwood [1995] and Hall & Weir [1996] in 
subsection 2.1.1).5 The debate is complicated even more by all the different terms in 
use, for example: para-governmental organizations (PGOs; WRR, 1983; Hood, 1984), 
non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs; Hogwood, 1995), extra-governmental 
organizations (EGOs; Weir & Hall, 1994; Hall & Weir, 1996), hybrids (In 't Veld, 
1995) or 'the grey zone' (Greve, 1996; 1999).
To find a useful solution to the definition problem, it is necessary to acknowled- 
ge that there is not just one type of quango. Instead, there are severa l types of 
organizations that could be classified as a quango. Following this idea, some authors 
have described a continuum of quangos (see, for example, Loeff Claeys Verbeke 
[1994:19] and Commissie Sint [1994] on the Netherlands; and Rainey [1997:68] on the 
USA). Table 1.1 presents the sub-sectional map of quangos that will be used as a 
guideline in this study (adapted from Greve, Flinders & Van Thiel, 1999).
Table 1.1 shows four types of quangos: (i) contract agencies (in Dutch: agen t­
schappen, cf. the British Next Steps agencies), (ii) public bodies (e.g., the Dutch 
zelfstandige bestuursorganen [Scheltema, 1974] and Water Boards [waterschappen], or the 
British NDPBs), (iii) voluntary or charity organizations, and (iv) state-owned enter- 
prises (SOEs). Departmental units are listed as a contrast on the right side of the con­
tinuum, while on the left side private organizations are listed.6 Private organizations 
can be involved in policy implementation through privatization of SOEs, or through 
contracting out, also known as outsourcing or competitive tendering. In the latter case, 
public organizations can be involved in the bidding process as well. The position of an 
organization on the quango continuum need not be constant over time. Quango-drift 
(Greve et al., 1999:143) can occur; for example, an agency can become a public body 
or a public body can be privatized.
The typology offers a useful classification for research purposes. It is based on the 
assumption that the conditions under which an organization operates determine what 
type of quango it is. Table 1.1 lists three conditions: (i) financial arrangements; (ü) the 
extern to which ministerial accountability applies and (iii) the control mechanisms for 
ministers.The type of task is not included as a distinctive condition, because different
4 The parent department is the department responsible for the policy sector in which an organization is 
operating.
5 Advisory councils are generally not considered to be quangos.
6 The ultimate contrast at the left side of the continuum would be that the government leaves the provision 
of goods or services entirely to the market, and is no longer responsible. As the table lists only examples of 
organizations used to implement policies, that ultimate contrast is not included here.
Table 1.1. Different types of organizations used by the government for policy implementation, including four types of quangos (adapted 
from: Greve, Flinders & Van Thiel, 1999:142)
Market / 
Private Sector 
organizations
State Owned 
Companies / 
Enterprises
Voluntary / 
charity organi­
zations
Public Body Contract
Agency
Departmental
Unit
Definition organization 
contracted by 
government
government 
owns company 
or majority of 
shares
bottom-up body 
given public task 
and funding
quasi-autono- 
mous organiza­
tion outside 
government
quasi-autono- 
mous unit with- 
in government
division of
government
bureaucracy
Finances through market 
mechanism
state budget or 
stock exchange
donations,
subsidy
state budget, fees 
or levying
state budget state budget
Ministerial
accountability
only for terms 
of contract
limited to strate­
gie and financial 
decisions
only for terms 
and the amount 
of subsidy
only for policy 
design and regu- 
lation
reduced in case 
of managerial 
matters
full ministerial 
accountability
Control
mechanisms
contract market inter- 
vention or buy- 
ing/ selling 
shares
contract statutes, law framework
document
hierarchical
intervention
Dutch examples waste disposal 
by local govern- 
ments, co-finan- 
ced infrastruc- 
tural projects
Postal and 
Telecommunica- 
tions Services 
(now privatized)
Salvation Army, 
Red Cross
legal aid, public 
universities, 
Water Boards
Service for 
Immigration and 
Naturalisation
division of 
Ministry of 
Justice, Defence, 
the Home 
Office
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types of quangos can be charged with similar tasks.7
Going through the table from right to left, one will notice the turning point in 
the middle, where opportunities for politicians to exert influence (control mechanisms, 
ministerial accountability and finances) decrease and the autonomy of quangos in- 
creases. Autonomy is defined here as the ownership of the rights of production, that is 
who decides about or provides the organization with: goals, tasks, budget, input 
variables such as labour and Capital, output and/or outcome, prices of supplied goods 
or services, and the production process (including so-called Standard operating proce­
dures, information, and technology). The greater the extern to which organizations 
own such rights, the more they are in control of and responsible for their activities, 
and the more autonomous they are.
Quangos are gw^sj-autonomous, which means that they are given som e of the 
production rights, but not all. Part of the production rights remains the prerogative of 
the minister of the parent department. There is no uniform arrangement in this 
matter, as every single quango, irrespective of its type, owns a different set of produc­
tion rights. Some quangos cannot command their own budget because they receive it 
directly from the state. Other quangos are allowed to impose fees or levies. Some 
quangos cannot determine their output, because they are bound by pre-determined 
numbers of goods or services (output) being laid down in management contracts. Some 
quangos are free to hire employees while other quangos employ only seconded civil 
servants from the parent department (see also chapter 2). In general, most quangos 
receive relative managerial freedom: managing the production process (input, output, 
procedures) is their own responsibility. The minister is no longer accountable for 
managerial affairs. The minister does remain accountable for policy matters, the choice 
of a quango, and supervision of quangos. A limited ministerial responsibility is 
accompanied by fewer control mechanisms for ministers (Stone, 1995).
Due to the mixed ownership of production rights, quangos are not public 
organizations in the traditional sense, as, for example, departmental units, although 
they do belong to the public domain. As stated before, depending on the conditions 
under which they operate and their degree of autonomy, different types of quangos 
can be distinguished. Table 1.1 lists some examples of these types. Most empirical 
references in this study will be to quangos of the 'public body' type. Now, we turn to 
the motives of politicians for establishing quangos.
1.3. The practitioner theory
Politicians mention different motives for their choice of quangos, that is, i f  they 
mention one. There seems to be a general lack of justification by politicians for the 
use of quangos (except in New Zealand; see Boston, 1995). See, for example, table 1.2, 
which lists the motives for the establishment of quangos in the Netherlands, as
7 Another important condition could be the distinction between public and private law (cf. Loeff Clayes 
Verbeke, 1994). Quangos on the right side of the continuum are more often based on public law, while on 
the left side of the continuum private law predominates. As this dimension only holds for countries with a 
System of administrative law, it is not included in table 1.1.
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mentioned by politicians in the statutes.8 It shows that in most cases (53%) no motive 
is given. If there is, the motives most often mentioned are: an expected increase in the 
efficiency and effectiveness of policy implementation, bringing the government closer 
to the citizens by putting policy implementation at arm's length, the desirability of 
self-regulation by, for example, charging interest groups with executive tasks, and 
execution of a task by independent experts.
Table 1.2. Motives of politicians to establish quangos in the Netherlands (N = 545)
Motive Number1
To increase efficiency 18%
Closer to the citizens 15%
Self-regulation by social groups 13%
Execution by experts 12%
Other motives2 12%
No motive mentioned 53%
Source: A lgemene Rekenkamer, 1995 (own calculations)
1 More than one motive can be mentioned
2 Other motives are, for example: no state interference is desired; continuation of a 
historically grown situation; affirmation of independency of executive agents
Similar motives are also found in, for example, the United Kingdom (Flinders, 1999a). 
Next to motives politicians themselves mention, a number of others are thought to 
play a role, such as the desire to gain additional political support (patronage, i.e. 
quangos are used to reward political supporters, e.g. by appointing them member of 
quango boards), to bypass other organizations or governments, to conceal the actual 
height of government expenditure, and to decrease the 'risk potential' of policy imple­
mentation for politicians by limiting ministerial responsibility (Hood, 1988; Hogwood, 
1995).
The motives and (implicit) assumptions underlying - and often legitimizing - 
politicians' preference for quangos are referred to as the practitioner theory (in Dutch: 
beleidstheorie, Hoogerwerf [1984]; Van de Graaf [1988]; Leeuw [1989]). Note that the 
practitioner theory is not a scientific theory, although politicians might use scientific 
theories and concepts to explain or justify their decisions.
As the lack of (explicit) justification in table 1.2 shows, it is questionable whether 
there is indeed a coherent set of ideas, a practitioner theory, underlying the creation of 
quangos. Analysis of the motives of Dutch politicians does show some trends though. 
The prevalence of certain motives has changed over time (cf. Van Leerdam, 1999). In
8 Here, data are used on so-called z elfstand ige bestuursorganen  (cf. public bodies in table 1.1) which were 
collected by the Netherlands Court of Audit (Algemene Rekenkamer, 1995).
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the 1950s 'self-regulation' and 'bringing the government closer to citizens' are 
mentioned most frequently, while in the 1970s and 1980s the efficiency and 
effectiveness motive predominated. This shift in the type of justification can perhaps 
be explained by the difference in the politicial and economic situations between those 
periods.
In the 1950s, Dutch society was highly pillarized (in Dutch: verzuild). Such a strong 
(vertical) segmentation of society was possible because cooperation between segments 
took only place at the top (Lijphart, 1968). The role of the government was limited, in 
favour of self-regulation and decentralization. The creation of quangos was legitimized 
accordingly, as the exemplary motives in boxes 1.2 and 1.3 show.9
In some cases, the initiative to establish a quango did not come from the govern­
ment but from citizens or interest groups (see the last example in box 1.3). In that 
case, private initiatives were given a legal basis without being incorporated fully into 
the government bureaucracy. This process is called 'hiving in' (in Dutch: 
verstatelijk ing, In 't Veld, 1995:10).
Child Welfare Council (1956)
Established as a quango to guarantee the participation of citizens within the legal 
district.
Social Security Bank (1956)
It is considered desirable to bring the implementation of social security policies 
close(r) to the people concerned.
(Source: Database Algemene Rekenkamer, 1995 [my translation, SvTJ
Box 1.2. Examples of motives of politicians for the establishment of quangos labellec 
as 'bringing policy implementation closer to the citizens'.
The opposite - 'hiving off' - is the placement of departmental units outside core the 
government bureaucracy. The creation of quangos by means of hiving off is usually 
motivated by a wish to separate politics and administration, reduce the interference by 
politicians in the daily operation process, and leave policy implementation to experts 
(see box 1.4).
This separation of policy and administration became very popular in the early 1980s, 
as part of a widespread public sector reform. Reform was triggered by economic 
decline, growing international competition, general dissatisfaction with public sector 
performance and a change in the political composition of several western govemments 
(Wright, 1994), including the Netherlands.
9 Not all exemplary motives for the establishment of quangos relate to the time period mentioned. This is 
caused by two methodological problems. First, a lack of data, because in 53% of the cases no motive was 
mentioned. And second, the listed date of establishment is not always the original date, due to mergers of 
many quangos in the 1980s (see also chapter 2).
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Dutch Order of Lawyers (1952)
Voluntary self-regulation by a group of professionals needs a legal basis to ensure 
that all lawyers will be bound by the same rules of conduct.
Bureau for Registration of Architects (1988)
The government should not support, financially nor organizationally, the execu­
tion of a legal arrangement which mainly serves the interests of suppliers and 
consumers of architects' services.
Foundation to Guarantee the Quality of Calfs (1990)
Businesses within the sector requested establishment of the quango in order to 
promote and guarantee the quality of meat and feed.
(Source: Database Algemene Rekenkamer 1995 [m y translation, SvT])
Box 1.3. Examples of motives of politicians for the establishment of quangos labellec 
as 'desirability of self-regulation for social groups'.
Fund to stimulate Dutch Cultural Broadcasting Productions (1988)
Aim is to improve a certain degree of autonomy for the board to undertake 
activities and to develop simple procedures for swift decision-making.
(Source: Database Algemene Rekenkamer, 1995 [my translation, SvTJ
Land and Registry Office (1994)
Establishment was considered necessary to ensure economic, efficient and 
continuous control without immediate political intervention.
(Source: Rapportage D oorlich tin g  Z elfstand ige B estuursorganen , 1997 [my translation, SvT])
Box 1.4. Examples of motives of politicians for the establishment of quangos labellec 
as 'separation of policy and administration'.
A New Public Management was developed (Dunleavy, 1994) which, in combination 
with the rising (neo-liberal) belief in the superiority of the market mechanism, resulted 
in the adoption by the public sector of market-type mechanisms, such as vouchers and 
internal markets (LeGrand & Bartlett, 1993), the creation of new public bodies and 
agencies to perform public tasks, and downsizing of the government through privatiza- 
tion and contracting-out (cf. Pollitt, 1999).10 In most countries quangos existed already 
but they were now re-discovered as instruments for public sector reform (Greve e t  al., 
1999), and a means to achieve more efficiency and effectiveness, as is demonstrated by 
the motives for establishment listed in box 1.5.
So, politicians' preference for quangos from the 1980s on stems from a belief in the 
superiority of the market. Compared to government bureaucracy, quangos are viewed
10 The Dutch public sector reform was labelled G rote E fficiën tie O peraties and was initiated by the first 
Lubbers administration in 1982.
Introduction 11
Hallmark of Platinum, Gold and Silver Inc. (1986)
A long-term economic profit is expected because a privatized organization will 
be able to use its available knowledge or expertise for other activitities besides 
certifications.
Fund for labourmarkets and training in government (1987)
Imitation of similar initiatives in the private sector that have played a stimula- 
ting and innovating role in the area of improvement of qualifications of 
individual employees, research and the educational infrastructure.
Inspection of Weights and Measures (1989)
More autonomy for the former departmental unit can improve economic mana­
gement, including the development of fees. This privatization is aimed at 
attaining budget cuts, a decrease in the size of government and an expansion of 
the market.
(Source: Database Algemene Rekenkamer, 1995 [my translation, SvTD
Box 1.5. Examples of motives of politicians for the establishment of quangos labellec 
as 'adoption of market-type mechanisms'.
as market-like, because they can own production rights. Their quasi-autonomy is 
expected to create incentives to perform more efficiently, for example, because they 
are allowed to retain surpluses, or have to compete over budgets with other 
organizations. Moreover, they operate at arm's length, which means away from 
meddling politicians and presumedly closer to the citizens (and the market). This is 
expected to lead to a more articulated demand by citizens and a more efficient match 
of supply and demand (Waldegrave, 1993). The possibility of competition between 
quangos or with other organizations is expected to rule out other potential in- 
efficiencies.
There are, however, several reasons to doubt the validity of the practitioner 
theory underlying the establishment of quangos in and after the 1980s. First, putting 
an organization at arm's length is not the same as getting closer to the citizens, nor 
does it equal operating in a market. Section 1.1 already discussed the problem of 
market failure in the case of collective goods. The free-rider problem, i.e. other 
organizations will not invest in collective goods, means that quangos usually have a 
monopoly. Citizens have no substitute providers (cf. Van Waarden, 1995). This 
situation is enforced by the legal monopoly that executive agents have on policy im- 
plementation.
Second, the establishment of quangos is, in itself, no guarantee for efficient and 
effective policy implementation. Several authors have stressed that efficiency 
sometimes seems to contradict other policy objectives such as equity, fairness, and 
responsiveness to needs of citizens (Wilson, 1989:131-132; LeGrand & Bartlett, 1993:13­
19). The presence of multiple and sometimes conflicting goals may obstruct efficient 
and effective policy implementation by any executive agent. Moreover, because of the 
lack of potential bankruptcy for public organizations and the disjunction between 
costs and revenues (i.e. the absent or unknown relation between taxes paid by citizens 
and the amount of goods and services received), there is a lack of incentives to
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perform efficiently (LeGrand, 1991). These problems are typical of the public sector 
and will not be overcome merely by establishing quangos.
Third, the establishment of quangos creates new problems. As pointed out earlier, 
executive agents may pursue their own goals rather than those of their principal 
(Downs,- 1965; Niskanen, 1975; North, 1981; Mueller, 1989, Varr den Doel & Van 
Velthoven, 1990; Dunleavy, 1991). To prevent inefficiency, the performance of 
quangos needs to be monitored or evaluated, regulators are appointed, and so on. In 
theory, this undermines the idea that less regulation is needed because quangos can 
operate more autonomously than government bureaucracy (cf. Van Waarden, 1995). In 
practice, studies on quangos in the UK and the Netherlands show a severe lack of 
accountability requirements imposed upon quangos (Weir & Hall, 1994; Hall & Weir, 
1996; Algemene Rekenkamer, 1995; see also chapter 2). Performance assessment is 
complicated by the aforementioned conflicting policy objectives and the absence of 
competitors to compare performance with. I shall return to these problems in 
subsection 3.3.4.
Finally, the claim of the practitioner theory that quangocratization will lead to 
more efficient and effective policy implementation has yet to be corroborated. Until 
recently, there has been little interest in quangos and their performance, both among 
politicians (hence perhaps the lack of accountability requirements; Leeuw, 1995) and 
academics. So far, there is no evidence that policy implementation by quangos is more 
efficient or effective than implementation by government bureaucracy (see, for 
example, Van Berkum & Van Dijkem, 1997; Ter Bogt, 1997). The next section 
provides an overview of the research on quangos that has been carried out already.
1.4. Previous research on quangos
In most western states, quangos have existed for a long time (Greve et a l 1999) but 
have not attracted much attention either from politicians or academics. While the 
public sector reform in the 1980s has been studied extensively (see, for example, the 
international comparative studies by Kickert [1997] and Pollitt & Bouckaert [2000], or 
Rainey's review of public management [1997]), the increase in the number of quangos 
has not been given much thought. Some studies carried out in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, compare the efficiency and/or effectiveness of public and private providers of 
public services, usually at a local or regional level. However, these studies confined 
themselves to contracting-out or privatization (see Mueller [1989: 262-265] and Weimer 
& Vining [1992:195-200] for reviews; and see Naschold [1996] and Boyne [1998] for a 
discussion). In the mid-1980s a few studies on public bodies were carried out. These 
studies gave an inventory of the number of public bodies in several western countries 
and some of their characteristics, such as the tasks they executed, the policy area in 
which they operated (WRR, 1983; Hood & Schuppert, 1988; Modeen & Rosas, 1988) 
and the motives underlying their establishment (Boxum, De Ridder & Scheltema, 
1989).
Still, it was not until the mid-1990s that the real interest in quangos was 
triggered, by the publication of some reports that questioned the use of quangos - 
mainly public bodies - and their accountability (see Algemene Rekenkamer [1995] on 
the Netherlands, and Weir & Hall [1994] and Hall & Weir [1996] on the United 
Kingdom). These reports revealed (i) the large number of quangos that existed, (ii) the
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large amount of money that was spent on them, (iii) the large amount of money spent 
by them, and (iv) the poor account they provided of their performance. The 
consequent political debate concentrated mainly on the accountability of public bodies. 
For example, in the Netherlands, politicians wanted to restore their control of public 
bodies {Herstel van  het prim aat, 1995), improve legislation and accountability re- 
quirements (Aanwijzingen v o o r  d e  regelgevin g, 1996; Rapportage D oorlichting Zelf­
standige Bestuursorganen, 1997) and limit the possibilities for commercial activities 
(Commissie Cohen, 1997). In the United Kingdom, the debate concentrated on the 
large scale appointment of former politicians on quango boards (the so-called ’sleaze' 
debate, investigated by the Nolan Committee).
The reports and following debate also triggered more interest in quangos among 
academics. Studies were undertaken to describe the new types of organizations that 
governments used to provide collective goods (Kicken, Mol & Sorber, 1992; Coops, 
1995). One of the most famous international examples is the study by Osborne and 
Gaebler, who list 36 different types of arrangements (1992:app.A). Other relevant 
studies are: OECD (1993), World Bank (1997), and Flinders and Smith (1999). In the 
UK, case studies were carried out on new bodies in the housing sector, education and 
the national health service (LeGrand & Bartlett, 1993; Pollitt, Birchall & Putman, 
1998). In the Netherlands the semi-privatization of public transport was studied 
(Groenendijk, 1998) and the provision of legal aid (Bulder, Van der Wal, Leeuw & 
Flap, 1997). Other researchers focussed on the legal aspects of the use of quangos 
(Boxum, 1997; Goorden, Den Boer & Buijn, 1997), their democratic accountability 
(Zijlstra, 1997; Gray [forthcoming]), the relationship between quangos and parent 
departments (Kickert et al., 1998), and the change in organizational culture of hived-off 
departmental units (Hakvoort & Veenswijk, 1997; 1998).
Even though academie interest in quangos is growing, the definition problem as 
discussed in section 1.2 continues to complicate comparative studies of different types 
of quangos, both within and between'xountries. And despite there now being more 
information on public bodies, privatization, public-private partnerships (PPP) and 
contracting-out, knowledge of voluntary organizations and agencies (cf. table 1.1) is 
still limited (but see Ministerie van Financiën [1998] and Next Steps R eview s in the 
UK). Moreover, attention is still focussed on the position of the government, i.e. on 
how it should deal with all these new organizations and relations. Little attention is 
paid to internal matters of quangos and their performance.
So far, researchers have used different theoretical approaches, mainly neo-institutional 
economics (see, for example, Ter Bogt [1994; 1997], Künneke [1992] on property 
rights, and Van Leerdam [1999] on transaction cost analysis). The application of neo- 
institutional economics to public bureaucracy offers the opportunity to explain why 
politicians prefer a certain type of organization - be it government bureaucracy or a 
quango - as executive agent charged with policy implementation, instead of leaving 
provision of goods and services to the market (March & Olson, 1983, 1984; Moe, 
1984; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Hendrikse, 1993; Ter Bogt, 1994, 1997; Douma & 
Schreuder, 1998; Bovenberg & Teulings, 1999).
The common focus in neo-institutional economics is on the efficiency of markets 
and organizations. For example, transaction cost analysis (Williamson, 1981, 1989, 
1995) posits that organizations are established when that is the best way to minimize
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transaction costs (i.e. the costs of seeking Information, bargaining and enforcing a 
contract). It is argued that if the production of a good requires very specific invest- 
ments (e.g. to procure specialist knowledge) it is more expensive - hence less efficient - 
in the market than in an organization. Assuming that quangos are more market-like 
than government bureaucracy, the application of transaction cost analysis to explain 
the establishment of quangos is an obvious choice.
Another example is principal agent theory (e.g., Pratt & Zeckhauser, 1991). The 
basic model of this theory is very simple. A (the principal) enters into a contract with 
B (the agent), which states that the agent will execute an order for the principal, for 
which the agent will receive a compensation. Problems can arise when the principal 
has no information on the performance of or the efforts made by the agent. 
Monitoring is required to determine whether the agent acts on the terms of the 
contract and should be rewarded accordingly. Two problems are discerned: 'adverse 
selection' (will the agent disclose full information ex an te on his performance?) and 
'moral hazard' (will the agent perform as agreed upon in the contract?). Principals will 
choose an agent in such a manner that the risk of these problems is minimized. 
Principal agent theory can therefore be applied to politicians' choice of an executive 
agent.
A third approach is property rights theory, which investigates the allocation of 
property rights, for example through contracts, to actors in order to regulate responsi- 
bilities and undo externalities (Coase theorem; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; North, 1981; 
Eggertson, 1990; Künneke, 1992; Hendrikse, 1993:46-50;). It is assumed that if an actor 
has the right to use, produce and sell a particular good, it will be produced in the 
most efficient manner, because the actor stands to gain from his own investments. 
However, as was mentioned earlier, in the case of collective goods rights cannot be 
assigned exclusively to one individual. Therefore, it was argued, the provision of such 
goods and the associated rights are taken over by the government (see section 1.1). 
Another application of property rights theory was touched upon in the definition of 
autonomy in terms of ownership of production rights (see section 1.2).
A specification of (neo-institutionalist) economics in the political realm is public 
choice theory (Mueller, 1989; 1997; Van den Doel & Van Velthoven, 1990; Dunleavy, 
1991, based on work originated by Downs [1965] and Niskanen [1975]). The principle 
of utility maximization is applied to politicians and bureaucrats in order to explain 
their behaviour, in particular in cases where it leads to inefficiencies in policy 
development and implementation, such as the oversupply of goods or services (cf. 
Breton & Wintrobe, 1982).
The most important common element underlying all these approaches is the 
rational actor model (also known as rational choice theory; Coleman, 1990; Linden- 
berg, 1983). Individuals are seen as self-interested actors whose rational behaviour is 
aimed at utility maximization, given their preferences and constraints. Thus far, most 
applications have concentrated on bureaucrats. However, the approaches can also be 
applied to quangocratization. Minimalize transaction or agency costs and ensure effi­
cient allocation of (production) rights can explain why politicians choose a particular 
type of executive agent, such as quangos. Moreover, principal agent theory can be used 
as well to explain the behaviour of an executive agent. Moral hazard and adverse 
selection are problems that occur in all organizations, including quangos. Therefore, it 
has been decided to use the rational actor model as the basic framework of this study
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(see chapter 3 for more details), taking elements from neo-institutional economics and 
public choice theory to answer the two main research questions posed in the next 
section.
1.5. Research questions and outline of this study
The previous sections have presented two interesting observations, which will be the 
leading topics of this study. First, it was argued that quangos are replacing government 
bureaucracy, and that quangocratization is seen as one of the most recent stages of 
state development in western countries (section 1.1). To investigate to which extern 
there indeed is such a trend, chapter 2 will describe quangocratization in the Nether­
lands between 1900 and 1993.
However, this study intends to go beyond description. It also seeks to explain the 
increase in the use of quangos. To ascertain the causes of quangocratization it is 
necessary to determine under which conditions politicians choose quangos as executive 
agent, rather than government bureaucracy. Therefore, the first research question of 
this study is:
RESEARCH QUESTION 1:
Under which conditions do politicians choose quangos as executive agents,
rather than governm en t bureaucracy, f o r  the implem entation o f  p o licies?
In this study, the practitioner theory as described in section 1.3 will not be used to 
explain quangocratization. It is not a scientific theory, but rather a legitimization by 
politicians of their actions. Moreover, the practitioner theory as described is merely 
my interpretation of the motives mentioned by politicians, and in more than half of 
the cases no motive whatsoever was mentioned (cf. table 1.2). It is therefore an 
incomplete theory. Finally, the primary focus of the practitioner theory is on (the ex- 
pected performance of) quangos rather than politicians themselves, which makes it less 
suitable to explain behaviour of politicians, the aim of this study. Based on these consi- 
derations, I have decided to construct a theory about politicians' choice for quangos as 
an executive agent, using the rational actor framework as mentioned before. Chapter 6 
will confront the results of this study with the practitioner theory.
The second interesting observation in this chapter concerns the claim of the 
practitioner theory that policy implementation by quangos is more efficient and 
effective than implementation by government bureaucracy. Section 1.3 already listed 
several doubts with regard to that claim, while the review in section 1.4 showed that 
we still know very little about quangos, in particular when it comes to their 
performance. Quango performance lies at the heart of the second research question:
RESEARCH QUESTION 2:
Under which conditions w ill p o licy  implem entation by quangos be m ore
efficien t and effect iv e than im plem entation by governm en t bureaucracy?
To find an answer to the two research questions specified, in chapter 3 a theoretical 
model will be given of (i) the choice of politicians for quangos and (ii) the
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performance of quangos. As stated before, the model will be based on the rational 
actor model, using concepts from neo-institutional economics and public choice theory 
(cf. section 1.4). From the model, hypotheses will be derived that are tested in chapters 
4 and 5 respectively, using a combination of quantitative research methods (regression 
analysis) and qualitative ones (case studies).
Chapter 6 summarizes the main findings of this study on the trends, causes and 
consequences of quangocratization. Results of the testing of the hypotheses are 
discussed, and confronted with the practitioner theory. But before that, we turn to 
chapter 2, which describes trends of quangocratization.
2. TRENDS
The purpose of this chapter is to give a description of quangocratization in the 
Netherlands.1 The main focus will be on public bodies (cf. table 1.1) at a national 
level, in particular the so-called zelfstandige bestuursorganen (ZBOs). Data were 
provided by the Netherlands Court of Audit (NCA), which carried out a survey 
among all ZBOs in 1993 (Algemene Rekenkamer, 1995).2
Information on other types of quangos or at lower levels of government is often 
incomplete or absent. Privatization has not occurred often in the Netherlands, partly 
because there have never been that many state-owned enterprises. Two examples are: 
the postal service (KPN) and the Dutch State Mines (DSM). Dutch agencies {agent­
schappen) have been established only after 1994. In 1998 there were 21 agencies 
assigned with, among others, the prison service, demographic records, meteorology, 
granting subsidies, and immigration {Miljoenennota 1999). No systematical collection of 
information has been carried out on quangocratization by provincial and local govern­
ments in the Netherlands.3
Some data are available on quangocratization in other countries, such as the 
United Kingdom (Weir & Hall, 1994; Hogwood, 1995; NAO, 1995; PERC, 1996; Hall 
& Weir, 1996; Flinders Sc Smith, 1999) and Denmark (Greve, 1996; 1999). 
Information on quangos in other countries, like Sweden, Finland, Australia and New 
Zealand, has been found (Hood & Schuppert, 1988; Modeen & Rosas, 1988; Wistrich, 
1996; 1999), but is less complete or outdated. References are made where appropriate/
Section 2.1 describes quangos, i.e. ZBOs, in the Netherlands. Attention is paid to 
their number (subsection 2.1.1), some of their characteristics (subsections 2.1.2 and
2.1.3) and the policy fields in which they operate (subsection 2.1.4). When available, 
information on other countries is used as a comparison. Section 2.2 investigates the 
accounts quangos give of their performance. Accountability requirements are studied 
in subsection 2.2.1, using the NCA survey. The content of the accounts given by 
quangos is studied in subsection 2.2.2. Data were provided by the accountancy and
1 Parts of this chapter were published before (Leeuw & Van Thiel, 1996; Leeuw, Van Thiel & Flap, 1997; 
Van Thiel, Leeuw & Flap, 1998; Leeuw & Van Thiel, 1999).
1 The NCA defines a ZBO as a public law organization, charged with the execution of a public task but 
without full ministerial accountability, or an organization based on private law but given the legal authority 
to fulfil a public task (Algemene Rekenkamer, 1995:8-9).
3 Van Tilborg (in: Coops, 1995) estimates that some 48% of Dutch local governments have considered 
privatization and/or establishing quangos to provide goods or services.
4 For quangos in other countries, extensive use was made of the results of the Quango-project of the 
Political Economy Research Centre (PERC) at the University of Sheffield in 1996 (see Flinders Sc Smith, 
1999). Additional international comparative information was collected during a two-month stay at PERC in 
1997, subsidized by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO).
18 Cbapter 2
consultancy firm Arthur Andersen (1995; 1996; 1997; 1998). Section 2.3 summarizes 
the findings on the trend of quangocratization in the Netherlands.
2.1. Quangocratization in the Netherlands
2.1.1. The number of quangos
In 1993, the NCA counted 545 quangos in the Netherlands, of which over 40% were 
established after 1980 (Algemene Rekenkamer, 1995).5 Figure 2.1 shows the rate of 
establishment.6 It is important to note that quangos are sometimes established as clus­
ters, i.e. more than one quango is charged with the same task. These quangos may 
operate in different regions. The NCA survey contains 23 clusters, which account for 
406 organizations, and 139 ’single’ organizations.
Figure 2.1 shows how often a decision was taken to establish (a cluster of) quangos, 
and the number of established organizations that resulted from these decisions. In the 
case of a cluster, one decision will have led to several quangos being established.7
Figure 2.1 shows that the number of quangos has increased over time, with 
spurts in the 1950s, the 1970s and the 1980s. The growth of the number of quangos in 
the 1950s and the 1970s are mainly caused by the establishment of clusters of quangos 
(e.g. social security). The increase in the 1980s is primarily the result of an increase in 
the number of single quangos. To put it differently, the number of decisions to 
establish quangos was largest in the 1980s.
Historical comparison
The NCA survey investigated only quangos that were in existence in 1993. The data 
are therefore left-censored. Quangos that were established but abolished again before 
1993 are not included, which makes it impossible to draw conclusions on the average 
life span of quangos.
A historical comparison was made between a study by the Scientific Council for 
Government Policy (SCGP) on almost 650 para-governmental bodies (WRR, 1983; cf. 
Van Waarden, 1987; 1988) and the NCA survey (limited to the time period 1900­
1980). The results are shown in figure 2.2. Because the SCGP uses a broader 
definition, the number of quangos in the two studies differs, with a 62.5% overlap 
(400 odd organizations).
5 The NCA asked departments to list all quangos present in the policy sector for which they are responsible 
in 1993. Immediately after publication, some departments discovered quangos that had been overlooked in 
the NCA survey. It is therefore possible that a small (insignificant) number of quangos has been left out.
6 In 1954 and 1979 large clusters of quangos were established leading to respectively 77 and 62 quangos 
being established in one year. As these numbers exceed the scale of figure 2.1 by far, they are not shown to 
their full extern but rounded off at 30 (the end of the scale). After 1993, 15 decisions were taken to establish 
new quangos, induding 2 clusters (Staatsalmanak, 1999). These new bodies are not included in this study.
7 A decision was operationalized as the passing of the law instigating the establishment of (a cluster of) 
quangos. In the NCA survey each cluster of quangos is represented by one organization. The date of 
establishment of a cluster is assumed to be the year in which the law was passed. It is conceivable, however, 
that some quangos in a cluster were established in another (later) year.
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Figure 2.1 Establishment of quangos in the Netherlands, 1900-1993 (Source: Algemene Rekenkamer, 1995 [own calculationsj.
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Of the approximately 245 non-overlapping number of organizations in the SCGP- 
study 75 are not public bodies but government sponsored enterprises or agencies, 
about 150 organizations have merged or transformed into other (clusters of) quangos8, 
and 20 odd organizations have ceased to exist, are inactive or were never established 
The ’mortality rate’ of quangos is thus estimated to be 3%. The average lifespan of 
these 20 organizations is some 30 years. So, only few quangos are abolished but their 
existence can be discontinued if they merge with other quangos. Still, most quangos 
have a long lifespan (cf. Kaufman, 1976). Apparently, quangos are ’here to stay’,
Comparison with bureaucratization
It seems logical to expect an increase in the number of quangos to coincide with a 
decrease in the size of goverment bureaucracy, particularly when departmental units 
are hived off. In fact, one of the objectives of public sector reform, which led to the 
establishment of large numbers of quangos, was to downsize government bureaucracy 
(cf. section 1.3). Figure 2.3 compares the trends in quangocratization and 
bureaucratization. Bureaucratization is indicated by the number of departmental units 
(taken from Carasso, Koopmans, Raadschelders & Voermans [1994], based on the 
Dutch State Directory), the number of civil servants in the national administration 
(taken from Van der Meer & Roborgh, 1993:69) and government expenditures (taken 
from CBS, 1998a, indexed for inflation, index 100=1990; CBS, 1998b).
Figure 2.3 shows that both quangocratization and bureaucratization have grown 
over time, which is probably the logical consequence of an expanding and increasingly 
’asymmetric’ society (see Coleman’s [1982] description of a society with an increasing 
number of corporate actors). It was not until the 1980s that the number of 
departmental units decreased, but without a decline in the number of civil servants or 
government expenditures occurring as well. Therefore, there is no immediate evidence 
to support the claim that quangocratization has led to a substantial decrease in the size 
of government bureaucracy as was assumed by the practitioner theory described in 
section 1.3.
International comparison of the number of quangos
Most data on quangos in other countries used here relate to the United Kingdom. 
There is little agreement among British researchers on the definition of quangos. 
Hogwood (1995) and the British National Audit Office (NAO, 1995) use a very 
restricted definition. They list only public bodies, in particular executive NDPBs, as 
quangos, adding up to a total of 228 in 1995. Researchers of the Political Economy 
Research Centre (PERC, 1996) use a broader definition, which includes public bodies, 
contract agencies and some privatized organizations. They list 904 public bodies, 
comprising of 607 NDPBs (283 advisory; 322 executive; 2 others), 107 Next Steps 
agencies, 72 tribunals, and 118 other organizations.
8 Because the NCA survey does not contain information on the origin of quangos, it cannot be determined 
how many quangos in the 1980s spurt (see figure 2.1) were newly established or were the results of mergers 
of existing quangos.
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Figure 2.3. Bureaucracy and quangocracy in the Netherlands, 1900-1990. (Sources: Carasso et al., 1994; Algemene Rekenkamer, 1995 [own calcu-
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Figure 2.2. Dutch Quangos, 1900-1980 (Sources: WRR, 1983 [own calculations]; Algemene Rekenkamer, 1995 [own calculations]).
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The broadest definition is used by Hall and Weir (1996). Besides public bodies 
(NDPBs), they include local quangos into their count, as well as privatized organiza­
tions in the National Health Service, grant maintained schools, and housing associa- 
tions. Hall and Weir’s count is displayed in table 2.1. They estimate that the number 
of quangos will increase to over 7,000 within a few years (see also Weir & Hall, 1994).
Table 2.1. The number of quangos in the United Kingdom in 1994 and 1996.
1994 1996
Executive Non-Departmental Public Bodies 358 309
National Health Service Bodies 629 788
Advisory Non-Departmental Public Bodies 829 674
Other organizations, such as grant maintained schools, 
police authorities and housing associations
4,534 4,653
Total quango count 6,350 6,424
Source: Hall and Weir (1996:5)
Data on the number of quangos in other countries are scarcer. Most counts are 
estimates only, and are often incomplete because due to lack of information. For 
example, Greve (1996; 1999), reporting on Danish quangos, finds some 4,189 
organizations (contract agencies, public bodies, state-owned enterprises). There is nó 
information, however, on the number of voluntary and private organizations charged 
with public tasks. Rosas and Suksi (1988; 1994) report some 40 quangos in Finland 
(public bodies and state-owned enterprises), using a strictly legal definition. The 
number of quangos in Sweden is not reported in a consistent manner. In the 1980s, 
there existed approximately 300 quangos at national level (public bodies, voluntary 
organizations and state-owned enterprises; Tarschys, 1988). There are, however, many 
more local quangos for which no estimate is given. Wistrich (1996; 1999) found some 
3,115 quangos in the New Zealand Official Yearbook (state-owned enterprises, 
advisory quangos and public bodies [Crown entitiesj. She does not provide an 
estimate of the number of local quangos, however.
2.1.2. Characteristics of quangos
Quangos are characterized by a large diversity in their legal basis, tasks, way of finan- 
cing, et cetera. Table 2.2 gives some Dutch examples, taken from the NCA survey.
Legal basis
Most quangos (on average 90%) are established by law, although this is more often the 
case for quangos based on public law than private law (e.g. foundations). More than 
half of the Dutch quangos (55%) are public law organizations. The law underlying the 
establishment of a quango, referred to as the statute in this study, is often incomplete. 
In one third of the cases (35%) no goal has been formulated; in most cases (53%) no
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Table 2.2. Random examples of quangos (public bodies) at national level in the 
Netherlands in 1993.
Quango Task Legal
structure
Establis- 
hed in
Policy
sector
Bureaus for legal aid Advise Private law 1974 Justice
General Pension Fund for 
Civil servants1
Paying
benefits
Public law 1922 Home
Office
State Examinations Commit- 
tees
Quality
judgement
Public law 1971 Education
The Netherlands Central 
Bank
Super­
vision
Private law 1814 Finances
Bureau for registration 
of architects
Registra­
tion
Private law 1988 Housing
Council for Air traffic Research Public law 1993 Infra-
structure
Chambers of Commerce Advise/co- 
ordination
Public law 1852 Economics
Chamber for Fishing Licensing Public law 1955 Agri-
culture
Social Economic Council Making
regulations
Public law 1950 Social
affairs
Central Organ for Health 
Service fees
Decision-
making
Public law 1982 Welfare
(Health)
Service for Radio and 
Television Licence Fees
Collection 
of fees
Private law 1941 Welfare
(Culture)
1 The General Pension Fund was privatized in 1996 
Source: Algemene Rekenkamer (1995)
motive for the establishment is mentioned; and in 16% of the cases financing has not 
been stipulated {source-. Algemene Rekenkamer, 1995 [own calculations
Tasks
Quangos are charged with different tasks, ranging from supervision to quasi-judicature 
(categorized by the NCA). Figure 2.4 shows that the most common tasks of quangos 
are: quasi-judicature (21.7%), judging quality (18.5%), paying benefits (17.2%) and 
supervision (13.2%). Historically, quangos have been charged most often with the last 
three tasks, while other tasks such as making regulations, registration, quasi-judicature 
and advice became popular only after the 1950s.
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Ways offvnancing
Quangos can be financed either by the state (60%) or by levying (40%). In the latter 
case, tariffs can be set by a minister (28%) or by the quango (12%). The NCA survey 
lists only budgets from quangos that are financed by the state (see also subsection
2.1.3).
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Make regulations 
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Supervision
0 20 40 60 80 1 00 120
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Figure 2.4. Tasks of quangos at national level in the Netherlands in 1993 {Source-. 
Algemene Rekenkamer, 1995 [own calculations]).
International comparison of characteristics of quangos
Information on characteristics of quangos in other countries is limited, but most 
studies provide some examples of types of organizations concerned. Some British 
examples were already given in table 2.1. Examples of NDPBs in the UK are: the 
Health and Safety Commission, Further Eucation Funding Council, police authorities, 
Arts Council, several museums and the Medical Research Council (taken from: NAO, 
1995).
Greve (1996; 1999) gives some examples from Denmark, such as the National Bank, 
Copenhagen Airport, the patent office and high schools. In Denmark, quangos are 
found most often in the sectors of social welfare, health, education, culture and 
transport (Christensen, 1988). Examples of Finnish quangos are the broadcasting com- 
pany and the social insurance institution (Rosas & Suksi, 1994). Social security, indus- 
try and trade, general administration, and agriculture and forestry are the main fields 
in which Finnish quangos operate (Rosas & Suksi, 1988). In Sweden, most quangos are 
found in the sectors of labour, social affairs, industry, telecommunication, education 
and culture. The regional forestry boards are considered quangos, as is the Swedish bar 
association and the broadcasting company (Petren, 1988).
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Wistrich (1996; 1999), reporting on New Zealand, mentions the postal service, 
school boards and the Crown health enterprises as examples. Most quangos are found 
in the fields of education (almost 90%), health and business development. Next to 
tasks such as issuing grants or subsidies, regulation and quasi-judicature, quangos in 
New Zealand are also charged with policy development and advisory tasks (e.g., com- 
mittee on disarmament and arms control). This is relatively unique, as most govern- 
ments use quangos for policy implementation purposes only.
2.1.3. Budget and number of employees
In the NCA survey, information on budgets and the number of employees of quangos 
is limited. Budgets are listed only if quangos are financed by the state (60% of all 
cases). Seconded civil servants from the parent department are not listed as employees 
(30%). Despite these limitations, the NCA has managed to draw a number of 
conclusions. In 1992, in the Netherlands approximately 130,000 people were employed 
by quangos and 120,000 by government departments. In the same year, almost NLG 
38 billion9 was spent on  quangos by the central government, 18% of the total 
government expenditures in 1992. About NLG 160 billion was spent by quangos in 
1992 (NLG 126 billion on social security and health insurance). Quango revenues 
include NLG 38 billion from the State Budget and NLG 122 billion from fees and 
levying (Algemene Rekenkamer, 1995:15; cf. Algemene Rekenkamer, 1999). With the 
information in the NCA survey it remains impossible, however, to distinguish 
between expenditures on running costs (e.g. salaries and equipement) and programme 
costs (the costs of policy implementation, e.g. total of paid benefits).
International comparison of the number of employees and budgets
Most international studies give some estimates of the numbers of employees of certain 
types of quangos. For example, in the United Kingdom 107,000 employees of 
executive NDPBs were counted (Flinders, 1999b). In Finland the number of 
employees in public bodies is estimated as 115,000 (Rosas & Suksi, 1988), and in 
Sweden as 390,00 (Pierre, 1995). Other studies report how the number of civil 
servants has decreased through the hiving off of units. For example, in New Zealand a 
decrease of 50% in the number of civil servants is reported (Boston, 1995). In the 
United Kingdom, nowadays approximately 75% of civil servants works in the 123 
contract agencies that have been created since 1988 [Next Steps R eview  mentions 69% 
in 1995J.
There is much less information on budgets of quangos in other countries, with 
the exception of the United Kingdom. In 1993, the British government claimed to 
spend only £12 billion10 on quangos. Weir and Hall (1994), however, estimate that 
approximately £48 billion was spent on quangos, which amounts to almost a third of 
total government expenditures. Table 2.3 summarizes Hall and Weir’s findings up to 
1995.
Since the Conservatives came into office in 1978, quango related expenses have
9 NLG 1 equals 0.45 Euro. 1 Euro equals NLG 2.20.
10 £ 1 equals approximately 0.66 Euro. 1 Euro equals £ 1.50.
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Table 2.3. Expenditures by quangos in the United Kingdom, 1978-1995 in £million
1978
1979
1984
1985
1989
1990
1995
1995
Executive quangos 17,940 12,710 14,870 20,840
National Health Service bodies 22,580 27,900 24,260 33,100
Other quangos 1,120 1,180 1,109 6,462
Total 41,640 41,790 40,239 60,402
Source: Hall & Weir (1996:7)
increased by almost 45%. The British NAO (1995) found similar figures in 1993-1994. 
Expenditures amounted to £14,9 billion on executive NDPBs quangos and £37 billion 
on other bodies (health bodies, education, housing associations).
2.1.4. Policy sectors
Quangos are found in all policy sectors.11 However, there are large differences 
between policy sectors, regarding the number of quangos (figure 2.5) and the rate of 
establishment of quangos over time (figure 2.6).
Most quangos are found in the policy sectors of social affairs, justice, agriculture, 
welfare, housing and planning, and education, whereas defence and foreign affairs have 
only one quango each (see figure 2.5). The remainder of this section will deal only 
with policy sectors in which more than 10 quangos operate.
Figure 2.6 shows the rate of establishment of quangos for policy fields with more than 
10 quangos in 1993. In some fields, such as infrastructure and agriculture, a relatively 
stable pattern is seen, while in other fields, such as social affairs and housing and 
planning, quangos are established in spurts. In the 1950s and the 1970s such spurts 
usually concern clusters of quangos (cf. subsection 2.1.1).
Besides the rate of establishment of quangos in the different policy fields, there 
are more differences, for example, in the tasks of quangos, their legal basis, the way 
they are financed, and the motives underlying their establishment. Figure 2.7 shows 
the distribution of quangos with the four most frequent tasks, divided along the 
policy fields in which they operate.
In some fields (agriculture, welfare) a large variety of tasks is carried out by 
quangos, whereas in others (education, housing) quangos seem to be more specialized.
11 Policy sectors are operationalized as the parent department responsible for a certain field. Note that 
quangos are not hierarchically related to the parent department. This operationalization is not entirely 
reliable, because of rearrangements within the departmental structures in the past. Quangos now registered 
with department A m ay have been established by department B. The NCA survey is based on the 
departmental struaure of 1993. In 1994, two policy fields (sports and culture) were integrated with other 
departments.
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Figure 2.5. The number of quangos in policy sectors in the Netherlands in 1993. 
{Source-, Algemene Rekenkamer, 1995 [own calculations])
In some policy sectors (housing and planning) most quangos are based on public law; 
in some (economics) private law is most common; whereas in others (justice, 
education) there is no prefered legal basis. A comparable situation is found with 
respect to the financing of quangos; in policy fields such as justice, education, 
agriculture and housing and planning almost all quangos are financed by the state, 
whereas in fields such as social affairs and economics quangos are mostly financed by 
means of levying or imposing tariffs. Welfare is the only policy field with no apparent 
preferred way of financing.
To sum up, there are differences between policy sectors with regard to 
quangocratization. Omitting the sectors of foreign affairs and defence (only one 
quango each), there appear to be two patterns. On the one hand, there are policy 
sectors in which quangos are established to perform a specific task, such as justice, 
housing and planning, and education. These quangos are typically established in large 
numbers at the same time, and often based on public law, with the exception of 
education. The major motive for establishment of these quangos is efficiency.
On the other hand, there are policy sectors in which quangos are charged with 
all kinds of tasks. Examples are agriculture, economics, social affairs, welfare and 
infrastructure. Most of these quangos are based on private law (except in the field of 
social affairs) and their establishment is based on motives like increasing self-control 
and getting closer to the citizens (see also table 1.2). The quangos are established in 
small numbers at stable intervals, except in the case of social affairs.
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International comparison of quangos in different policy sectors
Subsection 2.1.2 already shed some light on the policy sectors in which quangos 
operate in the UK, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and New Zealand, and listed some of 
the tasks with which they are charged. Most reports do not offer more information 
than that. Again, the British reports are the most detailed but also very divided about 
what should be included as a quango. Moreover, apart from the definition problems, 
not all departments are listed (NAO, 1995; Hall & Weir, 1996; PERC, 1996). Using a 
restricted definition, it can be said that the most executive NDPBs are found in the 
policy sectors headed by the Scottish Office, followed by the Department of National 
Heritage (e.g. museums), the Department of Environment, and the Welsh Office. 
There is no agreement on the number of quangos in the fields of defence and health.
2.2. Accounts of quango performance
Section 2.1 showed what kind of organizations quangos are. Now we turn to what 
quangos do. The actual performance of two cases will be described in chapter 5. Here, 
I shall focus on the accounts that quangos (have to) provide of their performance. 
Accountability requirements are discussed in subsection 2.2.1, while subsection 2.2.2 
deals with the quality and contents of the accounts that quangos give of their 
performance.
2.2.1. Accountability requirements
There are two reasons why quangos should account for their performance. First, a 
large amount of public funds is spent on and by quangos (see subsection 2.1.3). 
Quangos are accountable for the way in which these budgets are spent and the results 
to which this leads. Second, ministers remain responsible for policies even if the 
implementation is done by quangos. To fulfil his ministerial responsibility, a minister 
needs information on the performance of quangos and therefore imposes 
accountability requirements on them.
Accountability has two dimensions: scrutiny and openness to the public (cf. Weir 
& Hall, 1994). Scrutiny means that external control or evaluation is possible, that is, 
quangos provide (written) information that can be checked by others such as Members 
of Parliament, audit offices, or the Ombudsman. Openness to the public is achieved if 
when actions of quangos are transparent, for example, if board meetings are held in 
public, or if citizens have opportunities to influence the actions through, for instance, 
the use of a complaints procedure. Table 2.4 shows which accountability requirements 
are imposed on Dutch quangos and their compliance with these demands, i.e. whether 
the required information is indeed provided.
As most quangos (75%) are subject to the Open Government Code of Practice (in 
Dutch: Wet Openbaarheid van Bestuur), scrutiny is usually possible by, for example, 
the Ombudsman. However, almost 28% of Dutch quangos are not required to publish 
an annual report, which can be regarded as a minimal level of accountability. In fact, 
in 18% of the cases no requirements have been made at all to ensure that quangos 
provide information about their performance. In 54% of the cases the information
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Table 2.4. The percentage of Dutch quangos on which accountability requirements 
are imposed, 1993 (N = 545).
Requirements Stipulated in 
statutes
Has to be sent 
to department
Present at 
department
Annual report 72.3% 62.6% 59.6%
Annual plan - 12.1% 17.4%
Annual account 67.2% 49.4% 55.6%
Audited annual account 45.3% 36.5% 54.7%
Budget - 44.2% 44.4%
Evaluation report 6.2% 5.0% 42.0%
Performance data 
Board:
25.5% 24.4% 62.4%
- appointment procedure 93.2% - -
- reimbursement - 41.3% 41.3%
- public meetings 44.0% n.a. n.a.
Complaints procedure 19.8% - 30.4%1
Subject to open government 
code of practice
75.0% n.a. n.a.
1 from National Ombudsman survey (own - No information available
calculations): N=322 n.a. Not applicable
Source: Algemene Rekenkamer (1995 [own calculations])
given is insufficiënt, according to the NCA (Algemene Rekenkamer, 1995:53-54).12
As far as openness to the public is concerned, in most cases (56% and over 80% 
respectively) public meetings and complaint procedures are not statutory 
requirements. In 1994, it was determined that all quangos at national level are subject 
to the General Civil Law (in Dutch: A lgemene Wet Bestuursrecht), which offers citizens 
possibilities to settle differences with (public) organizations. However, this does not 
imply that quangos have a formal complaint procedure. According to table 2.4, only 
19.8% of the quangos has to have such a procedure.
Data from a small survey among ZBOs, carried out in 1993 by the National Ombuds­
man (NOM), confirm that quangos, in particular those in the policy sectors of 
education, housing and planning, infrastructure, and agriculture have little concern for 
their clients (own calculations). The NOM survey covered 322 quangos, and although
12 After the publication of the NCA survey, a political debate was launched on how to restore control of 
quangos by politicians, which resulted in a series of political measures and studies to improve accountability 
(cf. chapter 1). I shall return to this matter in chapter 6.
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over 75% stated that they had to comply with general legal procedures in case of 
complaints, in only 30.4% of the cases a formal complaints procedure existed.13 The 
number of reported complaints is extremely low. 50% of the quangos in the NOM 
survey reported that they had had only 1 complaint in every 1,000 contacts with 
citizens. About 20% of the quangos reported 1 complaint in every 100 contacts. 
However, as most quangos have no formal complaint procedure, they do not keep a 
record of the number of complaints.
According to table 2.4, the compliance of quangos with accountability require­
ments is good. Quangos provide most of the information required and in some cases 
even more, often in the form of evaluation reports and performance data.
On the basis of the information in the NCA survey on accountability, an accounta­
bility scale has been constructed (7 items, Cronbach’s alpha .77) ranging from 0 (=no 
requirements) to 1 (= all requirements). Items included are:
1. providing information; indicated by the requirement to publish an annual report 
and an annual account (two items);
2. subject to audit or scrutiny; indicated by the requirement to have the annual 
account audited by an accountant, the minister’s right to make general inquiries, 
and the minister’s right to act on neglect by the quango (three items);
3. openness to the public; indicated by the requirements to hold public meetings 
and to have a procedure for the appointment of board members (two items).
Analysis with the scale confirms the NCA conclusion that in almost half of the cases 
(47%) no accountability requirements are imposed.14 In quangos with accountability 
requirements the average score is 0.63, indicating that 4.5 out of the seven 
requirements are imposed (standard deviation .27, N = 289). Figure 2.8 shows that 
accountability recently established quangos are less often subject to accountability 
requirements. However, if accountability requirements are imposed, the number is on 
average higher.
There is large variation between quangos in accountability requirements they 
have to meet. Figure 2.9 describes the accountability scale score of quangos with the 
most frequent tasks and of quangos in policy fields with more than 30 quangos.
It shows that some quangos have to meet many requirements (e.g. quangos 
charged with registration, and quangos active in the policy fields of education and eco- 
nomics), whereas others face fewer requirements (e.g. quangos charged with quasi-judi- 
cature, and quangos in the fields of welfare and justice). Furthermore, quangos based 
on private law have to meet more requirements (75%) than those based on public law 
(35%). Perhaps because public law quangos have to meet more regulations already. 
There are no differences in the accountability of quangos if they are divided into 
groups based on the motive(s) for their establishment, or the way they are financed.
15 The sample in the NOM survey (unpublished) is not really representative. 59% of the quangos in the 
NCA survey were studied in the NOM survey. Quangos more concerned with accountability are overre- 
presented, as indicated by the high number of organizations that publish annual reports (84% in NOM 
survey, almost 60% in NCA survey). Moreover, quangos in the policy sectors of justice, home office and 
finances were under-represented.
14 The NCA survey includes a variable compliance of quangos with minimal accountability requirements, 
according to NCA standards (correlation with scale: r = .42, p<.001).
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International comparison of the accountability of quangos
The accountability of quangos is debated in most western countries (cf. Greve, 1999; 
Gray [forthcoming]), yet little empirical research has been done on the subject, except 
in the UK. Hall and Weir (1996) studied the democratie accountability of British 
quangos. Their results - displayed in table 2.5 - show that, compared to Dutch 
quangos, British NDPBs have to meet fewer accountability requirements (cf. table 
2.4). Table 2.5 shows, for example, that annual reports and annual accounts are 
required in respectively 62% and 74% of the cases (Dutch quangos, 72% and 67%). 
The requirement to hold public meetings is made less often in the United Kingdom 
(3% of the cases) than in the Netherlands (44%).
Table 2.5. Accountability of executive NDPBs in the United Kingdom, 1994-1996.
1994
(N=358)
1996 
(N = 309)
Subject to scrutiny by Ombudsman 35% 42%
Subject to full public audit 53% 80%
Required to observe Open Government 
Code of Practice
35% 63%
Required to publish annual reports 56% 62%
Required to publish annual accounts 53% 74%
Required to hold public meetings 0.5% 3%
Source: Hall and Weir (1996:10)
2.2.2. Performance indicators
Imposing accountability requirements upon quangos does not in itself guarantee that 
quangos will provide a full and adequate account of their performance (let alone of the 
quality of their performance). This raises the question to which extern the provided 
information gives a good insight into quango performance.
In this section I shall try to answer this question by exploring a data base consis- 
ting of evaluations of 74 annual reports published by 47 Dutch quangos between 1994 
and 1997. These data were provided by the accountancy and consultancy firm Arthur 
Andersen (1995; 1996; 1997; 1998). Since 1995, this firm has held contests among 
Dutch public organizations, such as ZBOs, agencies, water boards and local govern- 
ments, in writing the best annual report of the previous year. Only the data on ZBOs 
will be used here, which comprise on average 30% of the total number of participants 
(21 in 1995 [37 participants in total]; 14 in 1996 [47 participants]; 19 in 1997 [89
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participants]; and 20 in 1998 [89 participants]).15 Some examples of participating 
ZBOs are: the student loan company (winner in 1996), the Social Security Bank 
(winner in 1997), regional police authorities (one of them was winner in 1998), several 
public universities, the service for radio and televisions licence fees, the registry of real 
property, several chambers of commerce, and some art funds.
A jury evaluated the annual reports on the presence of 139 items in 6 main 
categories: (1) basic information such as address, board composition, and 
organizational structure; (2) goals, i.e. objectives, mission, vision, strategy, and long 
term expectations; (3) management, i.e. personnel, computerization, maintenance, and 
environmental care; (4) performance indicators of input, output, productivity, effects 
and quality of production; (5) finances; and (6) user’s comfort of the report (e.g., 
layout). The presence of each of these items was awarded a certain number of points. 
The organization with the highest number of points was declared winner of the 
contest. Table 2.6 summarizes some of the results, in particular of the performance in­
dicators. It is important to keep in mind that the evaluation concerns only the 
presen ce of items and not their content or quality.
The categories basic information and mangerial matters are reported on in all annual 
reports. Financial arrangements and budgets are given in less than half of the annual 
reports (separate annual accounts were not evaluated). Most quangos have formulated 
goals (77%), a mission and/or a strategy. However, there is usually no indication with 
which means these objectives are going to be achieved (Arthur Andersen, 1998:20-21). 
Performance indicators are mentioned with respect to input (89%), output (98%), 
quality (66%) and productivity (60%) in most reports and more often in recent years. 
Norms are seldom set to determine success or failure (maximum 20% of reports). Nor 
has information been provided to evaluate performance over time.
Table 2.6 shows some progress on a number of items. For example, currently, 
both ’effects of performance’ and 'quality care’ are discussed in over half of the 
reports (52% and 66% respectively). Cost prices are mentioned in 28% of the reports, 
which is two times as often as in 1995, when the first contest was held. It is not 
inconceivable that these improvements are partly a result of the contest itself. The 
evaluation of (consecutive) annual reports provide organizations with guidelines on 
how to produce a good annual report. However, the average score of organizations is 
still low. Between 1995 and 1998, the best annual report by a ZBO was rewarded a
7.1, on a scale from 1 to 10. The overall average was 4.5 (standard deviation 1.4). It 
must be recognized, though, that in general quangos score comparatively high (Poot, 
Te Loo & Hengeveld, 1999).
To conclude, quangos that report on their performance tend to report mainly on 
management issues and performance indicators, but hardly ever connect these 
indicators to objectives and corporate strategy. Also, performance is not compared 
with pre-set norms. Nor is it evaluated over time, or compared with the performance
15 Participants were classified (by me) as a quango when the State Directory listed them as a ZBO. 
Representativeness of the data is fairly good, although the voluntary participation implies some self- 
selection. Results are summarized to ensure that they cannot be traced back to individual organizations.
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Table 2.6. Evalution of quangos’ annual reports, The Netherlands 1994-1997.
Items Present in percentage of quangos’ annual reports
All
N -74
1995
N -20
1996
N -14
1997 
N= 19
1998 
N = 20
Goals 77.0 66.7 92.9 57.9 95.0
Input indicators 89.2 85.7 85.7 94.7 90.0
Input norms 20.3 0.0 14.3 26.3 40.0
Output indicators 98.6 95.2 100.0 94.7 100.0
Output norms 20.3 4.8 28.6 15.8 35.0
Cost prices 28.4 14.3 57.1 26.3 25.0
Productivity indicators 60.5 19.0 28.6 63.2 50.0
Productivity norms 13.5 0.0 0.0 21.1 30.0
Effects of performance 52.7 47.6 64.3 52.6 60.0
Side effects 17.6 19.0 28.6 26.3 0.0
Quality care 66.2 47.6 50.0 84.2 80.0
Quality indicators 29.7 14.3 21.4 52.6 30.0
Quality norms 14.9 0.0 7.1 31.6 10.0
Budget 47.3 28.6 50.0 68.4 45.0
Source: Arthur Andersen (1995; 1996; 1997; 1998 [own calculations])
of other organizations. Some improvement has been made, but there is still much 
information lacking.
2.3. Summary
This chapter described the establishment of quangos in the Netherlands. Three 
observations were made. First, the number of quangos in the second half of the 
twentieth century has increased strongly. This trend substantiates the claim made in 
chapter 1 that a process of quangocratization is taking place. It should be noted, 
however, that the growth has occured in spurts in the 1950s, the 1970s and the 1980s. 
Quangos are seldom abolished (3%), although one out of five merges with or transfor- 
ms into other quangos. Since 1993, a few new quangos have been established, which 
makes the current total some 600.
In 1993 there were more ’quangocrats’ than bureaucrats (i.e. civil servants at 
national level). According to the NCA survey, quangocrats spent almost one fifth of 
the total State Budget. So far, however, quangocratization has not led to a significant
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decrease in the size of government bureaucracy.
Not only has quangocracy increased, there is also an ever greater diversity among 
quangos with respect to their tasks and legal forms. This second trend is also evident 
when distinguishing between policy sectors. Quangos are found most often in the 
fields of social affairs, justice, agriculture, housing, welfare, education, economics and 
infrastructure. In the fields of defence and foreign affairs only one quango was present.
• Differences were also found in the growth and use of quangos. Two patterns 
were identified. In the policy fields of agriculture, economics, social affairs, welfare 
and infrastructure, quangos are established in small numbers at regular intervals, albeit 
for different motives. They are charged with different tasks and given different legal 
forms. The use of quangos in these sectors does not seem to be limited to specific 
purposes, as opposed to quangos in the fields of justice, housing and education. Here, 
quangos are established in spurts. They handle specific tasks and their establishment is 
generally motivated by the desire to increase efficiency.
Third, this chapter showed that the knowledge of what quangos actually do is 
limited. Not all quangos (have to) report on their performance. In fact, it was shown 
that recently established quangos less often have to comply with accountability re­
quirements, but if they have to, with far more requirements. The political debate that 
was triggered by the publication of the NCA survey led to a number of measures 
being taken to increase the accountability of quangos (see also chapters 1 and 6).
However, even if quangos have to account for their performance, performance 
assessment remains problematic. The evaluation of annual reports shows that the 
reported information is inadequate in several respects - which makes it hard to 
determine whether performance is adequate. The information in annual reports is 
restricted to listing input and output indicators. Further analysis is not possible 
because no norms are set for input, output, productivity and the quality of production 
(see also table 2.6).
Possible implications of these findings will be discussed in the next chapters. Chapter
3 makes a beginning by offering an explanation for the increase in the number of 
quangos. Also, the consequences of quangocratization in terms of quango performance 
will be discussed.
3. THEORY
After the descriptive part of this study we now turn to the explanatory part.' In 
chapter 1 two questions were raised, one about the causes and one about the conse­
quences of quangocratization: (i) under which conditions do politicians choose quangos as 
executive agents, rather tban government bureaucracy, for the implementation o f policies, 
and (ii) under which conditions will policy implementation by quangos be more efficient 
and effective than implementation by government bureaucracy? This chapter will give a 
theoretical answer to both questions. The basic ingredients for these answers were 
specified in section 1.4; a rational actor2 model, with elements of neo-institutional 
economics and public choice theory. The proposed explanation will be further inves- 
tigated in chapters 4 and 5.
Section 3.1 describes some important theoretical premises of the model presented 
in this chapter. The next two sections deal with one research question each. Section
3.2 discusses conditions under which politicians are expected to prefer quangos to 
bureaucracy. Section 3.3 specifies conditions that are expected to influence the (in-)- 
efficiency of policy implementation by quangos. Section 3.4 suggests some possible 
extensions of the model. Section 3.5 summarizes the chapter by listing all hypotheses 
derived in sections 3.2 and 3.3.
3.1. Premises
Three premises are fundamental to the proposed explanation of quangocratization. The 
first premise is that macro phenomena can be explained by using certain assumptions 
about the behaviour of individuals and the conditions or constraints under which they 
act (methodological individualism). In the problem situation at hand, two actors will 
be distinghuished, who are both considered key actors: (i) the legislature and (ü) the 
executive agent. The behaviour of these corporate actors is the aggregated behaviour of 
individuals. O n the basis of certain assumptions about the behaviour of individuals, 
the macro behaviour of the two corporate actors will be predicted or explained (Cole- 
man, 1990:541).3 Of course, this is a strong simplification, which does not do justice to 
the empirical complexity of the problem. Moreover, in reality other actors, such as
1 Parts of this chapter were published earlier in Van Thiel, Leeuw, Siegers Sc Flap (1999).
2 'Actor' can refer to  individuals, groups of individuals or organizations. In this study, individual actors will 
be referred to as 'he'.
3 This approach is supported by Scharpf, who - concerning the application of methodological individualism 
to  political processes - said that "[i]n the politicial process [...] the most relevant actors are typically acting in 
the interest, and from the perspective, of larger units, rather than for themselves. This allows us to  simplify 
analysis by treating a limited num ber of large units as composite (i.e., aggregate, collective, or corporate) 
actors with relatively cohesive action orientations ..." (1997:12).
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interest groups and civil servants, will play an important role in the process of 
quangocratization as well.4 Therefore, the theoretical model in this chapter is only a 
first step towards an explanation of quangocratization. O n the basis of this study new, 
more realistic and more complex elements can be added to the model (method of de- 
creasing abstraction; Lindenberg, 1992). In section 3.4 some possible extensions of the 
model, such as the incorporation of other actors, will be discussed.
The second premise is that the behaviour of individuals is rational, i.e. they pursue 
goals. By achieving goals in the most efficient way, actors can maximize their expected 
utility. According to the social production function approach - based on work origina- 
ted by Adam Smith - the two universal goals for all individuals are physical well-being 
and social approval (see, for example, Lindenberg & Frey 1993). These universal goals 
are reached by way of intermediary, or instrumental, goals. For example, physical 
well-being is produced by comfort (i.e. the fulfilment of primary needs such as hunger 
and sleep) and stimulation. Social approval is produced by status, affect5 and beha- 
vioural confirmation from significant others. In its turn, status can be achieved by 
attaining other sub-goals such as a job, and so forth. A hierarchy of intermediary goals 
can be constructed, which are assumed to produce physical well-being and social 
approval (cf. Siegers, 1992). N ote that only intermediary goals can vary both over time 
and between individuals. The two ultimate goals are given preferences, i.e. they do not 
change over time, nor differ between individuals. To some extent, however, the two 
goals can substitute each other.
The achievement of goals is restricted by the amount and type of resources an 
actor has at his disposal and the constraints he faces. By determining their inter- 
mediairy goals and constraints, the behaviour of (corporale) actors can be modelled 
and testable hypotheses deducted (constraint-driven approach).
The third and final premise concerns the relationship between the two actors specified. 
It is a principal-agent relationship, i.e. legislature is the principal who charges an 
executive agent, such as a quango, with policy implementation (Coleman, 1990:146­
156; Pratt & Zeckhauser, 1991). In the model below, it is assumed that the choice for 
an agent precedes the executive's actions. Therefore, the choice made by legislature is 
discussed first, followed by a discussion of the (in-)efficiency of quangos. The model 
does not include interactions between the actors. Again, the reason for this restriction 
is that the model used in this study is just a first step towards an explanation of 
quangocratization. In section 3.4 I shall return to this point.
4 Current academic literature focusses on the role of policy networks between political actors in the decision 
making process. There are severval models on how these actors try  to influence each other and the final 
decision through, for example, exchange or conflict (Bueno de Mesquita & Stokman, 1994; Stokman, 1994; 
Stokman & Van Oosten, 1994; Stokman & Zeggelink, 1996). Chapter 6 will return to  this point.
5 Affect as a source of social approval will be left out of the model used in this chapter. Affect is usually 
given by family members or friends. As my interest in politicians' behaviour is limited to  a professional 
setting, affect from family and friends is not considered relevant here.
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3.2. Problem  1: the choice of legislature for an executive agent
3.2.1. Politicians
The corporate actor 'legislature' comprises all elected politicians. N o distinction is 
made here between Ministers and Members of Parliament. The decision to charge a 
quango with the implementation of a particular policy is considered to be their joint 
decision.6 N or will I assume differences between politicians from different political 
parties. In the adoption process of laws or policies, ideology will, of course, play a 
major role. However, my interest lies in the decision of politicians to charge a quango 
with the implementation of a particular policy, not in the policy itself, nor in the 
process of policy adoption. I do not expect ideology to play a decisive role in the 
choice of politicians for a quango as an executive agent. This expectation is supported 
by the fact that quangos have existed throughout history in many western countries 
with very different political traditions (cf. Greve et al., 1999; see also chapter 2), and 
also by the use of quangos during the global administrative reform of the 1980s by 
politicians of different political backgrounds (cf. Pollitt, 1999). In the Dutch case, 
Fernhout (1980:129-131) and Aquina (1988) both have argued that politicians in the 
Netherlands all favoured quangos, albeit for different reasons (Catholics and Protes­
tants prefer absence of state interference with private life, social democrats fear bureau- 
cratism, and liberals favour market mechanisms over bureaucracy). See also Verhaak 
(1997:170), who lists the motives for using quangos by consecutive Dutch cabinets of 
different political constellations since 1981. Therefore, in this study choices for 
quangos are expected to be influenced by policy and situational characteristics alone, 
and not by ideologies (cf. hypothesis 1 in subsection 3.2.3).
As agents acting on behalf of the citizens, politicians will aim their behaviour at 
fulfilling the goals of voters, who are their principals. However, politicians have their 
own goals as well. Following public choice theory, I posit that a politician's physical 
well-being and social approval is dependent on his being re-elected (see e.g., Downs, 
1965; Mueller, 1989; Van den Doel & Van Velthoven, 1990; Dunleavy, 1991). If he is 
not re-elected, a politician cannot continue his job and obtain the benefits that enable 
him to maximize physical well-being and social approval. Being a politician allows one 
to: (i) acquire wealth and/or power, associated with being a politician; (ii) propagate 
and implement ideologies, beliefs or opinions; and (iii) attain (more) electoral support.
Material benefits of the job, such as a salary and other, fringe benefits (office, 
staff) guarantees physical well-being, because it enables the fulfilment of basic human 
needs. Moreover, the power and perquisites associated with being a politician 
contribute to the status one has among other politicians, usually members of the same 
political party. Besides the voters, other politicians, or party members, are a significant 
frame of reference, and a major source of social approval. Politicians will therefore act 
in conformity with the expectations of the colleagues.
6 All legislation is the rautual responsibility of the parliament and the cabinet. In practice, parliaments often 
grant a minister the right to  take decisions on policy implementation on his own. However, this does not 
preclude parliaments' formal responsibility, nor their right to hold a minister accountable for his decisions.
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Propagation of beliefs or party ideology will strengthen a politician's position in 
the party, because it affirms his affiliation (behavioural confirmation). I also assume 
that propagation of beliefs also satisfies a politician's need for discussion and 
affirmation.7 And if those beliefs appeal to the voters as well, propagation contributes 
to electoral support and hence increases the opportunities for re-election.8
Finally, but most importantly, the success of politicians is dependent on the 
amount of electoral support received from the voters. In order to attain the benefits 
mentioned - approval from fellow politicians, and to increase the opportunities for re- 
election - politicians will strive to gain and keep electoral support. As the number of 
voters is limited, politicians have to compete for their support. Such support is 
acquired by adopting and implementing policies that are favourable to voters. 
However, individual politicians cannot achieve this by themselves. They have to 
cooperate with each other, because decisions on policies require a parliamentary 
majority. Politicians will therefore form alliances with other politicians or parties to 
adopt policies favourable to voters (or obstruct other politicians' activities to prevent 
them from increasing their electoral support). So, these collective efforts of politicians 
will be aimed at serving the voters' interests and thus maximize their individual 
electoral support (cf. Coleman, 1990:20-21).
To gain and keep the support of voters necessary for re-election, politicians will 
adopt policies favourable to the electorate. For the implementation of those policies, 
they have to choose an executive agent. I submit that politicians can choose between 
only two types of agents: government bureaucracy or a quango. Their choice will be 
determined by the extern to which it can contribute to the maximalization of the 
number of supportive votes. Below I shall explain that the efficiency of policy imple­
mentation is decisive in the choice of politicians for a certain executive agent.
3.2.2. Quangos versus government bureaucracy
What are the main advantages and disadvantages of the choice of politicians for a 
quango as an executive agent? Choosing a quango implies the transfer of (some of) the 
production rights to the agent, one on the main differences between quangos and 
government bureaucracy (see section 1.2). Such a transfer of rights means a reduction 
of the responsibility of politicians for policy implementation.
Limited responsibility reduces political risks, such as loss of electoral support, 
because politicians can no longer be held accountable for bad policy implementation. 
O n the other hand, it becomes difficult for politicians to benefit from successful policy 
implementation, it no longer being ascribed to them directly. However, limited
7 O f course, propagation of beliefs can also lead to disagreement and fnctions. That does not, however, 
contradict the fact that politics is essentially about debate and propagation of beliefs. The self-expression is 
regarded as more prestigeous than refraining from discussion; it stimulates the carreer as a politician.
1 Here, it is not considered important whether electoral support is given to a single politician or a political 
party. If votes are given to an individual politician, he will be re-elected straightforwardly. If votes are given 
to  a party, it is assumed that the party will reward the politician that brought about the increase in 
supportive votes, in the form of re-election.
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responsibility does not imply no responsibility at all.9 Some responsibility remains, for 
example, for the choice for a quango, the budgets given to quangos and the 
supervision or regulation of quangos. In case of successful policy implementation, 
politicians can claim to have made the right choice.
Besides limiting responsibility, the transfer of production rights is advantageous 
to politicians in another way. The fact that a bureaucracy does not own any 
production rights is inherent to it being designed to be impartial or neutral. Quangos, 
however, can be used by politicians to enhance the commitment of (new) supportive 
(groups of) voters. For example, interest groups can be charged with policy 
implementation and thus become a quango ('hiving in') or they can be appointed 
members of a quango board (Van Waarden, 1999a:321). This type of patronage is not 
possible in bureaucracies.10 By increasing the participation of (groups of) voters in the 
implementation of policies, their commitment - and hence their electoral support - to 
politicians will increase (Hood, 1988; Hemerijck, 1994:26).11
Based on these suppositions, it would seem logical to expect politicians at all 
times to prefer quangos as executive agent, as opposed to government bureaucracy. Or, 
as Gazendam and Homburg (1999) put it, the choice for quangos is the most 
politicially efficient choice. However, politicians have to  take the economic aspects of 
policy implementation (efficiency and effectiveness) into account as well.
Efficient and effective implementation of policies offers politicians the op- 
portunity to either implement more policies from the same budget or reduce taxes. 
Both options will be appreciated strongly by voters and increase electoral support. 
However, there does not seem to be an a priori reason to assume that either 
bureaucracy or a quango is always the most economically (in-)efficient executive agent. 
Both have characteristics that induce and impede efficiency or effectiveness.
The long-standing experience of government bureaucracy with policy implementation 
enhances the chance of efficiency and effectiveness, because knowledge, technology and 
other resources are already present and can be used for other activities as well. 
Expressed in the terms of transaction cost theory, such assets can be redeployed (cf. 
Williamson, 1981; 1989; 1995). Furthermore, because of the experience of bureaucracy 
with policy implementation, politicians have trust in its performance, which leads to
9 Often politicians remain responsible 'by reputation'. Even though policy implementation has been hived 
off and formally is no longer the responsibility of politicians, a failing quango is still considered a public 
affair, both by voters and the media. This has already led to some 'scandals', where politicians were held 
accountable or even forced to resign because of the poor performance of a quango (e.g. the prison service [a 
Next Steps agency] in the UK and the regulator of social security [Ctsv] in the Netherlands [De Volkskrant, 
1996]).
10 Interest groups can, however, influence government bureaucracy. See note in subsection 3.3.1 and 
hypothesis 2.3 in section 3.3.3.
11 Patronage (cf. Flap, 1990) bears some resemblance to what is known in public choice theory as the rewar- 
ding of rent-seeking behaviour by interest groups (Mueller, 1989:229-246; Tollison, 1997). Interest groups pur- 
sue benefits (rents) for themselves and their supporters, in exchange for electoral support. However, interest 
groups seek monopolist rents, at the exclusion of other groups. Politicians, on the other hand, will want to  
maximize their support by rewarding as many groups as possible and therefore will not grant one group 
monopoly rents. Instead, they will divide (or promise to divide) patronage favours between different 
competing interest groups. See also hypothesis 2.3 in subsection 3.3.3.
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low investments in monitoring (principal agent theory; Pratt & Zeckhauser, 1991). So 
bureaucracy requires less monitoring costs, which indicate a more efficient policy 
implementation.12
Trust can be abused, however. In this context, Niskanen developed the idea of a 
'bilateral monopoly'; politicians have budgets but need bureaucrats to implement 
policies, while bureaucrats have the expertise and information necessary to implement 
policies, but need budgets to do so (see Van den Doel & Van Velthoven, 1990:171­
178). This mutual dependency can lead to an increase in the costs of production 
(inefficiency) or overproduction (ineffectiveness) if bureaucrats use their monopoly 
position for their own benefit, either in a financial manner (budget maximalization) or 
otherwise (bureau shaping, Dunleavy [1991:ch.6]). Next to this potential source of 
inefficiency or ineffectiveness in government organizations, there are two other threats 
related to the more general nature of bureaucratie organizations, namely (i) high costs 
of internal coordination (Mintzberg, 1997:193,218) and (ii) high costs of 
implementation of organizational changes (Mintzberg, 1997:221).
The main obstacle to  efficiency and effectiveness in quangos is that they are usually 
established to implement just one particular policy. Investments in assets such as 
knowledge and technology are non-recurrent and task-specific, which hinders their use 
for other tasks, to the detriment of efficiency. This is particularly the case with newly 
established quangos, because in quangos established through the hiving off of a 
departmental unit or the hiving in of longstanding private organizations, the costs for 
investments may be lower if the necessary assets are already available or seconded.
The main potential efficiency gains of the establishment of quangos lie in the 
reduction of coordination costs. Putting policy implementation at arm's length means 
that politicians no longer have to deal with all the details of daily operational 
activities, which may increase the effectiveness of policy implementation. On the other 
hand, monitoring remains necessary to meet their (limited) political responsibility. 
Monitoring costs lead to higher costs of policy implementation and hence to lower 
cost efficiency.
To sum up, choosing a quango as an executive agent can lead to a gain in 
electoral support due to the benefits of patronage and limited responsibility. If, 
however, the choice made leads to inefficient and ineffective policy implementation, 
the resulting loss of votes may exceed the benefits. Politicians will have to  weigh the 
potential gains of their choice against the losses. Also, situational constraints may vary, 
which leads to different choices. The next section discusses which constraints are 
decisive to the choices politicians make.
3.2.3. The choice of legislature
This section deals with conditions that are decisive to the choice of politicians for 
quangos as an executive agent. Hypotheses are formulated about the conditions under
12 This implies a trade-off between trust and monitoring. Although trust has never kept politicians from 
m onitoring policy implementation by government bureaucracy, for example, by the national audit offices, it 
does reduce the need for (extensive) monitoring and hence m onitoring costs.
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which politicians are expected to prefer quangos to government bureaucracy as an 
executive agent. These hypotheses will be tested in chapter 4.
Political ideology
O f course, ideology plays a major role in the process of policy design and policy adop- 
tion. Its role in decisions on the type of executive agent is assumed to be much less 
important. The benefits of reduced ministerial responsibility and patronage will appeal 
to all politicians, irrespective of their ideological preferences. O ther conditions or 
situational constraints, such as the type of task and policy sector concerned, are 
expected to exert much more influence (cf. hypotheses 1.5 and 1.6 below).
The following hypothesis is formulated:13 
HYPOTHESIS 1.1:
Politicians with different politicial ideologies do not differ in their choice for  
quangos as an executive agent, as opposed to government bureaucracy.
Economic conditions
Following the practitioner theory (see section 1.3), politicians can be expected to 
prefer quangos in times of economic down-swing, because the anticipated efficiency 
gains can relieve fiscal stress. However, the opposite may also be true; in times of eco­
nomic up-swing one can expect more quangos as well. Economic up-swing can lead to 
an expansion of government tasks. More policies need to be implemented and the 
chance that quangos are charged with these tasks increases accordingly.
So, both economic up-swing and down-swing art expected to  lead to  more 
quangos being established. Furthermore, it could be argued that the way in which 
quangos are established differs in periods of economic up-wing and down-swing. In 
periods of economic down-swing, when governments need to cut budgets and decrease 
the size of government bureaucracy, it is more likely for quangos to be established 
through the hiving off of departmental units. While in periods of economic up-swing, 
when the number of public tasks increases, the government sooner hive in formerly 
private organizations and turn them into quangos, to implement new policies.14 This 
leads to two hypotheses:
HYPOTHESIS 1.2:
a: The more severe the economic down-swing, the more often will politicians 
choose quangos to implement policies by means o f the hiving o ff 
o f  departmental units.
b: The stronger the economic up-swing, the more often will politicians choose 
quangos to implement policies by means o f the hiving in o f former private 
organizations.
As it is assumed that both economic up-swing and down-swing lead to a higher 
number of quangos, economic conditions are in fact not expected to be decisive to the 
choice of politicians for quangos as an executive agent. Politicians will choose quangos
11 All hypotheses on the choice of politicians for a quango as an executive agent refer to  the first research 
question and are therefore numbered with a 1.
w This hypothesis does not concern the establishment of quangos by means of creating entirely new 
organizations. Following the same line of reasoning, new quangos may be established both in periods of 
economic dedine and welfare.
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as executive agents under both conditions.
So, neither political ideology nor economic conditions are - contrary to common sense - 
expected to be decisive with respect to the choice of politicians for quangos. What 
then are the conditions that do influence this choice? Politicians are expected to 
choose the executive agent that maximizes the opportunities to increase electoral 
support. Therefore, the higher the potential increase in electoral support, the more 
politicians will be inclined to prefer quangos over government bureaucracy. Below two 
conditions are discussed that can increase electoral support: electoral competition and 
corporatism.
Electoral competition
When the competition for votes is strong among politicians, they need to ensure their 
electoral support and will search for opportunities to boost the number of supportive 
voters. Competition is fierce in election years, or when the differences in electoral 
support for politicians (or parties) are small. In such situations, to increase support and 
improve one's bargaining power in the cooperative efforts necessary for the adoption 
of policies and the decisions on policy implementation, politicians will use every 
means to increase electoral support. Quangos do not only offer the opportunity to 
increase the commitment of (groups of) voters through patronage, they also reduce 
potential political risks, because the responsibility of politicians for policy 
implementation becomes limited. Both mechanisms could lead to an increase in 
electoral support. This brings us to the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 1.3:
The stronger the electoral competion among politicians, the more often will 
they choose quangos to government bureaucracy for the implementation o f 
policies.
Corporatism
Participation of interest groups is expected to increase electoral support (patronage). In 
situations with many interest groups, the potential gain of votes is larger than in 
situations where there are only a few interest groups - unless these are large groups, of 
course. Therefore, I expect more quangos to be established in policy sectors with 
many interest groups (corporatist sectors) than in fields with fewer interest groups: 
HYPOTHESIS 1.4:
In corporatist policy sectors, politicians will more often choose quangos, 
rather than government bureaucracy as an executive agent, than in non- 
corporatist policy sectors.
So far I have discussed conditions under which it is beneficial for politicians to choose 
quangos as executive agents, because it induces the opportunity to  gain votes. 
However, there are also cases where the choice for quangos can diminish electoral 
support. The benefits of patronage and limited responsibility are then reduced 
strongly, or exceeded by the costs of inefficiency. Below, two such conditions are 
discussed: collective goods and specific investments.
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Collective goods
In chapter 1 it was argued that many western governments came into being because 
markets fail when it comes to the production of collective goods. Individuals transfer 
part of their rights to elected politicians to ensure the provision of these goods. 
Therefore, the way in which collective goods are provided is assumed to be an 
important determinant of the voting behaviour of individuals, which influences the 
chance that politicians will be re-elected.
Because of the strong interest that voters have, I expect politicians to prefer 
government bureaucracy to quangos as executive agents when collective goods are 
concerned. In the case of collective goods, which are highly valued by voters, the 
potential benefits of limited responsibility for quangos (i.e. lower political risks) are 
outweighed by the loss of opportunities to claim successful policy implementation 
concerning goods. Moreover, politicians want to be able to exert direct control and 
intervene at will, not only to prevent ill performance and reduce political risks, but 
also to guarantee re-election by demonstrating to the voters how well their interests 
are being served. The opportunities for direct control and intervention are better in a 
government bureaucracy. When dealing with quangos, they are limited and often more 
expensive (because of extra monitoring costs). Therefore, my contention is that the 
greater the extern to which a good or service that has to be provided bears the 
characteristics of a collective good - i.e. non-exclusiveness and jointness of supply - the 
less likely it is that politicians will charge quangos with its provision. The following 
hypothesis summarizes this argument:
HYPOTHESIS 1.5:
The more policy implementation resembles the provision o f collective goods, 
the less likely it is that politicians will choose quangos as executive agent, 
rather than government bureaucracy.
Specific investments
Policy implementation requires investments in knowledge, equipment, technology and 
other assets. The more task-specific these investments are, the harder it is to redeploy 
them to alternative use, without loss of productive value, and the higher the risk of 
inefficiency becomes (Williamson, 1989:142). The large-scale policy implementation by 
government bureaucracy necessitates the presence of a large number of assets at all 
times, which makes redeployment easier and enhances efficiency and effectiveness. 
Take, for example, the fact that policy implementation often requires legal knowledge. 
In a ministry, a legal unit can be established that advises all other units (redeployment 
of knowledge). A quango would have to consult a legal specialist on matters 
concerning the policy that has to  be implemented, but can consult that specialist only 
on that policy (i.e., it is a non-recurrent investment).15 Policy implementation by 
government bureaucracy will therefore be more efficient and effective. Following the 
ideas of transaction cost analysis (Williamson, 1989:150-151), I would, in case of 
specific investments being necessary, expect politicians to prefer government bureau­
cracy (cf. vertical integration) to quangos (cf. market) when it comes to choosing an
15 O f course, quangos could share specific assets. However, the costs of negotiating the investment and use of 
assets would still lead to higher average costs than investments made by a government bureaucracy.
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executive agent.
Specific assets may also create a (semi-)monopoly for agents. Sunk costs make it 
very expensive for dissatisfied politicians to choose another agent.16 Politicians might 
even become dependent on a such an agent, particularly because most agents have a 
legal monopoly on policy implementation. White (1991) refers to this as reversal o f  
control. A dependent principal might be forced to accept a certain level of inefficiency 
or ineffectiveness. Or, inefficiency or ineffectiveness go unnoticed, because there are 
no competitors to compare the agent's performance with.
Reversal of control can occur with all agents, either government bureaucracies or 
quangos. However, as in a bureaucracy specific investments are made less often, 
because resources or assets are already available and can be more easily redeployed, the 
risks of choosing bureacracy as an executive agent will appear lower to politicians. 
Moreover, because politicians own all production rights of the bureaucracy, they can 
exert immediate control over its activities, which is not the case with quangos. In 
quangos the opportunities for control are limited and the distance between politicians 
and agent is greater. Hence politicians will prefer government bureaucracy to quangos, 
when specific investments are involved (cf. Ter Bogt, 1994:215):
HYPOTHESIS 1.6:
The more specific the investments required for policy implementation are, the 
less likely it is that politicians will choose a quangos as the executive agent.
3.2.4. Uncertainty
Until now I have implicitly assumed that politicians are capable of making a well- 
considered choice or, in other words, that they are fully informed about all the costs 
and benefits that a particular choice would bring. However, this does not seem a truly 
realistic assumption. The amount of information actors can assess and comprehend is 
limited. Simon labelled this 'bounded rationality' (in: Williamson, 1989:138-139; 
Hendrikse, 1993:91). In the present study, bounded rationality means that politicians 
cannot be entirely certain whether, under the circumstances, their choice for a certain 
executive agent is indeed the best - the most efficient and effective - and will enable 
them to maximize physical well-being and social approval.
To reduce uncertainty, individuals will seek information (Rogers, 1995: xvii). 
Politicians can use several strategies when gathering information. The first is imitation, 
which means that politicians ex ante use information on efficient and effective agents. 
The second strategy is monitoring, which provides ex post information on the 
efficiency and effectiveness of policy implementation. Monitoring can also be used to 
give voters an account of the efficiency and effectiveness of policy implementation. 
Both strategies will thus increase the possibilities for politicians to make the 'best' 
choice, gain electoral support and secure re-election. Gathering information requires 
investment of time and money, however, and increases the costs of policy implementa­
tion. Therefore politicians will try  to use cost-saving strategies.
16 It can also be argued that expensive specific investments and/or low usage frequency of assets could be a 
reason for politicians to  hive them off or privatize policy implemenation. However, such high and very 
specific transaction costs raise the problem of finding investors (or shareholders) willing to invest (cf. Hazeu, 
2000:77-79).
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Imitation is a simple and cheap method of using information, gathered by other 
people. The information is used to reduce uncertainties, at a minimal cost. Politicians 
can, for example, copy the choice of other politicians for a certain type of agent. For 
example, politicians will look for examples of the use of quangos in other countries, 
regions, levels of government and/or policy sectors. If quangos are perceived to be 
efficient and effective, politicians will copy the choice for that type of agent17, which 
will result in an increase in the number of (that type of) quangos. To further 
maximize the benefits of imitation, politicians can copy the choice for a certain type 
of agent straightforwardly, choosing an agent with similar characteristics, tasks, and 
operating in similar policy fields. The phenomenon where in different sectors of 
society, policy sectors, or countries more and more similar organizations are establish­
ed is called isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983:151) or convergence (cf. Unger & 
Van Waarden, 1995:19-21).
A second type of imitation concerns the acquisition of information by gradually 
building up experience with particular types of agents, through either experimentation 
or the repetition of choices. By gradually increasing their experience, politicians will 
accumulate information that will reduce their uncertainty. When having been 
evaluated as a successful choice, quangos will be chosen more often as an agent. 
Moreover, they will be used in an increasingly diversified way. Assuming that the 
hypotheses formulated in subsection 3.2.3 hold, the idea of imitation could be 
combined with the aforementioned conditions. For example, one might expect 
quangos to be first set up in corporatist policy sectors because of patronage benefits. 
As politicians become more experienced and perceive quangos as efficient, quangos 
will be set up in non-corporatist sectors as well. Quangos established to implement 
policies that do not require specific investments will, in a later phase, also be charged 
with specific tasks. It could even be the case that quangos end up being charged with 
the provision of purely collective goods.
To conclude the discussion on imitation, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
HYPOTHESIS 1.7:
The more information about and experience with quangos politicians 
acquire, the more often will they choose quangos rather than government 
bureaucracy as executive agents; quangos will be used for a greater variety o f 
tasks and set up in an increasing number o f policy sectors.
So, imitation enables politicians to minimize the political risk of choosing the wrong 
executive agent, and reduces the potential loss of electoral support. Moreover, the 
incremental expansion of the number of a certain type of agent creates legitimacy 
(Tolbert & Zucker, 1982:30). Gradually the choice for that type of agent becomes 
more common and accepted by voters. In the end, it will become the most legitimate
3.2.4.1. Im itation
17 By implication, if the choice for a quango as an executive agent is not perceived as successful, politicians 
will not repeat that choice. This need not always be the case, however. As was argued before, the political 
responsibility for policy implementation by quangos is limited. Therefore, politicians can repeat their choice 
for a quango even if its performance is not regarded successful, because it is not the politicians who are held 
accountable for ill performance, but the quango.
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type of executive, and politicians will choose that agent merely to please the voters. 
Their choices are no longer based on efficiency arguments, but have become symbolic 
choices (Rowan & Meyer, 1977:361).
3.2.4.2. Monitoring
Monitoring provides politicians ex post with information on the performance of agents. 
They can use this information to evaluate whether their choice of agent was successful 
and should be repeated (imitation). Moreover, politicians can use the information to 
show voters in what a good way policies are implemented, and thus secure electoral 
support. However, there are two problematic aspects to monitoring. First, it requires 
investments (so-called monitoring costs [Arrow, 1991]), which increase the costs of 
policy implementation and create possible inefficiencies. To avoid inefficiencies, politi­
cians will try  to minimize monitoring costs. Generally, monitoring costs will be lower 
for the government bureaucracy than for quangos, due to (i) the long-standing 
relationship between politicians and government bureaucracy, which has induced trust 
and (ii) the fact that politicians own all production rights and can exert immediate 
hierarchical control if necessary.
The opportunities to intervene in the activities of quangos are limited. However, 
politicians can use alternative monitoring devices for quangos that do not require 
additional investments. For example, the participation by interest groups (i.e. 
patronage) can be viewed as a way of making quangos more accountable to the 
demands of citizens. Monitoring is thus replaced by 'accountability to the market', 
which is expected to ensure efficiency and reduce the need for monitoring by 
politicians (cf. Waldegrave, 1993; Leeuw, 1995; Stone, 1995).
A second problem is that monitoring devices - such as compulsory publication of 
annual reports and annual accounts - have to be imposed at the same time that an 
agent is charged with policy implementation (so, ex ante), because accountability 
requirements have to be laid down in the agent's statutes. The wish to minimize 
monitoring costs can induce politicians to impose no requirements until these prove 
necessary (cf. Leeuw, 1995). In other words, politicians decide to trust the executive 
agent until it is found guilty of inefficiency. In a government bureaucracy, such trust 
is facilitated by the long-standing relationship between agent and politicians. In the 
case of quangos, however, it remains difficult for politicians to make an accurate 
estimate of the need for monitoring, as they often have little experience with that type 
of agent. For this reason, one would expect that in situations with higher risks of in­
efficiency or situations where inefficiency and ineffectiveness have a higher damage 
potential to the chances on re-election, the need for monitoring will be stronger. 
Because monitoring costs for government bureaucracy are lower than for quangos, 
politicians will prefer government bureaucracy as an executive agent. This is assumed 
to be the case when, for example, agents are appropriated with a large budget - because 
the larger the budget, the higher the damage potential of inefficiency or ineffectiveness; 
when policy implementation requires specific investments (see also hypothesis 1.6), 
with the accompanying risk of sunk costs and reversal of control (White, 1991); or 
when the experience of politicians with quangos is limited.
To sum up, monitoring can be used to gather information on agents and reduce 
the uncertainty of politicians regarding the effects of their choice. At the same time,
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politicians want to minimize monitoring costs. This observation leads to the following 
hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 1.8:
When policy implementation requires large investments in monitoring, 
politicians will less often choose quangos as an executive agent, rather than 
government bureaucracy.
The reasoning underlying hypothesis 1.8 already touches upon the next topic of this 
chapter: the efficiency of policy implementation by quangos. As will be argued in 
section 3.3, agents have their own interests besides those of the principal, and 
quangocrats may abuse the trust of politicians and serve their own interests instead. If 
no monitoring takes place, there is no way of telling whether policy implementation is 
carried out in an efficient and effective maner. The problem politicians face is that 
monitoring can be seen as distrustful, and intrude upon the relationship with 
quangocrats. The effects of such intrusion can range from no to ill performance.
The next section continues the debate on monitoring and the efficiency and 
effectiveness of executive agents. It sets out to provide an answer to the second main 
research question: under which conditions will policy implementation by quangos be 
more efficient and effective than implementation by government bureaucracy?
3.3. Problem 2: quango performance
3.3.1. Quangocrats
Quangos are corporate actors. As before, I shall make certain assumptions about the 
behaviour of individual actors to explain the behaviour of corporate actors. People 
working in quangos will be referred to as quangocrats, analogous to bureaucrats, who 
are working in a government bureaucracy. In fact, bureaucrats and quangocrats share 
several characteristics. They both carry out public tasks, are charged to do so by the 
same principal (namely, politicians) and are funded with public means.18 Therefore, I 
shall use a number of suppositions from public choice models of bureaucrats and apply 
them to quangocrats (Breton & Wintrobe, 1982; Bendor, 1988; Mueller, 1989:ch.l4, 
1997; Van den Doel & Van Velthoven, 1990:ch.6; Dunleavy, 1991:ch.6).
Besides similarities, there are also three important differences. These concern (i) 
the ownership of production rights, (ii) accountability for ill performance and (iii) the 
potential presence of competitors. Contrary to government bureaucracy, quangos own 
some production rights, which implies a higher degree of autonomy in the production 
process, and limits the influence of or control by the principal. At the same time, 
quangos are also responsible for errors and can be held accountable, whereas in a 
government bureaucracy the minister is always the one who is accountable. In the 
worst case this could lead to the closing down of a quango. Bureaucracy, on the other 
hand, does not face threats of bankruptcy or non-existence (LeGrand, 1991). Also, in
18 Moreover, quangocrats can actuaUy be bureaucrats if they are seconded civil servants, o r have the same 
legal position as civil servants. This would particularly be the case in quangos established through the hiving 
off o f departmental units.
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some cases quangos face competition, albeit often only of the internal market (i.e. 
competition with other quangos in the same policy sector, for example, between 
hospitals or schools). While this does not imply that all quangos have to compete, still 
it is something that government bureaucracy does not face. The three differences have 
important consequences for the explanation of the efficiency of policy implementation 
by quangos.
As the agent of a principal (politicians), the efforts of quangocrats and bureaucrats 
would be expected to be aimed at the principal's goals, i.e. the implementation of 
policies in the most efficient and effective manner (see section 3.2). However, 
quangocrats and bureaucrats have goals of their own as well, which can be contra- 
dictory to those of politicians. This may result in inefficiencies.
Their function of agents, provides quangocrats and bureaucrats with money and 
other perquisites such as an office, staff, et cetera. Such material benefits allow the ful- 
filment of basic human needs and produce physical well-being. Moreover, these 
benefits increase one's status among fellow quangocrats, or bureaucrats, and therefore 
produce social approval as well.
Social approval can also be obtained by meeting the expectations of two (groups 
of) significant others: (i) the principal and (ii) fellow quangocrats or bureaucrats.19 
Confirming the expectations of politicians means that the agent's efforts are aimed at 
efficient and effective policy implementation. The more efficiently and effectively 
policies are implemented, the more satisfied the principal will be, and the higher the 
chances are that the agent's existence is continued or even stimulated by new tasks or 
additional budgets.
Fellow quangocrats or bureaucrats are an important source of social approval. 
Wilson (1989:45-48) argues that, since public agencies are confronted with multiple, 
often non-quantifiable and sometimes contradictory policy objectives, they lack a clear 
mission. Therefore, other factors will determine the performance of public agencies, 
for instance, peer expectations. These may range from being loyal and committed to 
the principal's goals to just serving one's own interests, or they may be a combination 
of these two extremes.
The more the goals of politicians and the executive agent diverge, the higher the 
chances are that the agent will prefer to serve his own ends, rather than comply with 
the principal's goals (Hendrikse, 1993:124-132; Douma & Schreuder, 1998:99-121). 
Niskanen developed a model of the budget maximizing bureaucrat, who uses his 
expertise and information to increase the bureau's budget beyond limits, thus creating 
spill-overs. Using a similar line of reasoning, Dunleavy (1991:ch.6) developed the so- 
called bureau-shaping model, and argued that bureaucrats - since they cannot profit 
themselves from a higher budget - will strive to maximize fringe benefits or the work- 
load of the bureau, in order to obtain status and social approval. O ther academics have 
argued that loyalty, commitment to policies and professional pride in performance can
19 In the literature on bureaucrats often a third important group of significant others is distinguished: interest 
groups. For example, Wilson (1989:76) discusses 'client politics' by agencies; Van Gunsteren (in Leeuw 
[1995:58]) refers to  the 'capture' of agencies by interest groups; and public choice theorists use the concept of 
'rent seeking' (Mueller, 1989:229-246; Tollison, 1997). Section 3.4 will discuss the incorporation of interest 
groups in the theoretical model.
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also be motivations underlying the behaviour of bureaucrats (Bendor, 1988; Van den 
Doel & Van Velthoven, 1990). All of these approaches share the idea that bureaucrats 
exert a strong influence on each other's behaviour and performance.
Here, it is assumed that a similar idea can be applied to quangocrats, with one 
important difference. The fact that quangos can be closed down or dismissed as execu­
tive agents, makes it more imperative for quangocrats to maintain budgets and 
safeguard the continuation of their existence, rather than maximize budgets, fringe 
benefits, or the organization's workload. Although the size of a budget or organization 
increases status among quangocrats, the pursuit of higher budgets is secondary to the 
pursuit of continuation of the organization as an executive agent and fighting the 
threat of being closed down.
3.3.2. Compliance versus deviance
An agent can use its discretionairy authority to serve the purposes of the principal or 
its own ends. In the first case, the behaviour of the agent is called compliance, in the 
latter it is called deviance. In reality, compliance and deviance are two extremes of a 
scale. Most behaviour will be a mix. For modelling purposes, I shall focus on the 
extreme modes of behaviour, because they have an immediate impact on the efficiency 
of policy implementation.
In the case of compliance, the agent's behaviour is aimed at the goals of the principal 
(i.e. politicians). Their common goal is efficient and effective policy implementation. 
The agent receives payment for his efforts, which enhances his physical well-being, and 
gains social approval from politicians through behavioural confirmation. His existence 
is therefore safeguarded. Moreover, if fellow quangocrats or bureaucrats highly ap- 
preciate efficient policy implementation, loyalty and commitment to the principal, 
confirmation of peer expectations produces social approval as well.
In this study, deviance is used to refer to cases where the agent does not carry out his 
task in the way intended by the principal. As a result, the efficiency and effectiveness 
of policy implementation are in danger. Therefore, deviance is considered to be (at 
least potentially) harmful to the principal's goal. It is important to keep in mind that 
deviance does not always mean that an agent is inactive. His behaviour or performance 
is merely not aimed at the principal's goal. Three types of deviant behaviour are 
distinguished here: adverse selection, moral hazard and deviant policy implementa­
tion.
The first type of deviant behaviour is called adverse selection, also known as the 
problem of hidden information. It concerns the misuse or withholding of information 
by the agent to increase the (fringe) benefits of his job (Hendrikse, 1993:124). By 
hiding or manipulating information the agent prevents the principal from choosing the 
best agent. 111 performing agents are not exposed and therefore not excluded from the 
pool of possible executive agents (adverse selection).
Hiding information allows the agent to acquire fringe benefits, which increases 
his well-being. If this type of behaviour is expected and appreciated by peers, it can be 
a source of social approval as well. Because of the public funding of quangos, most 
benefits associated with policy implementation are non-pecuniary in nature, apart from
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salaries (Mueller, 1989:251).20 Still, additional perquisites do have to be paid for. 
Consider, for example, increasing the size of rhe organization through the addition of 
personnel, or the introduction of new technology without there being an actual need 
for such investments (cf. bureau-shaping, Dunleavy, 1991:ch.6). The extra costs 
decrease the efficiency of policy implementation.
Moral hazard, or the problem of hidden action, refers to an agent performing his 
job with the least possible effort (Douma & Schreuder, 1998:50). Reduction of effort 
offers the agent more leisure time without a loss of salary, thus improving his physical 
well-being, but decreasing his productivity, and endangering both the efficiency and 
effectivity of policy implementation.
Both moral hazard and adverse selection are facilitated by the information 
asymmetry between principal and agent; the agent has far more knowledge about (the 
costs of) policy implementation than the principal (Hendrikse, 1993:124-126). More- 
over, hidden information can also be used to lead the principal to believe that the 
agent is acting efficiently, which safeguards the agent's existence. Hiding information is 
relatively easy for quangocrats, because of the distance between politicians and the 
quango, and the limited influence of politicians on operational activities who do not 
own all production rights.
The third type of deviant behaviour was studied by Torenvlied (1996a; 1996b; 
2000). He argues that agents can use their discretionary authority to implement 
policies in a manner that is consistent with their own policy position rather than the 
intentions of politicians.21 The larger the gap between intended and realized im­
plementation, the more one could say that the agent is deviant, at least from the 
principal's point of view. This does not necessarily lead to higher costs, as with 
adverse selection and moral hazard, but still it is considered undesirable by politicians, 
because it might affect the effectiveness of policy implementation and reduce their 
electoral support. Again, agents can make use of the information asymmetry to 
safeguard their existence, hiding information on deviant policy implementation, or 
using it to convince politicians of the efficiency of policy implementation.
To sum up, both compliance and deviance enable agents to maximize physical well- 
being and social approval. Because deviant behaviour requires less effort and/or pro- 
vides more benefits, it is assumed that agents will prefer it to compliance, unless they 
think they can be caught or sanctioned with, for example, a reduction of the number 
of tasks, or the size of their budget. In the extreme case, they can be closed down or 
dismissed as an executive agent. In the next section, I will discuss conditions that 
influence the choice of agents between compliance and deviance, with special emphasis
20 Policy implementation is funded with public means (tax revenues, premiums, levying). Efficiency gains 
should therefore either be paid back to the citizens, used for the implementation of other policies, or used to 
reduce the state deficit. Most organizations implementing public policies are therefore not allowed to keep 
(large) surpluses, nor to make profits, although recently ever more quangos have been looking for 
opportunities to do so (see e.g. In 't Veld, 1995; Commissie Cohen, 1997).
21 It should be noted that politicians sometimespurpostvely allow executive agents a high degree of discretio­
nary authority (in Dutch: beleidsvrijheid) in acknowledgement of their expertise, or to grant 'street level 
bureaucrats’ (Lipsky, 1979) professional autonomy in applying general policies to individual situations. 
Torenvlied (1996a:36,60-61) refers to this as the tolerance level of politicians for policy deviations.
Theory 57
3.3.3. The choice of quangocrats
In the previous sections it was shown that quangocrats and bureaucrats have much in 
common. This section tries to establish in which circumstances their behaviour will 
diverge, in particular with respect to the efficiency and effectiveness of their 
performance. As argued before, there are three important differences between 
quangocrats and bureaucrats: the ownership of production rights, the presence of com- 
petitors and the possibility of being held accountable for ill performance. In section
3.2 a fourth important difference was mentioned that is now added: the possibility of 
participation by interest groups in the policy implementation by quangos. This is not 
possible in (neutral) government bureaucracies.
It is assumed that because of these four differences the efficiency and effectiveness 
of policy implementation by quangos is higher than that of government bureaucracy. 
Implicitly, this answers the second research question. Below I shall formulate a 
number of hypotheses to explain how these quango-specific features influence the 
efficiency and effectiveness of policy implementation by quangos.
The ownership o f  production rights
In section 1.2, the autonomy of quangos was defined as the ownership of production 
rights. This autonomy provides quangocrats with the freedom to pursue the goals they 
value most. As quangos own (some of) the production, contrary to government 
bureaucracy, quangocrats have more discretionary authority than bureaucrats. One 
might argue that this also means that quangocrats have more opportunities for deviant 
behaviour, which would imply that policy implementation by quangos is more prone 
to inefficiency as compared to government bureaucracy. There are more incentives to 
implement policies in a deviant way (Torenvlied, 1996). N ote that this contradicts the 
practitioner theory underlying quangocratization, which states that politicians expect 
more autonomy to increase commitment to the principal and enhance the efficiency of 
policy implementation (see section 1.3).
The claim of politicians that quangocratization will lead to efficiency gains is 
undermined by the fact that policy implementation is funded with public means. As 
argued before, all money saved by higher efficiency will have to be transferred back, 
because politicians will want to implement new policies, or decrease taxes, to please 
voters. Efficiency gains are therefore not beneficial to the executive agent itself. N ot 
only does this imply that there are no incentives to operate efficiently, but it even 
increases the incentive to display deviant behaviour. In case of surpluses, politicians 
will argue that the agent apparently needs less money and they will reduce the budget 
for next year. The agent will perceive this as an unjust punishment. Even more so, 
when other, less efficient agents will receive the same budget as before (no 
punishment), presuming they have not been spotted as being inefficient or ineffective. 
Moreover, because one agent can apparently profit from the efficiency gains made by 
another agent - surpluses are spent on the implementation of other policies - individual 
agents have little incentive to strive for efficiency (a free-rider problem).
on the differences between quangocrats and bureaucrats. Hypotheses will be formu-
lated on the conditions under which policy implementation by quangos will be more
efficient and effective than implementation by government bureaucracy.
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In quangos, the incentives to be inefficient can be counteracted by the transfer of 
production rights, in particular rights that pertain to financial arrangements. The 
ownership of the right to retain (small) surpluses, or the right to determine the fees22 
charged to customers, make efficiency gains beneficial to the quango itself. Therefore, 
the more production rights quangos own, the more they will strive to implement 
policies in an efficient manner:23 
HYPOTHESIS 2.1:
The more production rights quangos own, the more efficient and effective 
policy implementation will be, especially when the production rights the 
quango owns concern financial arrangements.
Competition
A monopoly increases the opportunities for agents to display deviant behaviour, 
without being caught out. N ot only is there a lack of information to assess the efficien­
cy of policy implementation as compared to others, but the main information source 
is the agent itself. The agent can use the information asymmetry to manipulate or hide 
information, appearing to perform more efficiently than in reality,24 and thus safeguard 
continuation of its existence as an executive agent.
The legal monopoly on policy implementation implies that most executive agents 
are monopolists. This is especially the case when policy implementation requires 
investments in specific assets, such as knowledge or technology. As argued in 
subsection 3.2.3, specific investments make it difficult to replace an agent and reduces 
the chance of being sanctioned for inefficiency.
So, a monopoly or a semi-monopoly as a result of specific investments can 
induce inefficiency by executive agents. Competition, on the contrary, is expected to 
lead to more efficiency and effectiveness (cf. Naschold [1996], Boyne [1998]). The 
possibility of competition was mentioned as one of the differences between quangos 
and government bureaucracy. Therefore, quangos are expected to be more efficient 
and effective, if they face competition:
HYPOTHESIS 2.2:
The more competition quangos face, the more efficient and effective their 
policy implementation will be.
N ot all quangos operate in the market. Competition can also be present, though, in 
clusters of quangos, especially when quangos have to compete for budgets in an 
internal market. When such a cluster consists of regional monopolists, the effects of 
competition will be weaker.
Corporatism
An important feature of quangos is the possible participation of interest groups in
22 It should be noted, however, that the determination of fees can also lead to inefficiency, especially in the 
case of a (semi-)monopolist quango. Comparable information on fees is absent, which creates opportunities 
for quangocrats to maximize fees.
23 All hypotheses on quango performance refer to the second research question and are therefore numbered 
with a 2.
24 In case of a monopoly, not only the principal but also the agent has difficulties establishing whether the 
agent is performing well, because of the absence of comparative information.
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policy implementation through, for example, the appointment as members on the 
quango board (see subsections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3), or hiving in interest groups into the 
public sector as a quango (see section 1.3). Earlier, it was argued that participation of 
interest groups will increase their commitment to politicians. Stronger commitment 
implies a higher chance of compliance by the agent to the goal of the principal, 
namely efficient and effective policy implementation. Furthermore, participation by 
interest groups can be used to substitute monitoring aimed at ensuring efficiency and 
effectiveness (cf. subsection 3.2.4.2). Following this line of reasoning, it can be ex­
pected that quangos operate more efficiently than government bureaucracy.
However, interest groups have their own goals as well. For example, public 
choice theory asssumes that interest groups pursue maximalization of the provision of 
goods and services, to serve the interests of their members (cf. Wilson, 1989:76; 
Mueller, 1989:229-246). If these goals were to become the goals of the quangocrats as 
well, overproduction and hence inefficient policy implementation may be the result.
A  priori no prediction can be made about which of the two effects is stronger. 
But it does seem likely that the more the objectives of the participating interest groups 
and the goals of the politicians diverge, the higher at least the chance becomes of 
inefficient and ineffective policy implementation:
HYPOTHESIS 2.3:
The more interest groups tbat participate in policy implementation by 
quangos value efficiency and effectiveness, the more efficient and effective 
policy implementation by those quangos will be.
Accountability
While in government bureaucracy the minister is always held accountable,25 quango­
crats can be held accountable themselves for their performance (cf. section 1.2). 
Accountability increases the risk of getting caught at and sanctioned for inefficiency. 
Therefore, the higher the chances are that quangos will be held accountable, the more 
quangocrats will prefer compliance to deviance.
Information on the performance of quangos can be obtained through monitoring 
(see subsection 3.2.4.2). Accountability requirements can be imposed on quangos, such 
as the obligation to draw up an annual report or have the annual account audited by 
an accountant (see also subsection 2.2.1). Such requirements force quangos to provide 
information on their performance, which makes it more difficult to hide information 
about inefficient behaviour. Deviance becomes less appealing to quangocrats and the 
chances of efficient and effective policy implementation increase. Accordingly, the fol­
lowing hypothesis is formulated:
HYPOTHESIS 2.4:
The more accountability requirements are imposed upon quangos, the more 
efficient and effective policy implementation will be.
Besides accountability requirements, there are other conditions that increase the risk of 
being caught at performing inefficiently and ineffectively. For example, inefficiencies
25 Recently, D utch politicians and civil servants have started a debate on whether it should be possible to 
hold (senior) civil servants accountable (or failures in policy development and implementation (De 
Volkskrant, 1999a). For example, civil servants could be questioned by parliamentary committees.
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are more difficult to  hide or compensate when quangos are smaller.26 Budgetary 
deviations are more difficult to hide; there are no opportunities for hidden informa­
tion or deviant policy implementation. The idleness of some quangocrats cannot be 
compensated by others; there are no opportunities for hidden action.
The same holds for quangos that operate in small policy fields, where there are 
few other quangos to distract attention from their performance.27 Under such condi­
tions, quangocrats will more often prefer complying with the principal's goals to 
deviant behaviour, because of the higher risk of getting caught. This leads to the 
following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 2.5:
The smaller the size o f quangos, or the policy sector in which they operate, 
the more efficient and effective policy implementation will be.
The chances of getting caught at deviant behaviour increase also if the distance be­
tween quangocrats and politicians is smaller. N ot only will performance become more 
visible, but closeness also induces commitment. Quangocrats will not want to risk 
their relationship with politicians by inefficient behaviour.28 Moreover, efficient policy 
implementation will provide quangocrats with the social approval of politicians and 
fellow quangocrats.
Closeness refers to the (formal and informal) ties between quangocrats and 
politicians. The stronger the ties, the higher the commitment and thus compliance. 
Strong ties are present in situations where quangocrats are appointed by politicians, 
when a quango was established by the hiving off of a departmental unit, or when 
quangocrats are seconded civil servants. The following hypothesis can now be 
formulated:
HYPOTHESIS 2.6:
The closer quangocrats are to politicians, the more efficient and effective 
policy implementation will be.
Finally, quangocrats will prefer compliance to deviance if the chance of getting caught
26 Small quangos may also profit from their size; they are less visible to politicians. While this reduces the 
chance of getting caught at being inefficient or ineffective, it may also threaten the continuation of their exis- 
tence. If quangos are not noticed, it becomes more difficult for compliant quangos to obtain social approval, 
while deviant quangos lose the opportunity to  obtain (larger) budgets, more tasks and fringe benefits.
27 This hypothesis may seem contradictory to hypothesis 2.2 which stated that monopolist quangos are less 
efficient and effective. However, the absence of competitors that could perform the same task (a monopoly) 
is different from the absence of other organizations in the same policy field (a visible quango). A monopolist 
quango in a small policy area is expected to have more opportunities to display deviant behaviour, but at the 
same time it is more visible and therefore not indined to deviate. Beforehand, it cannot be predicted which 
of the two aspects will be most decisive.
n  Following Granovetter's (1973) seminal article on "the strength of weak ties", a debate started on the 
effects of the cohesion of networks. In general, it is assumed that strong ties induce compliance. However, 
Flache and Macy (1996) argue that high cohesion in groups can also lead to  deviance. ''[P]eer pressure" they 
conclude (p.23) "can be an effective instrument for blocking compliance, especially in groups in which the 
cost of compliance is high relative to  the value of approval". So, if the exchange of social approval between 
peers is more important to  quangocrats than acquiring the principal's approval through compliance, they 
may prefer deviance over compliance even if they are close to the principal. See also subsection 3.3.4.2.
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and being closed down is expected to be high (cf. Torenvlied, 1996a:50-51 on agent's 
fear of loss of reputation). The chance of being caught is expected to be perceived as 
higher in quangos that are hived off rather than hived in. Quangocrats who originate 
from former departmental units are used to control being strict (hierarchical) and 
omnipresent, with high chances of being caught at deviant behaviour. Another 
example could be the way in which quangos are financed. Quangos that have to 
adhere to the tight rules of the State Budget, have less opportunities to deviate than 
quangos who charge fees to customers, and will therefore prefer compliance with the 
principal's goals. This leads to the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 2.7:
The higher quangocrats perceive the risk o f getting caught at deviant
behaviour, the more efficient and effective policy implementation will be.
The relationship between accountability of quangocrats and the efficiency and 
effectiveness of policy implementation seems relatively simple and straightforward. 
However, monitoring can have unintended consequences as well. These are discussed 
in the next section.
3.3.4. Performance paradox
So far, it has been assumed that monitoring, or accountability, will provide correct 
and full information on the efficiency and effectiveness of policy implementation. This 
need not always be the case. N ot only is it not realistic to assume that monitoring will 
provide fu ll information, which can all be evaluated and processed by a principal (cf. 
bounded rationality, see also subsection 3.2.4), but performance assessment may also 
have unintended consequences that invalidate the fullness and correctness of 
information. One such unintended consequence is called the performance paradox 
(Meyer & O'Shaugnessy, 1993; Meyer 8c Gupta, 1994). It refers to a weak correlation 
between performance indicators and performance. This phenemonen is caused by the 
tendency of performance indicators (Pis) to run down over time. They lose their value 
as measurements of performance and can no longer discriminate between good and 
bad performers. As a result, the relationship between actual and reported performance 
deteriorates.
Such deterioration is caused by four processes (Meyer & Gupta, 1994:330-342). 
The first process is called positive learning, i.e. as performance improves Pis lose their 
sensitivity in detecting bad performance. Second, perverse learning may occur, i.e. 
when, although performance seems to improve, there is no actual improvement and 
perhaps even a deterioration of performance. The third process, selection, refers to the 
replacement of poor performers with better performers which reduces differences in 
performance. And fourth, suppression occurs when differences in performance are ig- 
nored. To solve the problem of the running down of performance indicators, Meyer 
and Gupta suggest that organizations should use various and non-correlated but 
comparable indicators to assess their performance. They refer to this as the paradoxical 
model of performance assessment.
It is important to understand that the paradox is not about performance itself, 
but about the reports on performance. Contrary to the expectation, Pis do not give an 
accurate report of performance. This could mean that performance is worse than
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reported (over-representation), but also that performance is better than reported 
(under-representation). In the latter case, the performance paradox might be considered 
harmless. However, when the results of performance assessment are used to evaluate 
organizations or persons, situations can arise where these are unjustly sanctioned. An 
example will illustrate this, given by Wiebrens and Essers (1999) who report on the 
percentage of crimes solved by the Dutch police. The percentage is decreasing, 
indicating that the police's performance is deteriorating. However, during the time 
period studied more perpretators have been arrested, prosecuted, and penalized than 
before, which would indicate an improvement of performance. Wiebrens and Essers 
maintain that crime has developed in a way that invalidates the PI 'percentage solved 
crime'. For one, crime has become more violent, but the PI does not differentiate 
between, for example, fellonies and misdemeanors (cf. suppression). Moreover, more 
groups of criminals have been arrested committing a crime together, which reduces the 
average number of crimes per criminal (cf. reversed perverse learning). Wiebrens and 
Essers conclude that it is not the police who is performing badly, but the indicator 
and that the PI should therefore be replaced.
An example of a performance paradox in a case of over-representation is taken 
from Smith (1995). In the British National Health Service it was agreed that patients 
should be no longer than two years on a waiting list for an operation. This measure 
appeared successful, as the average waiting time decreased. However, on further inspec- 
tion it was found that, the waiting time only beginning after the first hospital consul- 
tation, consultation was postponed in order to decrease the waiting time (perverse 
learning). In fact, the average waiting time did not decrease at all, but was merely 
shifted in time. The PI did not accurately reflect performance; it reported an improve­
ment where there was none.
O ther examples of the performance paradox are found in, for example, the 
educational field (see SCA [School Curriculum and Assessment Authority], 1997; 
Weiss & Piderit, 1999). In the next section other situations in which the performance 
paradox can occur will be discussed.
3.3.4.1. Unintended and deliberate performance paradoxes
As with deviant behaviour, it might be argued that the occurence of the performance 
paradox is facilitated by the information asymmetry between principal and agent. The 
unequal distribution of information can cause efficiency and effectiveness gains to be 
underestimated. Inefficiency and ineffectiveness can also remain undetected, because of 
manipulation of information by the agent. A performance paradox can thus be an 
unintended or the deliberate result of behaviour of agents and principals.
Unintended performance paradoxes
An unintended performance paradox can, for example, be the result of minimization 
of monitoring costs (see subsection 3.2.4). A one-shot introduction of (a minimal 
amount of) accountability requirements may reduce monitoring costs in the short run, 
but, as noted earlier, performance indicators have a tendency to run down and need to 
be changed over time (Meyer & Gupta, 1994). If they are not, indicators do no longer 
provide an accurate picture of performance (cf. the police example before). This need 
not imply that an executive agent is performing inefficiently, as it could well be that
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indicators became obsolete through positive learning. In that case, a compliant quango 
is not recognized as such. O n the other hand, minimal monitoring could also lead to 
other, more perverse effects as will be discussed below.
Another cause of an unintended performance paradox is the elusiveness of the 
objectives of public policies (Wilson, 1989:32-33). Because politicians want to please as 
many voters as possible, policies often have many, and sometimes contradictory, goals 
(cf. subsection 3.3.1). This complicates the evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness 
of policy implementation, for it is difficult to determine which objectives are most 
important and to whom (cf. suppression). Moreover, policy goals are often non- 
quantifiable and hard to measure. The risk of not choosing the best indicator(s) 
increases under such conditions, invalidating performance assessment. Again, this does 
not necessarily imply inefficient policy implementation; there is just no proper way to 
assess (in-)efficiency. This situation becomes even more complicated when the agent is 
a monopolist. The lack of comparative information or benchmarks makes evaluation 
and assesssment of performance difficult, also for the agent.
Furthermore, the chance of a performance paradox occurring is enhanced by a 
strong emphasis on monitoring and efficiency within the organization. The extensive 
use of PIs can create a situation in which agents learn what aspects of their work are 
important to the principal. Smith (1995) labels this 'measure fixation'. By increasing 
the efficiency and effectiveness of those aspects, agents are assured from the principal's 
approval (gaming, ibid.). Such learning effects and anticipatory behaviour of agents 
could, in the end, lead to ossification, i.e. organizational paralysis due to an excessively 
rigid system of performance evaluation (ibid.). Agents will aim all their efforts at 
meeting the principal's monitoring demands. It is then no longer relevant whether 
policy implementation is taking place in the most efficient manner (cf. suppression). 
As long as performance appears to be efficient, both principal and agent will be 
satisfied. Their goals are attained and there is no need to change their behaviour.
Deliberate performance paradoxes
Agents can also use the information asymmetry to deliberately evoke a performance 
paradox. For example, agents can 'sabotage' monitoring when they consider 
monitoring an act of distrust by the principal (cf., among others, Barkema, 1994; 
Ghoshal 8t Moran, 1996). Sabotage, such as delay or non-cooperative behaviour 
(Breton & Wintrobe, 1982), does not necessarily impair efficient and effective policy 
implementation, but contaminates the relation between reported and actual performan­
ce (cf. adverse selection).
O n the other hand, deviant agents can use the information asymmetry to hide in­
efficient and ineffective policy implementation from the principal (perverse learning). 
By misrepresenting or misinterpreting PIs (Smith, 1995) agents increase the 
opportunities to behave in a deviant manner without being caught (cf. moral hazard). 
Moreover, the continuation of their existence as an executive agent is safeguarded, be­
cause the principal is convinced that policy implementation is done efficiently and 
effectively. In fact, one could argue that a deliberate performance paradox is a type of 
deviant behaviour.
Smith (1995) mentions several ways in which agents can escape being caught at 
deviant behaviour, and create a performance paradox. For example, they can 
emphasize easily quantifiable aspects of performance (tunnel vision), and leave out
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reports on aspects of policy implementation that are difficult to measure. Also, they 
can confine themselves to reporting on the performance of parts of the organization, 
preferably those parts that are most efficient (suboptimization), or on short term 
objectives (myopia). In this context, LeGrand & Bartlett (1993:31-34) refer to cream 
skimming. Cream skimming, or cherry picking, is the tendency of executive agents to 
discriminate against inefficient aspects of the policies to be implemented, by providing 
services or goods only to those citizens who make the least or least expensive use of 
them (e.g. in health care, chronically ill patients are excluded). Cream skimming not 
only allows agents to reduce their efforts, it also reduces expenditures and makes 
agents appear efficient.
The less monitoring agents face, the stronger the information asymmetry, and the 
more leeway agents have to deliberately create a performance paradox and hide their 
deviant behaviour. In the case of monopolist agents, besides a lack of information to 
evaluate performance, there are no substitute agents This can force the principal to 
allow some inefficiency, ineffectiveness or deviant behaviour by the agent (cf. 'reversal 
of control'; subsection 3.2.3).
In sum, the performance paradox can occur as an unintended or a deliberate result of 
the behaviour of principals and agents. Because both actors lack the incentives to 
change the situation a paradox in progress will continue to reinforce itself. Principals 
will want to avoid additional (monitoring) costs and agents can use a performance 
paradox to appear to be performing well, thus safeguarding their existence. Only a 
compliant agent whose performance is under-reported, can be expected to want to 
eliminate the paradox. However, a compliant agent is also inclined to comply with the 
principal's wish to minimalize monitoring costs, which will reduce the desire to alter 
performance assessment.
A performance paradox can obscure the assessment of the efficiency and effective­
ness of policy implementation, and interfere with the expected effects of conditions on 
efficiency and effectiveness of quangos (see subsection 3.3.3). Below, I shall discuss 
circumstances under which a performance paradox might occur, either unintended or 
deliberately.
3.3.4.2. Occurence of a performance paradox
Unintended and deliberate performance paradoxes are the results of different cir­
cumstances. However, a deliberate paradox can occur only i f  the conditions for an 
unintended paradox are present as well, particularly an information asymmetry.
As noted before, there is a strong relationship between deviant behaviour and a 
deliberate performance paradox. In fact, the performance paradox can be seen as a type 
of deviant behaviour, because it prevents the principal from detecting inefficient or 
ineffective behaviour by the agent. Conditions that induce deviant behaviour will also 
increase the chance that other perverse effects occurs, such as a performance paradox. 
The same conditions as discussed in subsection 3.3.3 on deviance will therefore be 
examined below on their effect on the occurence of a performance paradox. The same 
numbering is used, added with a 'P' to indicate that they relate to the performance pa­
radox. Some new hypotheses will be added also (see summary in in section 3.5).
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Ownership of production rights
Earlier, it was argued that the more production rights quangocrats own, the less they 
behave deviantly (cf. hypothesis 2.1). In that case, there is no need to manipulate 
information to hide inefficiencies either (so, no hidden information nor perverse 
learning). A performance paradox is less likely to occur.
Moreover, if quangocrats have more production rights, they stand to benefit 
more from efficiency gains, such as surpluses.29 Also, they can use their ownership of 
rights to counteract inefficiencies, for example by firing bad performers. In order to do 
so, quangos require good insight into their performance, unobscured by a performance 
paradox. The following hypothesis can be formulated:
HYPOTHESIS 2.1P:
The more production rights quangos own, the smaller the chance that a 
. performance paradox will occur.
Competition
A monopolist quango is expected to have more opportunities to hide information on 
the efficiency of policy implementation, because usually it is the sole supplier of 
information on its performance. However, the lack of competitors reduces the threat 
of dismissal (see subsection 3.3.3) and decreases the necessity of hiding inefficiencies. 
Therefore, while a monopolist situation is expected to induce more inefficiency (cf. 
hypothesis 2.2), it is not necessarily expected to lead to a deliberate performance 
paradox as well. An unintended performance paradox can occur, though, because of 
the lack of comparative information (e.g. under-representation).
As stated earlier, competition is expected to improve efficiency (cf. hypothesis 
2.2). Because competition makes it imperative that quangos appear as efficient as 
possible, it can also lead to a deliberate performance paradox (e.g. manipulation of 
information). The following hypothesis is formulated:
HYPOTHESIS 2.2P:
I f  quangos are monopolists, the chance that an unintended performance 
paradox occurs increases; whereas i f  quangos face competition, the chance 
increases that a deliberate performance paradox occurs.
A (semi-)monopoly can be the result of a lack of competition but can also be caused 
by high specific investments (see subsection 3.2.3).
Corporatism
Hypothesis 2.3 predicted that the participation of interest groups could improve 
quango performance, provided that interest groups value the same goals as politicians, 
namely efficiency and effectiveness. If the goals of interest groups diverge from those
29 Obtaining (large) surpluses may not always be in the best interest of quangos. The principal may perceive 
surpluses as a sign that a quango apparently can do the same job with less money, and decide to cut the 
budget for next year. Therefore, most quangos that obtain surpluses will be inclined to 'retain' them  by, for 
example, making Capital reservations for next years or making extra investments in new personnel or 
equipment. Surpluses are then not reported in the nett result of performance. This could be seen as a way of 
hiding information i.e. a performance paradox. However, it is not so much the right of the quango to retain 
surpluses that leads to the hiding of information, but the way in which the principal deals with reported 
surpluses. Therefore, this line of reasoning is not contradictory with hypothesis 2.1P (see below).
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of politicians, inefficiency and ineffectiveness can be the result. In both cases, a 
performance paradox can be expected to occur. In the first case, quangocrats want to 
appear as efficient and effective as possible and might try to manipulate information. 
Also, the commitment to efficiency and effectiveness can lead to over-estimation of 
certain aspects of performance, although this need not necessarily be done deliberately. 
In the second case, quangocrats want to hide their inefficiencies by manipulating 
information deliberately.
Politicians can use the participation of interest groups as a substitute for formal, 
and perhaps more expensive, monitoring devices. However, in that case politicians 
place themselves outside the monitoring process, which reduces the transparancy of 
performance assessment for them. Politicians no longer can be sure about the adequacy 
of performance evaluations. Furthermore, the distance between politicians - who 
decide on the fate of quangos - and monitoring gives room for manipulation of 
information, particularly when interest groups have other intentions than politicians.
It would seem therefore that the participation of interest groups does not prevent 
an unintended performance paradox, and even may cause a deliberate paradox when 
the goals of interest groups diverge from those of politicians:
HYPOTHESIS 2.3P:
The more the goals o f interest groups participating in quangos diverge from  
the goals o f politicians, the higher the chance that a performance paradox 
occurs.
Accountability
Hypothesis 2.4 stated that accountability requirements stimulate efficiency. However, 
as argued in subsection 3.3.4.1, the effect of monitoring by means of accountability 
requirements and performance indicators is not that simple and straightforward.30 Here 
the difference between an unintended and deliberate performance paradox becomes 
important.
An unintended performance paradox is the result of a discrepancy between PIs and the 
objectives of policy implementation (Smith, 1995). This discrepancy can arise if 
performance has improved beyond the measurement capacity of the indicators (cf. 
positive learning; Meyer & Gupta, 1994:331), or if the objectives of performance are 
difficult to translate into appropriate indicators. In quangos with only a few 
performance indicators, fixed indicators, indicators that cannot be compared over time, 
or that are focussed only on easily quantifiable aspects of performance, an 
(unintentional) performance paradox is more likely to occur. In that case, reports on 
performance do not give a full and fair representation of actual performance, whether 
that performance is efficient or not. This leads to a new hypothesis:
30 The performance paradox can be seen as an unintended consequence of monitoring (cf. Leeuw, 1996). The 
need for m onitoring after the establishment of a quango has led to other unintended consequences. For 
example, Ghoshal and Moran (1996) discuss the increased amount of rules imposed upon quangos after being 
established, and the establishment of regulators, charged with supervision of quangos. Both developments 
restrict the autonomy of quangos, while quangos were meant to have more autonomy than government 
bureaucracy. Kicken et al. (1998:161) have referred to  this phenomenon as the 'm yth of autonomization'.
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HYPOTHESIS 2.8P:
The more diverse the system o f performance measurement (number, range, 
variation and comparability o f indicators), the smaller the chance that 
a performance paradox will occur.
Because the elusiveness of policy objectives contributes strongly to the occurence of a 
performance paradox - making it more difficult to determine Pis and performance - it 
is expected that the clearer these objectives are formulated, the smaller the chances are 
that an (unintended) performance paradox will occur. Accordingly, the following 
(new) hypothesis is formulated:
HYPOTHESIS 2.9P:
The more policy objectives are formulated in clear and specific terms, the 
smaller the chance that a performance paradox will occur.
Moreover, as Wilson (1989:109) stresses, clear goals will induce a sense of mission 
among employees of public agencies. However, if that mission emphasizes the use of 
Pis to achieve efficiency and effectiveness of policy implementation, it can create a 
situation in which the behaviour of quangocrats becomes more and more focussed on 
indicators. Such 'measure fixation' or suboptimization (Smith, 1995) and perverse 
learning (Meyer & Gupta, 1994) can invalidate the relationship between performance 
and indicators.31 A performance paradox will be the result. This leads to the following 
hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 2.10P:
The more efficiency, effectiveness and the use o f performance indicators are 
stressed in a quango, the higher the chance that a performance paradox 
will occur.
Hypotheses 2.8P-2.10P discussed three new conditions relating to accountability that 
increase the chance of an unintended performance paradox. Only if these conditions 
are present, can a deliberate performance paradox occur also. Little diversity in the 
system of performance assessment and unclear policy objectives are prerequisites for 
hiding or manipulating information.
Conditions that influence the chances of getting caught at being inefficient will 
determine whether or not quangocrats try  to display deviant behaviour. In subsection 
3.3.3 three such conditions were mentioned that influence whether quangocrats will 
prefer deviance or compliance: size, closeness and risk perception. Below these are 
discussed again and one more new condition is added: supervision.
Small quangos in terms of, for example, number of personnel and budget, were expec­
ted to be more efficient and effective because ill performance is difficult to hide or 
undo (cf. hypothesis 2.5). Small quangos therefore have stronger incentives to perform 
efficiently. This could evoke manipulation of information and thus a performance 
paradox.
31 Moreover, as more attention (time and money) is given to Pis, the costs of policy implementation by the 
quango will increase, leading to  possible new inefficiencies.
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However, small quangos are expected to have less means to manipulate 
information. Also, quangos operating in small policy sectors were expected to perform 
more efficiently, because their performance is more visible. The chance of getting 
caught at deviant behaviour or evoking a deliberate performance paradox decreases 
with the size of the policy sector (and the number of other quangos present in that 
sector). This leads to the hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 2.5P:
The smaller quangos are, or the smaller the policy sector in which they 
operate, the smaller the chance that a performance paradox will occur.
Closeness
Closeness was expected to enhance commitment to the principal and stimulate com­
pliance (cf. hypothesis 2.6). Therefore, it does not seem likely that quangocrats who 
are close and committed to politicians will try to hide or manipulate information on 
their performance.32 Moreover, if quangocrats are close to their principal, the chance 
of getting caught at deviant behaviour or creating a deliberate performance paradox 
increases. The following hypothesis is formulated:
HYPOTHESIS 2.6P:
The closer quangocrats are to politicians, the smaller the chance 
that a performance paradox will occur.
Perception o f risks
Only quangocrats who prefer deviance to compliance will try  to manipulate 
information to  hide their inefficiencies and safeguard their existence as an executive 
agent - in particular when they perceive the risk of getting caught as low. Risks were 
expected to be perceived as higher in quangos that are, for example, hived off rather 
than hived in, or financed from the state budget rather than through fees or levies (cf. 
hypothesis 2.7). The following hypothesis is formulated:
HYPOTHESIS 2.7P:
The higher quangocrats perceive the risk o f being caught at deviant 
behaviour, the smaller the chance that a performance paradox will occur.
Supervision
Through the appointment of a supervisor or regulator, performance is more thorough- 
ly monitored, which increases the risk that quangocrats will be caught at deviant 
behaviour. The presence of a supervisor makes it more difficult to hide or manipulate 
information, but at the same time increases the interest of quangocrats to appear as 
efficient and effective as possible. Quangocrats will therefore create a performance 
paradox only if they think that the supervisor will not be able to detect it, because,
52 As stated before, closeness does not necessarily always have to lead to more compliance (cf. Flache & 
Macy, 1996). If quangos are closer to eachother than to  the principal, their interest in the exchange of social 
approval among peers may exceed their desire to comply to the principal's wishes. The chance that a 
performance paradox will occur increases. This could be assumed to be the case when, for example, quangos 
are held accountable for ill performance and threatened with dismissal. By combining forces, quangos will 
fight that threat from  the principal.
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for example, it operates at a distance.33 Also, when the supervisor has no comparative 
information - as is the case with monopolist quangos - chances decrease of getting 
caught at deviant behaviour and creating a performance paradox. The more 
opportunities a supervisor has to monitor a quango's performance, the less likely it 
becomes that it will create a performance paradox. The following new hypothesis is 
formulated:
HYPOTHESIS 2.IIP:
The more opportunities a supervisor has to assess the performance o f quangos,
the smaller the chance becomes that a performance paradox will occur.
3.4. Extensions of the model
In the construction of the theoretical model in section 3.2 and 3.3, I have made a 
number of simplifying assumptions. Moreover, the model was limited to only two 
corporate actors between whom no interaction was allowed. This makes the model 
rather static and abstract. To improve the model, one could add new elements (cf. 
method of decreasing abstraction; Lindenberg, 1992), in particular other actors and 
possible interactions between actors. Below, I shall discuss these possible extensions 
(see also chapter 6).
Other actors
In the model, it was assumed that legislature comprises all elected politicians: ministers 
and Members of Parliament (MPs). In view of the fact that legislation is their mutual 
responsibility, this seemed logical. However, in reality ministers and MPs have 
different roles and authorities. Also, between MPs there are many differences, in 
particular as to whether they belong to governing parties or not. (As stated before, I 
do not expect political ideology to play a decisive role in quangocratization.) It would 
therefore be worthwhile to make a distinction between these different types of (still 
corporate) actors. The interests of ministers and MPs when it comes to the choice of 
an executive agent might be contradictory. Ministers want to reduce political risks, 
whereas MPs can be expected to prefer to hold ministers accountable.
W ithin the corporate actor 'quango', a distinction can be made between the 
board, management and operators (cf. Wilson, 1989). Assumptions can be made about 
the different and potentially conflicting interests of these (corporate) actors. For 
example, while operators benefit from deviance, managers are held accountable for 
inefficiencies and will strive for compliance. Another interesting point in this respect 
relates to Torenvlied's (1996a,b) work on deviant policy implementation. Executive 
agents use their discretionary authority to implement policies according to their own 
policy position. In some cases, politicians allow executive agents such discretion, be­
cause the agents are more familiar with the policy field, and customers, ('street-level 
quangocrats').
Although government bureaucrats were discussed during the development of the
33 O n the other hand, the smaller the distance between the regulator and a quango is, the more opportunities 
the quango has to ’capture' the regulator (cf. Van Waarden, 1995). Such capture allows the quango to 
manipulate information w ithout being caught, because the regulator will not report it.
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model (see subsection 3.3.1 and 3.3.2), no attention was paid to their interest in 
quangocratization. However, as Dunleavy (1991:ch.6) has pointed out, bureaucrats may 
have a high interest in the hiving off of their departmental unit, since that will provide 
them with more autonomy and hence more status.34 Particularly in a system where 
bureaucrats play an important role in the decision making process (cf. Van Waarden, 
1999b), they can use their influence to, for example, facilitate the hiving off of their 
own unit and turn it into a quango (Christensen, 1999).
Finally, interest groups played no (active) role in the model, whereas in reality 
they are important actors in policy making and implementation. N ot only do they 
provide an opportunity to establish patronage (i.e. by letting them participate in 
quangos as board members), they can 'capture' an agent and strongly influence its 
behaviour. Future incorporation of interest groups into the model could focus on 
different aspects, such as their interest in patronage, whether patronage can substitute 
monitoring, and how participation of interest groups will affect legislature's choice of 
an executive agent, or quango performance.
Interaction
N o interaction between legislature and executive agent was included in the model. In 
reality, these actors will no doubt try  to influence each other (see, for example, the 
performance paradox). The efficiency of policy implementation by a particular agent 
will have consequences for the next choice politicians make. Therefore, a feedback 
loop could be added to a more elaborate model.
Another possibility to include interaction relates to the assumption that 
politicians will cooperate to pass legislation. Allowing for conflict between politicians 
would create a more dynamic representation of reality (see e.g. models on decision- 
making in policy networks, Stokman 1994; Stokman & Zeggelink, 1996). Moreover, it 
would immediately raise the (now neglected) issue of a free-rider problem: why would 
one (group of) politician(s) make a choice that other politicians benefit from as well 
(i.e. by an increase in their electoral support)? The same holds for monitoring. 
M onitoring was assumed to increase efficiency gains. However, as all politicians bene­
fit from efficiency gains - surpluses can be used to implement new policies or reduce 
taxes - one single politician has no incentive to increase his efforts of imposing 
accountability requirements. This would imply that monitoring would not take place 
at all, even if imposing monitoring increases the status of politicians.
Finally, the model's complexity could be increased by allowing for politicians to 
have a choice between more than two executive agents (cf. table 1.1). See, for example, 
Van Leerdam (1999), who has developed a model to predict the choice of legislature 
between contract agencies or ZBOs. Politicians could use competition between dif­
ferent types of executive agents and/or quangos as a means to increase the chance that 
policy implementation will be done efficiently and effectively.
34 Being the head of a quango also renders a higher salary (cf. Algemene Rekenkamer, 1995: 51-52).
Theory 71
3.5. Summary
This chapter set out to provide an explanation of quangocratization by answering two 
questions: (i) under which conditions do politicians choose quangos as executive agents, 
rather than government bureaucracy, for the implementation o f policies, and (ii) under 
which conditions will policy implementation by quangos be more efficient and effective 
than implementation by government bureaucracy? Both questions were dealt with 
consecutively. The theoretical model used the assumptions of rational choice theory: 
actors pursue goals given the constraints of the situation in which they find 
themselves. Goals and constraints are used to predict or explain behaviour.
After describing the factors that determine the choice of an executive agent ( in 
this case a quango) by politicians, several conditions were discussed that are expected 
to influence this choice. Table 3.1 provides an overview of the hypotheses that were 
formulated and which will be tested in chapter 4.
Table 3.1. Expected effects on choice of politicians for quangos as an executive agent
No. Hypothesis Expected effect
1.1 Political ideology 0
1.2 Economic conditions + 1
1.3 Electoral competition +
1.4 Corporatism +
1.5 Collective goods ■
1.6 Specific investments ■
1.7 Imitation +
1.8 Monitoring -
0 — no decisive effect; - = a nepative effect; + = a positive effect
1 In fact, a curvlinear effect is expected.
Next, attention was paid to the efficiency and effectiveness of policy implementation 
by quangos. After establishing the determinants of the behaviour of quangocrats, con­
ditions were discerned that are expected to stimulate quango performance. Table 3.2 
summarizes the hypothesized effects.
In sections 3.2 and 3.3, the issue of the effect of monitoring was raised (cf. hypotheses 
1.8 and 2.4). Politicians were expected to use monitoring to collect information on the 
efficiency of policy implementation. In subsection 3.3.4, however, it was revealed that 
the relationship between monitoring and the correctness of information is not simple 
and straightforward. This was labelled the performance paradox. Conditions were 
discussed that could elicit such a paradox. Tabel 3.2 also includes the hypotheses that
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predict under which conditions a performance paradox will occur. All hypotheses in 
table 3.2 will be further investigated in the two case studies in chapter 5.
Table 3.2. Expected effects on the efficiency and effectiveness of policy implementa­
tion by quangos and on the occurence of a performance paradox
No. Hypothesis Effect on 
quango 
performance
Occurence of 
performance 
paradox
2.1(P) Ownership production rights + -
2.2(P) Competition + +
2-3 (P) Corporatism + + /-
2.4(P) Accountability requirements + ?
2.5(P) Size ■ +
2.6(P) Closeness to politicians + ■
2.7(P) Risk perception + -
2.8P Diversity Pis -
2.9P Clear policy objectives ■
2.10P Emphasis on efficiency, Pis +
2. IIP Supervision +/-
- =. negative effect; + = positive effect; + /- = mixed prediction; 
? = no prediction
The theoretical model constructed in this chapter is but a first step towards an 
explanation of quangocratization. In order to better represent reality, it needs to 
include more actors and allow for more dynamics and complexity. Some suggestions 
were made to that end. The results of this study, discussed in chapters 4 and 5, will 
perhaps provide some more suggestions for possible extensions or alterations of the 
model (see chapter 6).
4. CAUSES
This chapter deals with the first research question of this study: under which conditions 
do politicians choose quangos as executive agents, rather than government bureaucracy, for 
the implementation o f policies? In section 3.2 eight hypotheses were formulated. This 
chapter sets out to test these hypotheses.1 However, not all data required for such a 
test are available. Most important, there is no information on the choice of politicians 
for government bureaucracy as an executive agent, only information on the number of 
decisions to establish quangos, from the NCA  survey (Algemene Rekenkamer, 1995).2 
Therefore, it is assumed that within the population of choices of an executive agent, 
choosing government bureaucracy is the same as not choosing a quango. This implies 
that conclusions based on this study relate to conditions that induce quangocratization 
and not to  conditions that discourage the choice of government bureaucracy as an 
executive agent.
Another problem with the data is that the NCA survey does not provide all 
necessary information to  test the hypotheses. In some cases additional information 
could be collected from other sources. In section 4.1 the additional information 
sources that were used and the decisions that were made to enable testing of the 
hypotheses are described. The type of analysis that was used is explained in section
4.2. Next, the results are discussed. Section 4.3 starts with some descriptive statistics. 
In section 4.4 the results of the testing of the hypotheses are presented. Two additional 
analyses have been performed on (i) the establishment of clusters of quangos and (ii) 
the amount of accountability requirements imposed upon quangos (see section 4.5). 
The results of these additional analyses are used to improve the interpretation of the 
results in section 4.4. All findings are summarized in section 4.6, which also discusses 
the implications of the results for the theoretical model as developed in chapter 3 and 
for future research on the causes of quangocratization.
4.1. O perationalizations and data collection
4.1.1. Choice of politicians for quangos
The choice of politicians for quangos as an executive agent is measured as the number 
of decisions to establish a (cluster of) quango(s) per year. A  decision is reflected by the 
passing of a law, which constitutes the legal basis of the quango or cluster at hand 
(also referred to as the statutes of a quango). Per year, the number of laws on the 
establishment of quangos is counted as the number of decisions. Because decisions can
1 Earlier drafts of parts of this chapter were published before (Van Thiel, Leeuw, Siegers & Flap, 1999).
2 See chapter 2 for the definition of a quango in the NCA survey.
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lead to the establishment of more than one quango at the same time, the analysis will 
be repeated using the actual number of established quangos per year as dependent 
variable (see subsection 4.5.1).
The primary data source is the survey of the Netherlands Court of Audit (NCA) 
on Dutch quangos, in particular ZBOs of the category 'public bodies' in table 1.1 
(Algemene Rekenkamer, 1995).3 Chapter 2 already gave a detailed description of the 
information on quangos in this database, which is why I shall not go into much detail 
here.
It is important to note that the unit of analysis is the number of decisions or 
quangos per year, which means that the number of observations N  equals the number 
of years (and not the number of decisions or the number of quangos). The lack of 
information on the choice of the legislature for government bureaucracy as an 
executive agent made it necessary to use this type of dependent variable. Because no 
comparison could be made between the choice for alternative types of agents, indivi- 
dual decisions on executive agents cannot be analysed. Instead, I shall investigate which 
conditions lead to large numbers of quangos in a certain year. These conditions are 
regarded as the causes of quangocratization.
The number of years is restricted to the period 1950-1993 (N=44) to facilitate 
data collection on the explanatory variables (see below). The exclusion of earlier years 
is also meant to eliminate some methodological problems, such as the collection of 
data on wartime periods and on periods of which no records exist. The majority of 
quangos in the N CA  survey is still included in the analysis, though. Between 1950 and 
1993, 124 decisions were taken to establish a quango, resulting in 392 quangos (77% 
and 71% respectively of the total number of decisions [162] and the total number of 
quangos [545] in the NCA survey). Figure 2.1 in chapter 2 already displayed the 
number of decisions and the number of established quangos. Section 4.3 offers some 
more descriptive statistics.
4.1.2. Explanatory variables
Based on the theoretical model developed in chapter 3, three models are distinguished - 
and tested - to explain the choice of politicians for quangos as an executive agent. 
First, the base model consists of three control variables only: time, size of government 
and size of policy sector. This model is used to make sure that the analyzed increase in 
the number of quangos is more than just an autonomous trend. Second, the rational 
actor model that, besides the control variables, also includes the conditions specified in 
hypotheses 1.1 to 1.6. This model is called the rational actor model because it assumes 
politicians to be rational actors. This assumption is released in the third model, the 
bounded rationality model. Imitation and monitoring are added as explanatory variables 
to the rational actor model. Politicians were expected to use imitation and monitoring 
to reduce the uncertainty on the effect of their decision - which is the result of their 
bounded rationality (cf. subsection 3.2.4).
3 The database contains only quangos that existed in 1993; quangos that were abolished before 1993 are 
excluded. As demonstrated in chapter 2, only 3% of the quangos was abolished. The number of missing data 
is therefore limited and will not pose a problem to the analysis.
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Information on the explanatory variables was collected from the NCA survey and 
other secondary sources (see also Appendix A). The limited number of observations 
(N = 44) necessitates economical use of the explanatory variables. If more than one 
operationalization of a variable was present, the best one was selected, preferably on 
theoretical grounds. All operationalizations and selections are explained below.
As the unit of analysis is the number of decisions per year, most explanatory 
variables are time-related. However, it does not seem realistic to expect that a 
particular variable in year t can induce a decision (i.e. a law) on the establishment of a 
quango in the same year. The procedures to develop, pass and implement laws are 
usually a lengthy process. That is why time-lags are included in the analyses, of one 
year and four years respectively.4
Control variables
Three control variables together form the base model: time, size of national 
government and size of policy sectors. These variables are included to ascertain 
whether quangocratization is not merely an autonomous trend. For example, it could 
seem logical to expect that when a government takes on more tasks, the chance that 
quangos are charged with these tasks increases, at least in a statistical sense. Therefore, 
the size of the national government and the size of policy sectors are included in the 
analyses.
The size of the government is measured as the total number of civil servants at 
national level (taken from: Van der Meer & Roborgh, 1993). The number of civil 
servants is measured only once every decade between 1950 and 1993. Therefore, it is 
assumed that the number of civil servants within one decade is fixed (see Appendix A). 
The larger the size of the government, the more quangos are expected to be 
established (+).5
The size of a policy sector is measured as the number of divisions within the 
parent department (taken from Carasso et al., 1994; see Appendix A). The number of 
departmental divisions in 1992 is used as a proxy (time-constant variable). There are 
two reasons for this choice. First, the classification of departments has changed over 
time and is not always consistent with the classification as used in the N CA  survey. A 
quango that was established in policy sector A in 1950 could well be classified under 
policy sector B in 1993. Because 1993 is the year of measurement in the NCA survey, 
the size of the policy sectors in 1992 - as measured by Carasso et al. - was used as a 
proxy. There are no differences in the classification of departments between 1992 and 
1993.
The second reason for using the proxy is that it is measured per quango (or 
actually policy sector), instead of per year. To create a measure for size of policy 
sector per year, a weighting formula is used. Each decision is weighted by the (log of
' The average time associated with new legislation is estimated as seven years; four years for its development 
at a department and three years for parliamentary procedures (Algemene Rekenkamer, 1994:6). However, it 
does seem reasonable to  expect that decisions on the type of executive agent take less time than the 
development of new policies in general. Therefore, shorter time-lags were used in the analyses (which also 
reduces the loss of cases).
5 O n the other hand, it might also be argued that the more quangos are established - particularly through 
hiving off - the smaller the core government will become. See chapter 6.
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the) size of the policy sector in which the quango operates. To ascertain the effect of 
size of policy sector on the decisions in a year, all decisions are aggregated per year 
and divided by the total number of decisions in that year. More quangos are expected 
to be established in larger policy sectors (+).6 This type of weighting formula is used 
for other variables as well, see below.
Political ideology
Hypothesis 1.1 stated that politicians with different politicial ideologies do not differ 
in their choice of quangos as executive agents. Political ideology is measured as the 
composition of the cabinet in office one or four years previous to the decision to 
establish a quango. Data on the composition of cabinets were taken from annual 
reports on parliamentary affairs (Kiezer en Parlement, 1950-1993) and the Central 
Bureau of Statistics (CBS, 1998c).
The Dutch political system has a strong tradition of having coalitions of christian 
democrats with either sociodemocrats or liberals. Between 1950-1993 there are only 
four years in which other coalitions existed (see Appendix A). Therefore, a dummy 
variable is used, indicating the presence of the social democratie party ('left wing 
coalition'), or not. The expected effect of this variable should be (close to) zero, and 
not statistically significant.
Economic conditions
In section 3.2, it was argued that both economic up-swing and down-swing will lead to 
more quangos. A distinction was made, though, between quangos established through 
hiving off and hiving in. The NCA  survey does not contain information on the origin 
of quangos, which means that it cannot be determined whether quangos are established 
by hiving in or hiving off. Therefore, the testing of hypothesis 1.2 will be limited to 
testing the effect of economic conditions in previous years on the number of decisions 
to establish quangos.7 Both economic up-swing and down-swing were expected to lead 
to a higher number of decisions to establish quangos.
Two well established indicators of economic conditions have been found. First, 
the percentage of economic growth, calculated as the percentage increase in gross 
market prices of national income (taken from: CBS, 1994, 1998d). An increase in the 
percentage of economic growth equals an increase in the economic up-swing and a 
decrease of economic down-swing. The second indicator is the percentage unemployed 
people of the total work force (CBS, 1998e). Increasing unemployment indicates less 
economic up-swing and more economic down-swing.
6 To allow for time-variation in this calculation, one needs to trace, per decision or quango, in which policy 
sector a quango is established and whether in 1993 it is listed in the same sector or in another, because of 
redassification. However, the N CA  survey does not contain information on the original policy sector - only 
the dassification of 1993 has been used. The listings in the State Directory before 1993 are inconlusive on 
this matter. Therefore, it was decided not to  include time-variation and use a time-constant variable as a 
proxy.
7 If the practitioner theory is correct and the establishment of quangos leads to more efficient and effective 
policy implementation (but see the criticism in section 1.3), one could also argue that the choice for quangos 
as an executive agent reduces government expenditures, decreasing economic decline or increasing the 
chances of economic growth. See also chapter 6.
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Electoral competition
Hypothesis 1.3 predicted that competition for votes among politicians will increase the 
number of decisions to establish quangos. Two operationalizations for electoral 
competition were found: elections, and the size of the parliamentary majority of a 
cabinet in office (source: Kiezer en Parlement, 1950-1993, see also Appendix A).
Elections are expected to increase the competition between politicians, and hence 
the number of decisions to establish quangos (+). A dummy variable is used that 
indicates whether in previous years (one and four years ago) elections were held or 
not.8
The second possible indicator is parliamentary majority, measured as the 
percentage of the total number of seats in the Second House (in Dutch: Tweede Kamer) 
of Dutch parliament, occupied by the political parties of the governing coalition. The 
larger the majority, the less electoral competition there is and hence the fewer 
decisions to establish quangos are taken (-). However, this operationalization is 
considered inappropriate, because it presupposes differences between politicians with 
different roles (ministers or MPs) or from different political parties. Because such 
differences were assumed not to exist in the theoretical model (see section 3.2), the in­
dicator 'elections' was preferred over 'parliamentary majority'.
Corporatism
To test whether quangos are indeed established more often in corporatist policy 
sectors, as predicted in hypothesis 1.4, the degree of corporatism of each sector had to 
be assessed. Policy sectors are defined as coinciding with the department responsible 
for policies in that sector (e.g., the policy field of education is headed by the Ministry 
of Education), in other words, the parent department of a quango. The degree of 
corporatism is measured as the number of external advisory boards per department. 
These boards are officially acknowledged by the government and consulted in the 
policy making process. Information on the number of boards was collected from the 
State Directory (Staatsalmanak) that lists all officially acknowledged external advisory 
boards, more than half of the members of which are professional experts, not civil 
servants of the department at hand (see Appendix A for the number of boards per 
sector).
However, the State Directory has listed these boards only since 1993. Before that, 
it listed committees, councils, tribunals, boards and quangos, in categories that 
repeatedly changed over time. The classification of departments changes as well, which 
complicates counting the advisory boards per department. That is why the listing as 
given in 1993 is taken as a proxy for corporatism (time-constant variable). 
Adventageous to this approach is that 1993 was also the year of measurement in the 
N C A  survey, which means that the same classification of parent departments for
Because the data on the percentage unemployed are only partially available for
the period 1950-1970 (see Appendix A), only the first indicator is used in the analyses.
A time-lag is applied.
8 It could also be argued that the prospect of elections increase electoral competition. Therefore, a separate 
analysis will be performed on the effect of elections in the year after the decision to  establish a quango.
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quangos is used. At face value, the number of advisory boards in 1993 seems to reflect 
the degree of corporatism per department over time, i.e. policy sectors with the most 
or least numbers of advisory boards in 1950 have high or low numbers of boards in 
1993 as well {Staatsalmanak, 1950-1993).
The inclusion of corporatism in the analysis is problematic because of its measurement 
per department and thus per decision, instead of per year. Decisions to establish 
quangos in policy sectors with different degrees of corporatism need to be aggregated 
in some way to establish the influence of corporatism on the total number of decisions 
in a particular year. To solve this problem, a weighting formula is used. The total 
number of decisions per year is weighted with the amount of corporatism per 
decision. For example: in year t three decisions are taken, one to establish a quango in 
a moderately corporatist sector and two in highly corporatist sectors. Each decision in 
that year is multiplied by its weight (the log of the number of advisory boards in the 
sector in question). All decisions are aggregated and divided again by the total number 
of decisions.9 The outcome of this formula shows the degree of corporatism of the 
total number of decisions in year t. In this manner, corporatism is calculated for each 
year. Contrary to other variables, no time-lag is applied because the corporatism 
variable is based on decisions in the year t itself.
Corporatism is expected to lead to more decisions to establish quangos (+). 
Because of the way corporatism was operationalized, the analyses can only show the 
establishment of large numbers of quangos (or none at all) in corporatist policy sectors 
in certain years. If such a result is indeed found, it will be - implicitly - concluded that 
corporatism causes quangocratization.
Collective goods
Hypothesis 1.5 stated that quangos wil not often be charged with the provision of 
collective goods. In other words, the decision to establish a quango will almost always 
concern non-collective goods.
Using the NCA  survey, collective goods can be operationalized in two ways: the 
task with which quangos are charged or the policy sector in which they operate (cf. 
Van den Doel & Van Velthoven, 1990:48-51). To determine the degree of 'collective- 
ness' of tasks and policy sectors, the two characteristics of collective goods are used: 
non-exclusiveness and jointness of supply (see for results Appendix A). For example, 
non-exclusiveness means that individual citizens cannot be exluded from the use of a 
good or, reversedly, citizens cannot escape policy implementation. Tasks of a 
supervisory nature (registration, certification, licensing, supervision) resemble collective 
goods more than tasks such as the granting of benefits on request, research, and advice. 
However, specific investments are also operationalized on the basis of the tasks of 
quangos (see below). To avoid the risks of multi-collinearity, only the second operatio- 
nalization - the collectiveness of policy areas - is therefore used in the analyses.
Policy sectors are categorized according to their degree of collectiveness, using the
9 Corporatism in year t -  sum of (decision in year t * degree of corporatism per decision) /  number of 
decisions in year t. Degree of corporatism is measured as the natural log of the number of advisory boards 
per department.
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second characteristic of collective goods: jointness of supply, i.e. the costs of 
production do not rise with an additional consumer. In chapter 1, the example of 
national defence was used to illustrate this property. A division is made between three 
categories of policy sectors, i.e. parent departments. Departments that perform core 
government functions, such as Defence, Finances, Justice, Foreign Affairs and the 
Home Office, are considered to provide collective goods. Departments that were 
established during the building and expansion of the modern western welfare state (e.g. 
education, welfare and social affairs) are attributed a moderate degree of collectiveness. 
In these policy sectors, goods are provided that can be classified as publicly provided 
private goods. The lowest degree of collectiveness is assigned to departments charged 
with tasks of an 'entrepreneurial' nature; services are rendered to particular groups of 
people of organizations (e.g., housing, traffic, economics and agriculture). These 
categories are used as weights (3, 2 and 1 respectively)10 in a similar weighting formula 
as with the operationalization of corporatism. N o time-lag is applied, for the same 
reason as before. The analyses will show whether, as expected, large numbers of 
quangos are established in policy sectors where non-collective goods are provided (-).
Specific investments
Hypothesis 1.6 stated that the more specific investments implementation of a policy 
requires, the less likely it is that a quango will be charged with this task. Therefore, 
only small numbers of quangos are expected to be charged with tasks that require 
specific investments.
To measure the amount of specificity, the tasks of quangos as listed in the NCA 
survey are recoded (see Appendix A). Some tasks require production means 
(knowledge, equipment) that can be used for other principals as well and are not that 
task-specific. For example, advice can be given or research can be done for all kinds of 
principals (non-specific). Tasks such as the large-scale granting of financial benefits, 
licensing, registration and the collection of fees are considered moderately specific; 
although administrative activities can be undertaken by many organisations and on 
behalf of many principals, they often require special software or knowledge of policies 
(moderately specific). Policy implementation that has'immediate (legal) consequences 
for citizens is assigned the highest degree of specificity, because this task is the 
prerogative of the government. Tasks such as supervision, certification, self-regulation, 
quasi-judicature, and the development and implementation of regulations can be 
carried out only on behalf of the government.
Again, a weighting formula is used to ascertain the influence of the degree of 
specifity on the total number of decisions or quangos in a particular year (weights of
1, 2 and 3 respectively).11 N o time-lag is added. Decisions to  charge quangos with 
policy implementation are expected to concern mostly tasks that require less specific 
investments (-).
Imitation
Hypothesis 1.7 introduced imitation as an explanation of politicians' choice of quangos
10 O ther weights were also tried, but did not lead to  other results than those reported here.
11 O ther weights were also tried, but did not lead to other results than those reported here.
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as an executive agent. It was argued that politicians - to reduce uncertainty and gain 
information about the effects of their decisions - try  to acquire experience with 
quangos. Repetition of decisions will result in an increase in the number of quangos. 
Therefore, the number of previous decisions is included in the analyses with a time-lag 
of one and four years respectively. In case of imitation one would expect a high 
number of previous decisions to lead to more decisions in year t (+).
Imitation was also expected to lead to an increase in the diversity of quangos, 
with respect to the tasks with which they are charged and the policy fields in which 
they operate. To measure this increase in diversity, three interaction terms are 
included in the analyses. These are: time with (i) corporatism, (ii) collective goods, and 
(iii) specific investments. N o time-lags are applied, as before with these variables. The 
expected effects of the interaction terms are:
after establishment of quangos in corporatist policy sectors first, they are also 
established in non-corporatist policy sectors (-);
after being first charged with non-specific tasks, quangos are also charged with 
specific tasks (+); and
after being first charged with the provision of non-collective goods, quangos are 
also charged with the provision of collective goods (+).
Monitoring
Hypothesis 1.8 stated that politicians will not prefer quangos as an executive agent if a 
large number of accountability requirements is necessary. Therefore, it is expected that 
politicians will choose quangos as an executive agent most often if only a few accoun­
tability requirements need to be made (-).
To measure the accountability requirements of a quango the accountability scale 
as developed in chapter 2 is used (see section 2.3.1). The scale is based on seven 
accountability requirements laid down in the law underlying the establishment of 
quangos. All information was taken from the NCA survey. Because the information is 
only available per decision and not per year, again a weighting procedure was 
necessary. To ascertain the influence of accountability requirements on the total 
number of decisions for each year, decisions were weighted according to the scale 
score (range 0-1), aggregated per year and divided by the total number of decisions. No 
time-lag is applied, because accountability requirements are imposed in the same year 
as the decision is taken.
Table 4.1 lists all operationalizations and the expected effects of the explanatory varia-
4.2. Method of analysis
Linear regression is considered an appropriate method of analysis. However, inspection 
of the data shows that two basic assumptions of linear regression are violated, namely 
(i) independency of the observations and (ii) a normal distribution of the dependent 
variable (cf. Long, 1997:12; Berry & Feldman, 1985:10-11).
Independency of the observations means that the number of decisions to establish 
quangos in year t is not influenced by the number of decisions in year t-1. If decisions 
are not independent, there is auto-correlation between the observations (see e.g. Nooij,
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Table 4.1. Operationalizations of the conditions expected to influence the choice of
politicians for quangos as an executive agent.
No. Hypothesis (effect) Operationalizations (expected effect)
1.1 political ideology (0) left-wing cabinet (0, n.s.)
1.2 economic success (+) percentage economic growth (+)
1.3 electoral competition (+) election year (+)
1.4 corporatism (+) number of acknowledged advisory boards (+)
1.5 collective goods (-) collectiveness of policy sectors (-)
1.6 specific investments (-) specificity of tasks (-)
1.7 imitation (+) 1. number of choices previous year (+)
2. time * corporatism (-)
3. time * collective goods (+)
4. time * specific investments (+)
1.8 monitoring (-) accountability scale score (-)
0 = no effect, + = positive effect, - = negative effect, + /- = mixed prediction 
n.s. = not statistically significant
1995:100; Barry & Feldman, 1985:76). There are several ways to deal with auto- 
correlation.12 Most preferable is the introduction of additional time-related explanatory 
variables in the regression analysis - based on theoretical grounds, of course. Such 
variables were already introduced. Time was one of the control variables, and the 
lagged value of the dependent variable X -  Yt_, was used as operationalization of imita­
tion (see subsection 4.1.2). Together these variables are expected to eliminate the effect 
of auto-correlation.13
The second violation of the assumptions of regression analysis concerns the 
distribution of the dependent variable: the number of decisions to establish quangos 
per year. This is a count variable. As counts are always positive integers and have a 
high variance, their distribution is not normal and the application of (ordinary) linear 
regression inappropriate.14 Instead, a method of analysis should be used which is based
12 A method to solve the problem of auto-correlation is to  use difference scores, and thus correct for the 
influence of auto-correlation on the dependent variable: However, this method requires some a 
priori notion of the type of dependency between the observations. Chapter 3 provides (too) little guidance 
on this matter. Another method to  counteract the effects of auto-correlation could be the use of a Cochrane 
O rcutt regression analysis 0ohnston, 1984:304-330). Both methods require a normal distribution of the 
dependent variable, however, which is not the case here (see the second violation).
13 A regression analysis confirmed the presence of auto-correlation (Durbin Watson coëfficiënt DW = 1.40). 
The introduction of the additional explanatory variables t and Y,., solved this problem (DW -1.98; DW = 2 
means no auto-correlation).
14 Because there is no information on decisions not to  charge a quango with policy implementation, logistic 
regression could not be applied.
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on a Poisson distribution, for example Poisson regression analysis (Long, 1997: ch.8; 
Agresti, 1996:80-93; Land, McCall & Nagin, 1996:394-402; Gardner, Mulvey & Shaw, 
1995:396; Barron, 1992:179-190).
Poisson regression analysis often leads to overestimation of statistical significance, 
due to over-dispersion, which means that the variance of the dependent variable 
exceeds its mean (cf. Agresti, 1996:92; Land et al., 1996:388). There are several 
remedies for the problem of over-dispersion, the most popular of which is the use of 
Negative Binominal Regression Analysis (cf. Long, 1997:230-249). NBRA is a more 
"skeptical" method than Poisson regression (Gardner et al., 1995:399-402), and gives a 
better fit because it is more flexible (see Land et al., 1996:392-394). NBRA tests for the 
presence of over-dispersion, indicated by alpha.
In the analysis of the number of decisions to establish quangos no over-dispersion 
was found (alpha=.07, n.s.). Therefore, Poisson regression analysis was used. The 
results are given in section 4.4, but first we turn to some descriptive statistics.
4.3. Descriptive statistics
Chapter 2 already provided an extensive description of the data collected by the 
Netherlands Court of Audit, the primary data source for this analysis. Therefore, I 
shall confine myself here to the descriptive statistics of the variables constructed and 
used in the analysis. Table 4.2 contains some general descriptive statistics.
The number of cases equals the number of years. The table shows that the 
number of decisions to establish quangos (i.e. dependent variable) ranges from 0 to 10. 
Section 4.5.1 will show that the number of quangos resulting from one decision has a 
broader range. Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of the number of decisions and the 
number of established quangos.
Table 4.2 also shows the descriptive statistics of the explanatory and control 
variables. Inspection of the data shows that the three interaction terms that measure 
imitation and diversity are correlated (on average r = -.33, n.s.).
Two other features of the data are important to keep in mind when interpreting 
the results of the analyses. First, the size of the government has increased strongly 
over time (r = .92, p<.001). Second, quangos in small policy sectors are often charged 
with the provision of non-collective goods (r=.50, p<.001). N ow  we turn to the 
results of the analysis.
4.4. The choice of the legislature for quangos
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show the results of the Poisson regression analysis of the number of 
decisions to establish quangos, with a time-lag of one and four years respectively. 
Below the results are discussed (see also section 4.6).
Base model
Quangocratization is partly an autonomous trend. The increase in the number of 
quangos is related to the increase in the government size, particularly when 
considering a time-lag of four years (see table 4.4). When the government expands, the 
number of policies to be implemented increases also. The chance of quangos being 
charged with the implementation of policies increases, which results in more decisions
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Table 4.2. Descriptive statistics of variables in the analysis to explain the number of
decisions to establish quangos in the Netherlands, 1950-1993. (N=44)
Variable Mean S.d. Min Max
Dependent variable:
Num ber of decisions per year 2.82 2.40 0 10
Explanatory variables:
Left wing cabinet .34 .48 0 1
Economic growth 8.46 4.32 0.6 20.3
Elections .27 .45 0 1
Corporatism 2.46 .33 1.9 3.2
Collectiveness of policy sectors 1.70 .42 1 2.5
Specificity of tasks 2.17 .42 1 3
Monitoring .28 .27 0 .86
Control variables:
Size government 4.72 .20 4.47 4.99
Size policy sector 1.69 .03 1.63 1.76
Sources (own calculations): Kiezer en Parlement (1950-1993); Staatsalmanak (1993); 
Carasso et al. (1994); Van der Meer & Roborgh (1994); Algemene Rekenkamer 
(1995); CBS (1994; 1998c,d,e).
to establish quangos. This finding corroborates an observation made earlier in chapter
2. Bureaucratization and quangocratization go hand in hand.
Rational actor model
In this model six more explanatory variables are tested. The results are discussed per 
variable below.
Political ideology
The composition of cabinets in office has no statistically significant influence on the 
number of decisions to  establish quangos one or four years later (see tables 4.3 and 
4.4). Apparently, political ideology does not play a major role in the choice of 
legislature for quangos as executive agents (see section 4.6 for more discussion). 
Hypothesis 1.1 is confirmed.
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Figure 4.1. The number of decisions to establish quangos and established quangos, per year, the Netherlands, 1950-1993 (source: Algemene 
Rekenkamer, 1995 [own calculations]).
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Table 4.3. Results of Poisson regression analysis of the number of decisions per year
to establish quangos, the Netherlands, 1950-1993 (N=43, time-lag 1 year).
Coefficients (z-value)
Explanatory variables Base Rational Bounded
Model Actor Rationality
Model Model
Time -.03 (-1.25) -.06' (-2.05) -.03 (-.89)
Size government 4.41** (2.59) 5.76” (2.94) 2.95 (1.31)
Size policy sector -6.32 (-1.77) -7.08 (-1.89) -7.06 (-1.83)
Left-wing cabinet .36 (1.73) .31 (1.40)
Economic growth -.03 (-1.14) -.04 (1.08)
Elections -.77" (-2.94) -1.24*” (-3.98)
Corporatism -.07 (-.22) .02 (.06)
Collectiveness policy sector .16 (.63) .08 (.30)
Specific investments -.14 (-.46) -.02 (-.06)
Previous decisions .14” (2.70)
Time * corporatism .03 (1.04)
Time * collectiveness -.02 (-.82)
Time * specific investments -.02 (.48)
M onitoring 1.16* (2.44)
Constant -9.21 (-.93) -13.75 (-1.29) -1.58 (-.13)
Log-likelihood -84.08 -77.07 -67.95
Pseudo R2 .15 .22 .31
1 p < .0 5  ” p< .01  '” p<.001
Sources: Kiezer en Parlement (1950-1993); Staatsalmanak (1993); Carasso et al. 
(1994); Van der Meer & Roborgh (1994) Algemene Rekenkamer (1995); CBS 
(1994; 1998c,d,e)
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Table 4.4. Results of Poisson regression analysis on the number of decisions per year
to establish quangos, the Netherlands, 1950-1993 (N = 40, time-lag 4 years).
Coefficients (z-value)
Explanatory variables Base Rational Bounded
Model Actor Rationality
Model Model
Time -.02 (-.77) -.04 (-1.24) -.06 (-1.60)
Size government 4.15* (2.40) 4.72* (2.42) 5.69" (2.65)
Size policy sector 2.10 (.58) 3.08 (.79) 1.33 (.33)
Left-wing cabinet -.29 (-1.15) -.37 (-.97)
Economic growth -.01 (-.47) .02 (.66)
Elections .44* (2.01) .31 (1.27)
Corporatism .49 (1.44) .18 (.39)
Collectiveness sectors .10 (.36) .08 (.26)
Specific investments .14 (.49) .29 (.92)
Previous decisions .07 (1.07)
Time * corporatism .05 (1.20)
Time * collectiveness .01 (1.7)
Time * specific investments -.02 (-.46)
Monitoring .76 (1.28)
Constant -22.09* (-2.05) -28.07' (-2.28) -29.81* (-2.31)
Log-likelihood -76.63 -73.39 -70.29
Pseudo R2 .18 .22 .25
* p <.05 *’ p< .01  ***p<.001
Sources: Kiezer en Parlement (1950-1993); Staatsalmanak (1993); Carasso et al.
(1994); Van der Meer & Roborgh (1994) Algemene Rekenkamer (1995); CBS 
(1994; 1998c,d,e)
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Economic conditions
Besides the analyses reported in tables 4.3 and 4.4, two other analyses were carried out. 
First, an analysis was carried out to establish the expected curvlinear effect of 
economic conditions (cf. subsection 3.2.3).15 N o statistically significant results were 
found, however. In tables 4.3 and 4.4 only the results of the testing of the linear effect 
are reported (n.s.). Second, an analysis was performed with the other indicator for eco­
nomic conditions: the percentage unemployed of the total work force. These analyses 
also show no statistically significant influence on the number of decisions to  establish 
quangos.
It looks like economic conditions have no decisive influence on the decision of 
politicians to charge quangos with policy implementation. Such a conclusion would 
confirm the line of reasoning underlying hypothesis 1.2. However, there are too many 
reservations to made because of the limited nature of the testing of the hypothesis to 
draw such a conclusion. For more discussion, see section 4.6.
Electoral competition
Contrary to the expectation formulated in hypothesis 1.3, competition for votes 
between politicians leads to fewer decisions to establish quangos.16 Hypothesis 1.3 is 
therefore rejected.
Table 4.3 shows that elections lead to fewer decisions to establish quangos one 
year later. Perhaps politicians are less interested in policy implementation during 
elections, giving priority to the development of new ideas and policies, to please 
voters. Politicians consider the choice of an executive agent as less salient to voters. See 
section 4.6 for further discussion.
Corporatism
There is no statistically significant relationship between the degree of corporatism in a 
policy sector and the number of quangos established in it. Therefore, no conclusions 
can be drawn with respect to hypothesis 1.4. •
Collective goods
There is no evidence to support the expectation that quangos are less often established 
in policy sectors which provide collective goods. No conclusions can be drawn with 
respect to hypothesis 1.5.
Specific investments
Quangos are not charged more often with non-specific tasks, as was expected. 
Hypothesis 1.6 is not confirmed (but see subsection 4.5.1).
In sum, the rational actor model does not provide much more explanation for quango­
cratization than the base model did. The increase in the number of quangos cannot be
15 The percentage economic growth raised to the square was added to the regression equation to  determine 
the expected curvlinear effect.
16 A separate analysis shows that the prospect of elections in the next year does not lead to  more decisions to 
establish quangos (n.s.).
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attributed to particular political parties, nor to economic conditions. The tasks of 
quangos did not appear important either, nor were characteristics of policy sectors 
such as corporatism. Electoral competition was even found to lead to fewer quangos 
instead of the expected increase in their number.
Bounded rationality model
Releasing the assumption that politicians are rational actors, two more hypotheses 
were formulated in chapter 3 to explain the choice of politicians for quangos as 
executive agents (see subsection 3.2.4). The results of the testing of these hypotheses 
are discussed below.
Imitation
Politicians are inclined to repeat their decision to establish quangos; if more decisions 
in favour of quangos were taken in the previous year, politicians are more likely to 
decide to charge a quango with policy implementation in the present year. The 
repetition of decisions confirms hypothesis 1.8.
The imitation effect is no longer present after four years, though. The analyses 
do not confirm the expected increase in the diversity of tasks and policy sectors (but 
see subsection 4.5.1).
Monitoring
It was expected that if policy implementation requires monitoring, quangos will be less 
often chosen as the executive agent. So, a negative relationship was expected between 
the number of decisions to establish quangos and the number of accountability 
requirements. The results in table 4.3 contradict this expectation. Table 4.3 shows that 
an increase in the number of decisions to establish quangos is met with an increase in 
the degree of monitoring. Apparently, politicians do not refrain from establishing 
quangos if monitoring costs will have to be made. Hypothesis 1.8 has to be rejected 
(see also section 4.6). Subsection 4.5.2 will investigate under which conditions politi­
cians will impose accountability requirements on quangos.
Comparison of the three models
The bounded rationality model with a time-lag of one year gives the best fit of all 
models tested (see the improvement in the log-likelihood ratios and R2 when compa- 
ring tables 4.3 and 4.4). Quangocratization is caused by an increase in the size of the 
government and the repetition by politicians of their choice for a quango as an 
executive agent. The explanatory power of this model still leaves room for improve­
ment, though (pseudo R2 does not exceed .31). Section 4.6 will elaborate more on 
these conclusions, see also chapter 6.
4.5. Two more analyses
To improve the interpretation of the above results, two more analyses were carried 
out. To find out whether decisions on single quangos differ from decisions on clusters 
of quangos, the same analysis as before is repeated, but now with the total number of 
established quangos as the dependent variable (see subsection 4.5.1). Attention is also 
paid to the conditions that determine the degree of monitoring politicians impose (see
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subsection 4.5.2). The results of these and the former analyses are discussed in section
4.6.
4.5.1. The establishment of clusters of quangos
To ascertain the differences between decisions to establish a single quango and 
decisions to establish clusters of quangos, a separate analysis is performed of the 
number of established quangos per year.17 The same hypotheses are tested as before, 
and the same three models are used: base model, rational actor model, and bounded 
rationality model. Tables 4.5 and 4.6 present the results.
Operationalizations and method of analysis
The number of established quangos per year is measured by weighting the number of 
decisions per year with the number of quangos resulting from those decisions. For 
example, if in a given year three decisions were taken, resulting in one, one and twelve 
quangos respectively, fourteen quangos are assumed to have been established in that 
year. Between 1950 and 1993, 124 decisions were taken, resulting in 392 quangos. Of 
those 124 decisions, 13.7% involved the establishment of a cluster of quangos (on 
average 23 quangos resulted from one decision to establish a cluster).
Inspection of the data shows two extreme outliers of 62 and 77 quangos established in 
one year. These outliers were recoded to facilitate model fit. Values were set at the 
next highest maximum, which reduced the range of the number of established quangos 
per year to 0 to 28. Figure 4.1 already displayed the distribution of the number of 
established quangos per year (see section 4.3).
Furthermore, there is over-dispersion. For this reason, instead of Poisson regression 
analysis a Negative Binominal Regression Analysis (NBRA; see section 4.2) was carried 
out, using a time-lag of one and four years respectively. Tables 4.5 and 4.6 confirm the 
presence of over-dispersion in all analyzed models (alpha differs statistically significant 
from zero).
Comparison of analyses
The analysis of the number of quangos gives a worse fit than the analysis of the 
number of decisions did (pseudo R2 is maximum .12 against .31 in table 4.3).18 The 
hypotheses of chapter 3 provide a better prediction of the decisions of politicians to 
charge a quango with policy implementation than the number of quangos established 
as a result of those decisions.
Again, the bounded rationality model gives the best explanation for 
quangocratization. However, not all explanatory variables have the same effect as 
before. Below, the differences between the analyses are discussed.
17 The correlation between the number of decisions and the number of established quangos is moderate 
( r -  .49, p <  .01).
11 Convergence problems forced me to drop the imitation variable from the rational actor model and the 
bounded rationality model. Instead, it was included in the base model.
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Table 4.5. Results of Negative Binominal Regression Analysis on the number of
established quangos, per year, the Netherlands, 1950-1993 (N=43, time-lag 1 year).
Coefficients (z-value)
Explanatory variables Base
Model
Rational
Actor
Model
Bounded
Rationality
Model
Time -.05 (-.74) .01 (.22) .06 (1.01)
Size of government 3.40 (.71) .38 (.10) -2.83 (-.77)
Size of policy sector 13.88 (1.90) 6.74 (.96) 4.24 (.63)
Left wing cabinet .31 (.76) .37 (.96)
Economic growth .05 (.74) -.01 (-.18)
Elections -.19 (-.33) -.48 (-.87)
Corporatism -.55 (-.90) -.24 (-.43)
Collectiveness sectors .56 (1.09) .37 (.79)
Specific investments 1.25* (2.18) 1.47** (2.58)
Previous decisions -.03 (-1.26)
Time * corporatism -.02 (-.44)
Time * collectiveness -.08 (-1.68)
Time * specific investments -.02 (-.42)
Monitoring 1.83* (1.98)
Constant -37.03 (-1.24) -14.02 (-.61) 4.33 (.20)
Log Likelihood -133.69 ■127.59 ■123.56
Pseudo R2 .02 .06 .09
Alpha 1.67*” 1.18*** .94***
* p < .0 5  ** p < .01  *'*p<.001
Sources-. Kiezer en Parlement (1950-1993); Staatsalmanak (1993); Carasso et al.
(1994); Van der Meer & Roborgh (1994) Algemene Rekenkamer (1995); CBS 
(1994; 1998c,d,e)
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Table 4.6 Results of Negative Binominal Regression Analysis on the number of 
established quangos, per year, the Netherlands, 1950-1993 (N = 40, time-lag 4 years).
Coefficicnts (z-value)
Explanatory Base 
variables Model
Rational
Actor
Model
Bounded
Rationality
Model
Time -.13* (-2.20) -.11 (-1.68) -.13* (-2.06)
Size of government 9.58* (2.50) 7.77 (1.88) 10.04* (2.52)
Size of policy sector -1.96 (-.24) 2.28 (.29) -1.46 (-.19)
Left-wing cabinet -.57 (-1.11) -1.11 (-1.62)
Economic growth .07 (1.29) .10 (1.91)
Elections .83* (1.69) .43 (1.02)
Corporatism -.44 (-.70) -.40 (-.66)
Collectiveness sectors .39 (.74) .35 (.72)
Specific investments 1.55'" (3.30) 1.76'*' (3.75)
Previous decisions .06“ (2.51)
Time * corporatism .04 (.68)
Time * collectiveness -.10' (-2.18)
Time * specific investm. -.07 (-.1.07)
Monitoring .32 (.29)
Constant -39.90 (1.80) -41.93 (-1.71) -46.93 (-1.92)
Log-likelihood -119.04 -115.93 -110.77
Pseudo R2 .05 .08 .12
Alpha 1.38*“ 1.13*“ .80***
' p < . 0 5  ” p<.01 “ 'pC.001
Sources: Kiezer en Parlement (1950-1993); Staatsalmanak (1993); Carasso et al. 
(1994); Van der Meer & Roborgh (1994) Algemene Rekenkamer (1995); CBS 
(1994; 1998c,d,e)
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Time
Clusters of quangos are established less often these days (see the effect of time in table 
4.6). This corroborates the observations made in chapter 2 where figure 2.1 showed 
that clusters were mainly established in the 1950s and 1970s. The increase in the 
number of quangos in the 1980s is due to an increase in the number of decisions to 
establish (single) quangos.
Specific investments
Hypothesis 1.6 predicted that politicians will charge quangos less often with the 
implementation of a policy if specific investments will have to be made. The analysis 
in section 4.4 did neither confirm nor refute this hypothesis. Tables 4.5 and 4.6, on 
the contrary, show that clusters of quangos are charged more often with tasks that 
require specific investments than with non-specific tasks. Apparently, politicians do 
not decide to charge quangos with tasks that require specific investments more often, 
but i f  they do the executive agent is usually a cluster of quangos. Most quangos 
(74.5%) belong to a cluster, although only 13.7% of the decisions results in the 
establishment of a cluster. The conclusion is that quangos are charged more often with 
specific tasks. Hypothesis 1.6 is rejected.
Imitation and diversity
The decisions of politicians to establish quangos are repeated year after year. The 
establishment of clusters of quangos is, however, not19; large numbers of quangos are 
established in intervals of a number of years (four in the analysis). Although the 
imitiation interval is longer, hypothesis 1.7 still stands. However, table 4.6 shows that 
clusters of quangos are established increasingly less often in policy sectors with a high 
degree of collectiveness. While this finding suggest an increase in diversity (from 
quangos operating in policy sectors with a high degree of collectiveness to quangos 
operating in sectors with a low degree of collectiveness), the diversity-trend is contrary 
to the one expected. Apparently, clusters of quangos are charged more often with the 
provision of collective goods. Because clusters of quangos are established less often 
these days, the number of quangos in policy sectors with a high degree of 
collectiveness has decreased. The diversity of quangos has therefore increased, albeit in 
the opposite direction of the one predicted.
To sum up, the analysis of the number of established quangos adds one cause to the 
explanation of quangocratization, namely that politicians tend to choose quangos most 
frequently for the implementation of policies that require specific investments. 
Hypothesis 1.6 is rejected.
"  Barron (1992:187-193) hints at the possibility that over-dispersion and auto-correlation are related to  each 
other. He calls this the "contagion” effect: the increase in a dependent variable is not caused by 
interdependency of the observations, but an artefact of the data caused by over-dispersion. Although in this 
analysis over-dispersion was found (see alpha in table 4.5), no autocorrelation was present. Therefore it does 
not seem likely that there is a contagion effect at work.
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4.5.2. Monitoring and accountability
The analyses just discussed show that politicians choose (single or clusters of) quangos 
as executive agents even if a high degree of monitoring is necessary. N ot only does 
this finding contradict to the expectation formulated in hypothesis 1.8, it also seems 
awkward when one remembers the low accountability demands imposed on quangos, 
demonstrated in chapter 2. In order to better understand this result, an additional 
analysis was performed of the conditions that determine the decision of politicians to 
impose accountability requirements on quangos. The analysis below is not meant to 
test any hypotheses, but is of an exploratory nature. The aim is to ascertain whether 
conditions that influence the choice of politicians for a quango also influence their 
decision to impose accountability requirements on that quango. (Most of) the same 
variables are used as before.
Operationalizations and method of analysis
Accountability requirements are laid down in the law by means of which a quango is 
established (cf. the definition of a decision to establish a quango in section 4.1). 
Because a cluster of quangos is established by one and the same decision, the same 
requirements are imposed upon all quangos in that cluster. Accountability will 
therefore be measured per decision, and not per quango or year. Between 1950 and 
1993, 124 decisions to establish (clusters of) quangos were taken.
In chapter 2, an accountability scale was developed on the basis of seven require­
ments. That scale was also used in the previous analyses (the variable 'monitoring'). 
For the problem at hand, only the presence or absence of requirements is of interest, 
so whether accountability requirements are imposed (1) or not (0). O ut of the 124 
cases, 49 quangos face no requirements at all.
Most of the same conditions and variables are used as before. Two variables have 
been slightly altered: instead of economic growth, the percentage unemployment is 
used to measure economic conditions, and instead of the collectiveness of policy areas, 
the collectiveness of tasks is used. No time-lag is applied.
Four new explanatory variables are added.^ First, 'previous requirements' is 
measured as the average accountability scale score in the year prior to a decision. 
Following the idea of imitation, it can, for example, be expected that politicians learn 
from earlier experience and impose fewer requirements after a while. Next, two new 
variables are introduced that both relate to the size of a quango: expenditures (in NLG 
millions) and the number of employees (x 1000). Information on these variables was 
taken from the N CA  survey.20 In subsection 3.2.4.2, it was assumed that the larger the 
size of a quango, the greater the damage potential of ill performance, and the greater 
the need for monitoring will be. The fourth new variable is a dummy variable that 
shows whether a decision to impose accountability requirements concerns a cluster of 
quangos, or a single organization. Here, the focus lies on differences in the number of
20 A cluster of quangos is represented in the N C A  survey by one quango of that cluster. The number of 
employees and expenditures of that representative quango is used in the present analysis. Chapter 2 already 
mentioned that the data are incomplete for both variables. Expenditures are only listed if they come from 
the State Budget (in approximately 60% of the cases). Employees are not induded if they are seconded civil 
servants (in approximately 30% of the cases).
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accountability demands they face.
Given the type of dependent variable, logistic regression is considered the 
appropriate method of analysis (see, e.g. Menard, 1995). Table 4.7 gives the results.
Table 4.7. Results of logistic regression analysis of the accountability of quangos, the 
Netherlands, 1950-1993 (N -12).
Explanatory variables Estimate Z-value
Time -.28" (-3.23)
Size of government 18.41" (2.72)
Size of policy sector 6.06 (.85)
Expenditures quango 11.53 (1.05)
Personnel of quango -.20 (-.66)
Left-wing cabinet -.84 (-1.44)
U  nemployment -.16 (-.93)
Elections .92 (-1.76)
Corporatism -1.23" (-2.71)
Collectiveness task 4.12 (1.53)
Specific investments 4.95* (2.46)
Collective * specific tasks -2.79* (-2.27)
Cluster -1.05 (-1.35)
Previous requirements .94 (.97)
Constant -99.49" (-2.82)
Log Likelihood 
Pseudo R2
-58.72
.29
" p < .0 5  ”  pC .01 *’* pC.001
Sources: Kiezer en Parlement (1950-1993); Staatsalmanak (1993); Carasso et al. (1994); 
Van der Meer & Roborgh (1994) Algemene Rekenkamer (1995); CBS (1994;
1998c,d,e)
The results in table 4.7 show that whether (or not) accountability requirements are 
imposed depends mostly on the type of task with which a quango is charged and the 
degree of corporatism of the policy sector in which it operates.
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Quangos charged with tasks that require many specific investments face accoun­
tability requirements more often than quangos with less specific tasks. Previous 
analyses showed that clusters of quangos are charged more often with specific tasks. 
However, politicians do not impose accountability requirements more frequently on 
clusters, as one would expect (see table 4.7). Perhaps this is because politicians impose 
requirements less often when tasks are involved that require specific investments and 
resemble the provision of collective goods. Table 4.6 showed that clusters are 
established less often than they used to, and are increasingly less often charged with 
collective tasks. This could account for the finding that clusters do not face 
accountability requirements more often than single quangos.
In corporatist policy sectors, accountability requirements are imposed upon 
quangos less often. Perhaps, in corporatistic policy sectors politicians use their (in)- 
formal contacts with interest groups as a substitute for more formal monitoring 
devices like accountability requirements (cf. patronage).
All other conditions seem to be of less importance. Political ideology, economic 
conditions and electoral competition have no (statistically significant) effect on 
whether or not accountability requirements are imposed. Also, the size of a quango 
itself has no influence.
Finally, there are two trends discernable. First, politicians impose accountability 
requirements less often (see 'time' in table 4.7). This trend confirms the development 
already shown in figure 2.8; requirements are imposed less often. But if imposed, 
however, the number of requirements is higher. Following the idea of imitation (see 
subsection 3.2.4.1), it can be argued that politicians learn from their earlier decisions to 
impose accountability demands, that is, they know in which cases monitoring is 
necessary and when it is not. There is no direct evidence, though, to support this idea. 
There is no statistically significant relationship between the decision to impose moni­
toring in year t and the decision to do so in the year t+1.
The second trend is that accountability requirements are imposed more often 
when the government increases in size. Perhaps, government expansion has led to 
more monitoring of all executive agents - government bureaucracy and quangos. In the 
next section, I shall go deeper into this and explore some alternative explanations for 
other findings in the above sections.
4.6. Conclusions and discussion
Table 4.8 summarizes the results of the testing of the hypotheses on the causes of 
quangocratization. In general, it can be concluded that the bounded rationality actor 
model gave the best predictions. So, politicians use imitation and monitoring to reduce 
the uncertainty they face regarding the effects of their choice of an executive agent. 
Chapter 6 will go into this conclusion more extensively when confronting the results 
of this study with the practitioner theory underlying the establishment of quangos (cf. 
section 1.3).
Below, the conclusions per hypothesis are discussed (see table 4.8). The results 
from the two additional analyses, discussed in section 4.5, will be included as well. If 
hypotheses were rejected, implications for the theoretical model developed in chapter 3 
will be discussed. Attention will be paid as well to some methodological aspects of the 
analyses. Finally, some recommendations will be made for future research. In general,
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it needs to be emphasized that the testing of hypotheses in this chapter is hindered by 
the lack of data on the choice of politicians for government bureaucracy as executive 
agent. The conclusions should therefore be regarded with some reservations. For 
future research, it is recommended that data is also gathered on the choice for 
government bureaucracy (or perhaps even other types of executive agents).
Table 4.8. Results of the analysis of the number of decisions to establish quangos and 
the analysis of the number of established quangos.
No. Hypothesis
(operationalizations)
Predicted
effect
Observed
effect
Conclusion
1.1 Ideology
(left-wing cabinet)
0 n.s. Confirmed
1.2 Economic conditions 
(economic growth) + n.s.
No conclusion
1.3 Electoral competition 
(elections)
+ - Rejected
1.4 Corporatism 
(number of advisory 
boards)
+ n.s. No conclusion
1.5 Collective goods 
(collectiveness policy 
sectors)
n.s. No conclusion
1.6 Specific investments 
(task-specificity)
- + Rejected
1.7 Imitation
(previous decisions)
+ + Confirmed
1.8 Monitoring - + Rejected
0 = 
n.s.
no effect, + -  positive effect, - 
= not statistically significant
= negative effect
Political ideology
As expected (hypothesis 1.1), political ideology does not play a decisive role in the 
decision of politicians to charge a quango with policy implementation. Politicians of 
all politicial parties have used quangos as executive agents. The data and analyses also 
give no indications as to whether politicians of different political parties differ in their 
preference for (i) quangos as executive agents in case of particular tasks or policy 
sectors are concerned, or (ii) clusters or single quangos, and (iii) establishment of
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quangos through hiving in or hiving off.
A replication of this study with quangos established after 1993 is to be recom- 
mended. In 1994 and 1998 new cabinets came into office consisting of liberals, 
democrats and social democrats. These new coalitions ended 50 years of dominance of 
the Christian Democrats in Dutch government. The Christian Democrats participated 
in all coalitions between 1950 and 1993, which makes it almost impossible to test the 
effect of political ideology on quangocratization. It might even be argued that the fact 
that ideology does not affect politicians' preference for quangos can be attributed to 
the continuous presence of the Christian Democrats in Dutch cabinets. Supposing the 
Christian Democrats have a strong preference for quangos, it is logical that both the 
left-wing and right-wing coalitions that have been in office between 1950 and 1993 
have used quangos for policy implementation. The absence of Christian Democrats in 
the cabinets of the 1990s offers the opportunity to test the real effect of political 
ideology on quangocratization.
At face value, no simple trend can be detected in the period after 1993 (source: 
Staatsalmanak, 1993-1999). Although several quangos have been established (cf. chapter
2), the publication of the NCA survey in 1995 has triggered hot debate and led to 
initiatives to curb the establishment of quangos (see also chapters 1 and 6).
Economic conditions
Because information on the origin of quangos was not present in the NCA survey, it 
could not be ascertained whether quangos had been established by means of hiving in 
or hiving off. Hypothesis 1.2 could therefore not be fully tested. Future research 
should include study on the origin of quangos.
No statistically significant effects were found of the influence of economic 
conditions on the decision of politicians to establish a quango. This might be 
interpreted as supportive to the line of reasoning underlying hypothesis 1.2, which 
entailed that both in times of economic up-swing and down-swing quangos were 
expected to be established in large numbers. However, the results of the analyses do 
not corroborate these expectations. More research is therefore necessary, before hard 
conclusions can be drawn on hypothesis 1.2.
I f  both economic up-swing and down-swing would lead to quangocratization, the 
question rises what the effect is of quangocratization on economic conditions. The 
practitioner theory claims that policy implementation is carried out more efficiently 
and effectively by quangos than by government bureaucracy (see section 1.3). If this 
were the case, one would expect less economic down-swing, or at least a decrease in 
goverment expenditures, following the establishment of quangos. However, a decrease 
in government expenditures can also be achieved by imposing budget cuts on quangos 
at the time of their establishment. In that case, politicians anticipate efficiency gains 
from charging a quango with policy implementation. I shall return to this point in 
chapter 5, where the effects of the establishment of quangos on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of policy implementation are investigated.
Electoral Competition
Electoral competition was expected to induce politicians to choose quangos as an 
executive agent more often; it offers them the opportunity to decrease political risks
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and increase the commitment of voters. The results of the analyses show the opposite 
to be true: in times of fierce political competition, fewer quangos are established. 
Hypothesis 1.3 is therefore rejected.
Before discarding the theoretical model developed in chapter 3, alternative 
explanations for these results need to be studied. For example, in section 4.4. it was 
suggested that in election periods politicians might prefer to pay attention to the 
development of new policies (i.e. make promises to the voters) and be less interested in 
how and by whom those policies will be implemented (for not all promises are kept). 
Politicians may think policy implementation is less salient to voters than policy 
development. This would mean that in election periods fewer decisions are taken 
about executive agents. Four to seven years after elections, an increase in the number 
of decisions on executive agents w ill follow, four to seven years being the average 
amount of time needed to develop, pass and implement policies (Algemene 
Rekenkamer, 1994:6). However, as stated earlier, data are only available on decisions 
to establish quangos and this alternative explanation cannot be tested.
Another explanation for the findings on electoral competition can be sought in 
the assumption that "[l]osses weigh heavier than gains of the same amount" 
(Lindenberg, 1993:15 based on Kahneman & Tversky). If electoral competition is 
fierce, politicians can expect to win more votes when they can claim successful policy 
implementation by government bureaucracy. If implementation has been put at arm's 
length, they cannot claim successes nor intervene easily when ill performance occurs. 
The benefits of keeping policy implementation within range (i.e. charge government 
bureaucracy with it) outweigh the benefits of putting it at arm's length. This leads to a 
new hypothesis: the stronger the electoral competion among politicians, the less often 
will they choose quangos for the implementation of policies.
A third alternative explanation concerns the effects of patronage. In chapter 3, it 
was argued that by appointing members of interest groups to a quango board, 
politicians can enhance the commitment of those interest groups and increase their 
electoral support. However, in a political system based on cooperation and division of 
power like, such as the Dutch coalition system, patronage benefits cannot be assigned 
exclusively to one party. In a political system where one party holds all the power 
like, for instance, the UK system, patronage benefits are much higher (cf. Hall & Weir 
[1996] on the 'new magistracy'). Following this argument, it can be hypothesized that 
only in situations where parties hold large parliamentary majorities - and, consequent- 
ly , electoral competition is low - will politicians use quangos to benefit from 
patronage. To test this prediction, more information is needed on the composition of 
the quango boards. This information is not available in the NCA survey.
Corporatism
The measurement of the degree of corporatism of policy sectors was not without 
problems (see subsection 4.1.2). Besides the problems of reclassifications of departments 
and the lack of comparative information on the number of advisory boards over time, 
there have also been reductions in the number and types of advisory boards after 1993. 
Solving these problems falls outside the scope of this study.
Quangos are not established more often in corporatist policy sectors, as was 
expected (hypothesis 1.4). It was assumed that politicians would do this to increase the 
commitment (and votes) of interest groups. Perhaps politicians, in corporatist sectors,
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have other means to secure commitment. For example, politicians can offer interest 
groups a seat in one of the many advisory boards found in corporatist sectors (cf. the 
operationalization of corporatism, subsection 4.1.2). In that case, quangos are expected 
to be established less often in corporatist policy sectors. The analyses do no 
corroborate this expectation, however. More research on the possible substitutive 
effect of corporatism is needed.
Quangos in corporatist policy sectors face fewer accountability requirements. Again, it 
can be argued that in corporatist policy sectors politicians have alternative means at 
their disposal to ensure accountability (see also below). The general idea is that the 
stronger the involvement of interest groups - for example through membership of 
advisory boards - the higher the frequency of contacts w ill be between interest groups, 
quangos and politicians. The relationships between these actors are intensified. Impo- 
sing accountability requirements could then be perceived as a sign of distrust and is 
therefore not advisable. To state things differently, formal instruments of evaluation 
and accountability are replaced with informal ones, such as trust, socially exterted 
control and social networks (see, e.g. Bulder, Leeuw & Flap, 1996).
Collective goods
Hypothesis 1.5 predicted that quangos are charged less often with the provision of 
collective goods. No evidence was found to confirm this hypothesis. In fact, the 
analysis of the number of established quangos showed that clusters are established 
increasingly less often in collective policy sectors, which suggests that they were esta­
blished more often in such fields in the past. Such a finding would refute hypothesis 
1.5. Decisions to establish clusters of quangos should therefore be analyzed further.
The way in which the variable 'collective goods' is measured needs improvement. 
The recoding of policy sectors or tasks could be more refined by, for example, 
introducing more, or other types of, categories.21 The available data and the level of 
analysis (per year) did not allow for a more detailed operationalizations. I recommend 
that more attention be paid to what exactly constitutes a collective good - and use 
expert opinions, for example - before further investigating the relationship between the 
collectiveness of tasks or policy sectors and quangos. The same holds for the 
operationalization of specific tasks (see below).
Specific investments
Most quangos are charged with tasks that require specific investments. Hypothesis 1.6 
is therefore rejected. Although politicians do not decide more often to charge quangos 
with tasks that require specific investments, if they do make such a decision, it usually 
concerns clusters of quangos. Clusters make up for the majority of quangos (74.5%).
The underlying argument for hypothesis 1.6 was that politicians do not tend to 
choose quangos as executive agents if specific investments are needed, as it increases 
the costs of policy implementation. Investments have to be made in non-recurrent
21 See, for example, Van Waarden (1992, based on work by Musgrave) who proposes to categorize policy 
sectors by their functions of allocating goods and subsidies in the market, distributing goods fairly, and 
ensuring the stability of the society.
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assets (e.g. knowledge, equipment), assets which in a government bureaucracy are often 
already available. Moreover, charging a quango with very specific tasks could create a 
(semi-)monopoly (cf. White's (1991) reversal of control). Politicians were expected to 
try  to prevent such a situation. This expectation was refuted by the results.
An explanation for the rejection of hypothesis 1.6 can perhaps be found in the 
typical nature of specific assets. Although it is probably true that in a large 
government bureaucracy assets can be more easily redeployed, there are disadvantages 
associated with keeping specific tasks within a government bureaucracy. For example, 
specific tasks can be seen as a deviation from Standard operating procedures (Wilson, 
1989:133), or a disturbance of bureaucratie routines. Managing such tasks could take 
up much time or require skills and expertise that are not available. Charging a quango 
with policy implementation would solve these problems; a quango is not part of the 
core government bureaucracy, which allows for the involvement of external experts, 
in particular members of interest groups or voluntary organizations, to ensure 
efficiency of policy implementation. As argued in subsection 3.2.3, the interest of 
private organizations in these tasks will probably be low, therefore a <?ztósz-autonomous 
organization is charged with them.
An additional benefit of putting specific tasks at arm's length is a reduction of the 
political risk of being held accountable for ill performance. If bureaucracy is indeed 
less well equipped to carry out a certain task, the risk of ill performance increases, and 
also the risk that politicians will be held accountable. Charging a quango with the task 
reduces that risk. It might even be argued that politicians deliberately put the 
implementation of highly specific policies at arm's length when these policies are 
considered controversial (cf. Torenvlied, 1996a:61). In case of ill performance, the 
quango will be held accountable.
To test this alternative explanation, more attention needs to be paid to which 
tasks require more, or less, specific investments. Here, the original categorization of 
tasks in the NCA survey was recoded. This categorization could be more refined (e.g. 
how to classify quangos with more than one task). It would also be necessary to 
ascertain whether there are any tasks with which quangos are never charged.
Imitation
The analyses suggest that imitation indeed takes place, albeit not always in the 
direction that was predicted. Hypothesis 1.8 is therefore confirmed, with the 
annotation that the direction of imitation is not as expected.
Decisions to establish quangos are repeated year after year. Decisions to establish 
clusters of quangos are repeated after a longer interval (four years). This repetition of 
decisions has led to an increase in the number of quangos over time.
A change in the diversity of quangos has been demonstrated only for clusters of 
quangos, whose establishment in policy sectors with a high degree of collectiveness has 
decreased. This trend is mainly the result of the decrease in the number of decisions to 
establish clusters of quangos. Figure 2.1 shows that most clusters were established in 
the 1950s and 1970s. No overall decrease is found with respect to the establishment of 
quangos in policy sectors with a high degree of collectiveness; hypothesis 1.5 was not 
rejected. Nevertheless, the results of the analyses suggest that, in the past, clusters of 
quangos were charged in particular with the provision of collective goods. To test this, 
further analysis of the decisions on clusters is necessary.
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Monitoring
Hypothesis 1.8 stated that politicians are disinclined to charge quangos with tasks that 
require intensive monitoring. This hypothesis was rejected. It should be noted, though, 
that only decisions to establish quangos were analyzed. There is no knowledge of 
charging tasks that require monitoring to government bureaucracy. M y analyses only 
show that politicians do not hesitate to also charge quangos with tasks that require 
monitoring. The accountability of quangos on average being weak (see chapter 2), a 
separate analysis was performed in order to gain more insight into the findings on 
monitoring. The results were presented in subsection 4.5.2.
Politicians impose requirements on quangos more often if the task in question is 
charged more frequently to quangos. Earlier, it was assumed that politicians w ill want 
to minimize monitoring costs (cf. subsection 3.2.4.2). By imposing (the same) require­
ments in the same instances, the average monitoring costs will decrease. For example, 
requirements are imposed more often on quangos with specific tasks (unless these tasks 
resemble the provision of collective goods). An extra argument to explain the presence 
of high monitoring demands in the case of specific tasks could be that politicians fear 
the possible consequences of the information asymmetry. Because the expertise and 
knowledge about a policy and its implementation is concentrated in a quango (sunk 
costs), politicians depend on that quango for information on its performance. This 
could lead to a so-called reversal of control (White, 1991). To prevent dependency, 
politicians oblige quangos to provide information on their performance and allow 
inspection by others, such as the Ombudsman or (departmental) accountants.
The absence of accountability requirements in corporatist policy sectors can also 
be explained by the desire of politicians to minimize monitoring costs. In corporatist 
sectors, it was argued, contacts between politicians, interest groups and quangos are 
expected to be more frequent and intense, which replaces the need for formal 
monitoring devices, such as accountability requirements.
Finally, the analysis in section 4.5.2 confirms the trend described in chapter 2. 
Accountability requirements are imposed less and less often. However, figure 2.8 
showed that i f  accountability requirements are made, several requirements are imposed 
in one go. A possible explanation for this could be that politicians have learned from 
experience when monitoring is - or is not - necessary. Such an explanation corresponds 
with the ideas on imitation set out in subsection 3.2.4.1. Imitation and monitoring are 
two ways for politicians to deal with the uncertainty on the results of their decision 
about a certain type of executive agent.
In chapter 4, the first research question about the causes of quangocratization has been 
studied. Chapter 5 will dieal with the consequences of quangocratization, in particular 
quango performance. The results of chapters 4 and 5 will be summarized and 
integrated in chapter 6.

5. CONSEQUENCES
This chapter sets out to find an answer to the second research question of this study: 
Under which conditions will policy implementation by quangos be more efficient and effective 
than implementation by government bureaucracy? Section 3.3 identified four conditions that 
make quangos more efficient and effective executive agents than government bureaucracy. 
Seven hypotheses were formulated about the efficiency and effectiveness of policy imple­
mentation by quangos. To test these hypotheses, information on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of policy implementation by a large number of quangos would be necessary. 
Such a large amount of information could not be collected, however, which is why I need 
to use another research strategy.
A meta-analysis of existing (case) studies on quangos would not be a valuable 
strategy, because in those studies the focus is mostly on the history and characteristics of 
quangos, and not on their performance (cf. section 1.4). Typically, organizations such as 
the Netherlands Court of Audit, the Scientific Council for Government Policy, the Home 
Office and the M inistry of Finance, which can all conduct surveys among quangos, do 
not examine the performance of quangos but rather concentrate on other matters (WRR, 
1983; Algemene Rekenkamer, 1995; Rapportage Doorlichting Zelfstandige Bestuursorganen, 
1997; Ministerie van Financiën, 1998). It has to be admitted that a survey of the perfor­
mance of quangos would be a very difficult task. The diversity in tasks, policy sectors, 
and budgets (see chapter 2) means that the performance of quangos varies strongly, both 
in terms of what kind of services are provided and the measurability of those services. For 
example, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to compare the performance of the 
Chambers of Commerce with that of the National Bank, or the Child Welfare Councils 
with public universities. Moreover, chapter 2 showed that the accounts quangos give of 
their performance are often incomplete.
Because information on the performance of all quangos is not available, and because 
it is not feasible to collect such data on a large scale, the remaining research option is to 
select a limited number of quangos and study their performance; that is., take a case study 
approach. For this study, it was decided to select a small number of quangos, whose 
performance is examined over time and compared with the performance of their 
predecessors, which were not quangos (intra-quango comparison).1 For practical purposes 
only two quangos were selected.
1 Ideally, to test the claim of the practitioner theory, the performance of qunagos should be compared to that 
of government bureaucracy. For practical reasons this is not possible. First, the legal monopoly on policy 
implementation implies the absence of competitors and hence of comparative information. Moreover, a task is 
often charged to one type of agent only, which makes a comparison between agents impossible. Finally, due to 
low accountability (see chapter 2), data on the performance is not available for all quangos and their 
predecessors. Therefore, an intra-quango comparison was made between a quango and its predecessor, which 
might have been government bureaucracy, but also a private organization or another type of quango.
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The selected quangos do not belong to the same cluster. Although the performance 
of quangos in the same cluster is comparable, there is little if no variation in the condi­
tions under which they operate; they have similar tasks, a similar legal structure, similar 
means of financing, and have to meet similar accountability requirements (see for an 
example the study of Bulder, Van de Wal, Leeuw & Flap [1997] on legal aid in the 
Netherlands). Because of these similarities, it would not be possible to test for the 
influence of conditions on performance, which is, after all, the aim of this study.
The theoretical framework in chapter 3 will form the basis of the case study 
research. Changes in efficiency and effectiveness of policy implemenation after the 
establishment of the quangoswill be explained by means of the seven hypotheses 
formulated in subsection 3.3.3. A comparison of the results of the two case studies - but 
not of the performance of the cases for, which cannot be compared - will be used to test 
the hypotheses. Of course, a real statistical test is not possible due to the limited number 
of cases, but some conclusions can be drawn about the validity of the theoretical 
expectations set out in chapter 3 (analytical generalization-, Yin, 1994:30).
An argument in favour of a case study approach that has not been mentioned yet, 
is that there is only little (empirical) knowledge about the performance paradox (Meyer
& Gupta, 1994). To gain more knowledge on this phenomenon an exploratory research 
strategy is recommended (Yin, 1994; Swanborn, 1996). Subsection 3.3.4 described the 
performance paradox and its disturbing influence on the assessment of efficiency and 
effectiveness of policy implementation. The aforementioned seven hypotheses were 
reassessed and four more hypotheses formulated to predict whether or not a performance 
paradox will occur. These hypotheses will be evaluated as well.
In section 5.1 the research design and the methods that were used are discussed. The 
two cases to be studied are described in sections 5.2 and 5.3.2 Section 5.4 summarizes the 
results and confronts them with the theoretical expectations of chapter 3.
5.1. Research design
The main focus in the case studies is on the performance of the selected quangos, i.e. the 
efficiency and effectiveness of their policy implementation, compared to prior 
implementation by a non-quango. The hypotheses derived in sections 3.3 and 3.4 on (i) 
the efficiency and effectiveness of policy implementation by quangos and (ii) the potential 
presence of a performance paradox will be investigated. The two focal questions in the 
case studies are therefore:
(i) has the establishment o f a quango led to a more efficient and effective 
policy implementation and can changes in efficiency and effectiveness be 
explained by the conditions discemed in hypotheses 2.1-2.7;
(ii) is there a performance paradox present in the selected cases, and i f  so, can 
this be explained by the conditions mentioned in hypotheses 2.1P-2.11P?
2 Of each case study an extensive case study report was made (Van Thiel, 1999a,b). Sections 5.2 and 5.3 contain 
only a summary of those reports.
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5.1.1. Efficiency and effectiveness of policy implementation
Efficiency is measured as the ratio of costs to output. Output is determined by the type 
of task with which an organisation is charged. For example, if an organization is charged 
with the payment of benefits, output indicators can be the number of benefits paid to 
dients, the number of clients and the total amount of paid benefits. Costs can refer to 
costs of a policy such as the total of benefits or subsidies paid to clients (programme 
costs), or to the costs of the production process (running costs), such as salaries, office 
space and equipment.
Efficiency is considered to have improved when output increases while costs remain 
equal or decrease, or if costs decrease while output remains stable or increases. It is 
important to note that an increase or decrease in programme costs can also be caused by 
changes in the policy implemented. For example, if the average level of a benefit is raised, 
programme costs will increase (with the same number of benefits). However, this should 
not be seen as a sign of inefficiency, because the change in the ratio of costs to output is 
not caused by a change in the performance of the quango. On the other hand, a decrease 
in the size of programme costs as a result of efforts made by the quango (e.g. through 
fighting fraud or reducing errors) will be seen as an efficiency improvement. Therefore, 
the origin of changes in the programme costs needs to be traced before conclusions can 
be drawn whether it reflects a change in the efficiency of policy implementation.
Besides output and costs, the quality of output is important. Effectiveness is defined 
as the degree to which a quango manages to implement a policy successfully, without 
errors, in time, and to the satisfaction of its clients. Effectiveness is considered to have 
improved when the number of wrong decisions about the (non-)payment of benefits 
decreases, the time required to process information is reduced, or the number of 
complaints by clients drops.
In the case studies, attention is paid to all three aspects of performance, i.e. costs, 
output and quality. Information on performance is obtained through analysis of 
documents, such as annual reports and accounts, and interviews. To determine whether 
the establishment of a quango has led to more efficient and effective policy imple­
mentation, performance has to be studied over a period of time, both before and after the 
quango was established. To that end, the policy implemented by the quango has to be 
studied, and the goods or services it provides. The policy objectives will determine the 
output that has to be produced. An overview of output, costs, the ratio of costs to 
output, and quality of output will show whether policy implementation has become more 
efficient and effective (or not).
5.1.2. Presence of a performance paradox
The performance paradox refers to a weak correlation between reported and actual 
performance (see subsection 3.3.4 for a more detailed explanation). Sometimes 
performance indicators (Pis) report on limited aspects of performance only, giving 
information about easily quantifiable aspects of performance, but leaving out less tangible 
aspects. In that case, reports underestimate actual performance. Pis can also be 
manipulated to make performance appear better than it really is, or to hide ill 
performance. In that case, reported performance provides an overestimation. It is 
important to keep in mind that a performance paradox has to do more with the reports
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on performance than actual performance. If present, a performance paradox invalidates 
the conclusions about the performance of the selected cases.
To uncover a performance paradox, reports of performance need to be studied and 
compared to actual performance. However, because all reports of performance can be 
subject to the performance paradox, it is nearly impossible to assess actual performance. 
We are faced with a conundrum.
Other solutions to overcome the problem of gathering Information on the actual 
performance of quangos are to (i) collect information from other sources than the quango 
itself (e.g. competitive quangos3 or other organizations, clients, regulators, or the 
Ombudsman) and compare that with the reported performance, or (ii) develop new Pis 
that are not already being used by the quango itself, and use these to reassess 
performance.4 A lack of information from other sources increases the chance of a perfor­
mance paradox occurring. If new indicators lead to different assessments, one might con- 
clude that there is a performance paradox.
If other information sources are absent or new Pis cannot be developed, a third 
solution can be applied. Meyer and Gupta (1994) argue that certain characteristics of the 
performance assessment system increase the chance of a performance paradox arising (cf. 
subsection 3.3.4). For example, when only a limited number of Pis are used for a long 
time, positive learning can lead to a loss of the discriminating value of those indicators. 
Meyer and Gupta recommend the use of many, non-correlated indicators, and to vary 
those over time. Moreover, for eacb policy objective indicators should be developed; if, 
for example, Pis only stress quantifiable objectives, reports will underestimate non-quanti- 
fiable aspects of policy implementation. To investigate whether such a situation exists, an 
analysis of the performance assessment system is necessary. Aspects that need to be 
studied are: the translation of policy objectives into Pis, by whom the translation has 
been made and how; the amount and type of Pis used in annual reports and other reports 
on performance; and changes in the use of Pis over time. Furthermore, it is important 
to establish how much and what type of information on the performance of a quango is 
required and to which extent the quango complies with accountability demands. Finally, 
if information on performance is present but not reported, the cause for this lack needs 
to be determined, especially when reporting the missing information would lead to differ­
ent conclusions on the efficiency and effectiveness of policy implementation. An analysis 
of the quality of the performance assessment model can be assisted by expert opinions (cf. 
Arthur Andersen, 1995; 1996; 1997; 1998).
Hypotheses 2.1P-2.11P will be used to try to explain a performance paradox, if 
present. Caution is warranted, however, for two reasons. First, the performance paradox 
is a complex phenomenon. It can be an unintended result of the behaviour of principals 
and agents, as well as a deliberate attempt to hide or manipulate information (cf. chapter
3 Quangos in a cluster can be seen as competitive organizations, even though they are often regional 
monopolists. Their performance could be mutually compared, especially because they are charged with the same 
tasks and have to adhere to the same statutory prescriptions. However, quangos in a cluster can also take 
advantage of their cluster membership by cooperating when it comes to the presentation of information on their 
performance. For example, if the quangos in one cluster all report on particular aspects of their performance 
only, the principal has no comparable information to show that reports are incomplete or manipulated. A per­
formance paradox is thus deliberately evoked, aimed at misguiding the principal.
4 Note that new indicators can also suffer from a performance paradox.
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3). Second, the presence of conditions that may evoke a performance paradox, is no proof 
that a performance paradox is indeed present. Chapter 6 will return to this point.
5.1.3. Conditions
Table 3.2 in chapter 3 summarized all conditions that were expected to be of influence 
on the efficiency and effectiveness of policy implementation and the occurence of a 
performance paradox. Here, the hypotheses 2.1(P) to 2.IIP formulated in chapter 3 are 
regrouped into four categories, to structure the case descriptions in sections 5.2 and 5.3. 
Below, each category is described, including the hypotheses belonging to it, and the way 
in which conditions are measured. See Appendix B for a more detailed overview. Table
5.1 will give an overview of hypotheses, operationalisations, descriptive categories and 
methods. For methods, see subsection 5.1,5.
Production rights
Hypothesis 2.1 stated that the more production rights a quango owns, the more efficient 
and effective policy implementation will be, and the less likely it is that a performance 
paradox will occur. Especially production rights regarding financial arrangements were 
expected to exert an influence. In the case studies, attention w ill be paid to the following 
financial arrangements: whether the quango budget is determined by fees, levies and tariffs 
or by the State Budget of the parent department; if the quango has the right to retain 
surpluses; if the quango has to compete for budgets and with whom. Another production 
right that w ill be studied is the right to hire and fire employees. The legal position of 
quangocrats is also expected to influence the closeness of agent and principal (hypothesis 
2.6; see categorie 'perceptions'). Finally, it is important to examine which production 
rights have not been given to the quango, but have remained the prerogative of the 
principal, who is usually the minister in charge of the parent department. The main data 
source for production rights, financial arrangements and the legal position of quangocrats 
will be the statutes underlying the establishment of the selected quangos.
Organizational cbaracteristics
A number of hypotheses concerned organizational characteristics. For example, hypothesis 
2.2(P) predicted that competition would increase efficiency and effectiveness, but might 
also create a performance paradox. In the case studies, the market position of the selected 
quangos will be investigated, for example, whether the quango is a monopolist or a 
member of a cluster, and also how specific its tasks are - because specific in vest ment s can 
create a semi-monopoly. Whether a quango is allowed to undertake commercial activities 
for other principals will be studied as well.
The size of a quango was also expected to influence the efficiency and effectiveness 
of policy implementation and whether or not a performance paradox will arise 
(hypothesis 2.5[P]). Smaller quangos are expected to be more efficient and effective, and 
less prone to performance paradoxes. Size is measured by means of the budget of a 
quango and the number of employees. The size of the policy sector in which the quango 
operates will have to be taken into account as well, measured as the number of divisions 
in the parent department, the number of civil servants it employs and the departmental 
budget.
Finally, hypothesis 2.6(P) predicted that the origin of a quango was of importance;
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the closer a quango is to the parent department, the more efficient and effective policy 
implementation is expected to be, and the less likely it is that a performance paradox will 
occur. Quangos established through hiving off were assumed to be closer to the parent 
department. The way in which a quango was established will therefore be taken into 
account. Attention will also be paid to the composition of the quango board, in particular 
to the presence of members of interest groups. Hypothesis 2.3 predicted that participation 
of interest groups in policy implementation will increase the efficiency and effectiveness. 
A mixed prediction was made with regard to the effect of corporatism on the occurence 
of a performance paradox (cf. hypothesis 2.3P).
Documents such as statutes, annual reports and other studies will be used to gather 
information on the aformentioned organizational characteristics. Additional information 
will be obtained from interviews.
Accountabïlity requirements
Hypothesis 2.4 predicted that the more accountability requirements are imposed on a 
quango, the more efficient and effective policy implementation will be. In the case studies, 
attention will be paid to the accountability demands the selected quangos have to meet, 
such as the obligatory publication of annual reports, an audited account, et cetera. Also, 
the presence of an appointed supervisor or regulator will be examined. Hypothesis 2.IIP 
offered a mixed prediction on the effects of the presence of a supervisor.
However, as discussed extensively in subsection 3.3.4, the relationship between 
accountability demands and the efficiency and effectiveness of policy implementation can 
be disturbed by the performance paradox. Reported performance can provide an over- or 
underestimation of actual performance. Therefore attention will be paid as well to the 
likely occurence of such a paradox. For example, it was argued that if the discrepancy 
between policy objectives and Pis grows larger, it becomes more likely that a performance 
paradox will occur (hypothesis 2.9P). The divergence between policy objectives and the 
mission quangos themselves have formulated will be studied. Other hypotheses were also 
formulated, in particular about the performance assessment system quangos use. The 
amount of accountability requirements was expected to influence this, although no 
prediction was made how. Diversity of Pis - in terms of variation and comparability over 
time - was expected to reduce the chances of a performance paradox occurring (hypothesis 
2.8P) and will therefore be studied as well.
All accountability requirements are laid down in the statutes. Pis are found in annual 
reports and accounts. Also, interviews and statements can provide information on how 
quangocrats use and value Pis (see Appendix B).
Perceptions
Two hypotheses concerned perceptions of quangocrats: risk perception and the focus on 
efficiency and Pis. Both will be measured using interviews and statements given to 
respondents (see also Appendix B).
Hypothesis 2.7(P) stated that as quangocrats perceive the risk of getting caught at 
deviant behaviour, the more efficient and effective policy implementation will be, and the 
less likely it is that a performance paradox will arise. Risk perception is operationalized 
as aversion or reluctance to take or accept responsibility for errors, the presence of 
sanctions, and the way in which quangocrats deal with change (e.g. do they take 
initiatives to change or not).
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Hypothesis 2.10P predicted that a strong emphasis on efficiency, effectiveness and 
the use of Pis increases the chance of a performance paradox occurring. The importance 
attached to indicators will be investigated, as well as the consequences of non-compliance 
with indicators, and the number of indicators - assuming that the more emphasis is 
placed on indicators, the more indicators there will be. Attention is also paid to how 
important efficiency is to the quango, for example, whether efficiency and effectiveness 
are organizational goals and what sanctions are imposed upon the quango when 
inefficiency or ineffectiveness are discovered.
5.1.4. Selection of cases
Cases have to meet four criteria to qualify for selection. First, they have to fall within the 
definition of a quango as used in this study (see chapter 1): they are charged with policy 
implementation by politicians, funded with public means, but operate at a distance from 
the government. Second, it is necessary that prior to the quango's establishment another 
organization already existed - not being a quango - which carried out the task in question. 
Otherwise a comparison of performance before and after the establishment of a quango 
is not possible. So, quangos that are newly established to implement new policies are 
excluded. Third, organizations should provide accounts of their performance. W ith a view 
to the ease of data collection it is preferrable if the date of establishment is relatively 
recent. Cases set up in the 1980s or 1990s with relatively high accountability requirements 
are therefore most suitable. The fourth criterion is rather pragmatic and involves the 
accessibility and cooperation of organizations.
Based on these criteria two organizations were selected from the same policy sector: 
education.5 Quangos in this policy sector often have to meet a lot of accountability requi­
rements (cf. figure 2.9 in chapter 2), which heightens the chance of finding information 
on performance. Both cases thüs meet the third criterion.
From the quangos in the educational field, tw'o recently established quangos were 
selected. The first quango is IB-Groep, a former departmental unit which was hived off 
in 1994 and is charged with, amongst others, the payment of student loans and grants. 
This case meets the first criterion; IB-Groep is a quango of the public body type (cf. table
1.1 in chapter 1). lts predecessor is the Informatiseringsbank, an organization that was very 
similar to a contract agency. IB-Groep has been studied to some extern already.
The second quango is a regional training centre for vocational and adult education 
(ROC). In a short period of time almost all schools for vocational and adult education 
have merged into 46 ROCs. Little attention has been paid so far to this major change in 
the educational policy field. By forming a ROC, the schools are given more autonomy 
to execute their public task; to prepare adults for society and the labour market. All 
schools and ROCs have to send annual reports and annual accounts to the parent 
department, to account for the way in which they spent their budget. Information on
5 Because the cases are active in the same policy sector, hypothesis 2.5(P) cannot be tested, where the size of 
the sector is concerned. In 1993, there were 65 quangos in this policy sector (Algemene Rekenkamer, 1995), 
which makes it one of the sectors with the highest number of quangos. The parent department, i.e. the Ministry 
of Education, is also one of the largest ministries; total expenditures in 1998 are projected as NLG 38.9 billion, 
approximately 16% of total government expenditures (Rijksbegroting, 1998). In the 165 divisions (count of 1992; 
Carasso et al-, 1994), over 2,700 civil servants were employed (count of 1996; Staatsalmanak, 1996).
110 Chapter 5
ROC performance is therefore expected to be present. The selected ROC - which will 
remain anonymous - was established in 1996 through a merger of five formerly 
independent schools (the quango's predecessors). In sections 5.2 and 5.3 a more detailed 
description is given of the cases and their history.
5.1.5. Methods and procedures
Case study research is defined as the study of contemporary phenomena in their natural 
appearance and environment over a certain period of time (Yin, 1994:13; Swanborn, 
1996:22). Here, to identify the effects of quangocratization the efficiency and effectiveness 
of policy implementation are studied during a number of years before and after a quango 
was charged with the implementation. Moreover, it will be verified if there is a 
performance paradox because, if present, it can exert a distorting influence on the 
assessment of efficiency and effectiveness. Although the sample of two case studies is 
much too small to draw valid general conclusions, they will be used to explore the 
hypotheses 2.1(P)-2.11P(cf. Yin, 1994:30).
Often, the uniqueness of cases impedes generalization of results beyond that case. To 
compensate for low external validity, three measures are taken. First, multiple sources of 
information and different methods are used (triangulation; Yin, 1994:91-93). In the cases 
below, data are obtained from two types of sources (documents and respondents) and by 
means of three different methods (content analysis, interviews, statements; see also table 
5.1). Triangulation of data sources and research methods increases the amount of 
information, and enables researchers to check the consistency of findings (Yin, 1994:32-37; 
Swanborn, 1996:104-105).
Documents such as annual reports, accounts and available evaluation reports of 
several years are analysed. Interviews were held with informants within and outside the 
organization (see Appendix C for a list). The outside informants will be referred to as 
experts. There are two types of experts: from the parent department, in this case the 
Ministry of Education, and accountability experts. Results from these interviews have 
been anonymized. Only when all informants have given the same answers are responses 
used for the analysis.
Informants from the selected quangos have been asked to respond to a short list of 
statements as well. Some conditions cannot be measured directly from documents or 
asked in interviews. To measure these conditions, statements were developed. Informants 
were asked to indicate to which degree they believe the statement to be true for their 
organization. Again, answers are used only if all informants gave the same answer. See 
Appendix B for more information on the development of the statements and a full list.
A second way to increase the validity of results is enlarging the number of 
observations through, for example, increasing the number of variables or dividing cases 
into sub-units (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994:208; Swanborn, 1996:95-108). In both case 
studies below, the number of observations ranges from a few years before to a few years 
after the establishment of the quango. Sub-units of organizations can be analyzed 
separately. For example, IB-Groep consists of a number of divisions with different tasks, 
while the ROC provides different types of education. Sub-units were indeed analyzed, but 
the results are not reported here (see the separate case study reports).
Third, the selection of cases is important. If possible, multiple case designs - also 
known as comparative designs - are preferred to single case designs (Yin, 1994:45-50).
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Cases can be chosén because they differ with respect to the values of the independent 
variables, and thus represent contrasting conditions, or because they are replications of 
earlier case studies (Swanborn, 1996:55-66). In the present study, cases are selected that do 
not belong to the same cluster, this to ensure that policy implementation takes place 
under different conditions.
Although case studies are usually perceived as qualitative research, the use of 
quantitative statistical methods is not precluded, neither in the analysis (Yin, 1994:ch. 5) 
nor in the presentation of results (Miles & Huberman, 1994; King et al., 1994). Most of 
the data obtained on the cases in this study are quantitative, displayed in tables or graphs. 
For each case, a log was kept with a detailed description of the data sources (informants 
and documents) and procedural steps or decisions taken during the gathering and 
processing of information (see appendix C).
Table 5.1 offers a summary of the research design of the case studies. Hypotheses, 
operationalizations, descriptive categories and methods of analysis are listed. This table 
is the shortened version of Appendix B.
5.2. Case study 1: Informatie Beheer Groep (IB-Groep)6
IB-Groep was established in 1994/ This former departmental division is charged with the 
implementation of several educational policies. The case study was done in 19988, and 
compares the performance four years before and four years after establishment. See 
Appendix C for a list of data sources and informants.
Subsection 5.2.1 gives a case description along the lines of the categories that were 
discerned before. Next, the performance of IB-Groep is evaluated over time (1990-1997) 
to ascertain the consequences of quangocratization (subsection 5.2.2). Finally, evidence 
pertaining to the presence and workings of a performance paradox will be discussèd 
(subsection 5.2.3). In section 5.4 the results of the case study will be confronted with the 
theoretical expectations.
5.2.1. Case description
Origin
The establishment of IB-Groep as a quango in 1994 was the end-result of a process of 
increasing autonomy of the organization. This process started with the movement of three 
divisions of the M inistry of Education from The Hague to Groningen between 1969 and
6 The results of this case study have been reported separately (see Van Thiel 1999a). This section only presents 
a summary.
7 The legal status of IB-Groep is that of a so-called zelfstandig bestuursorgaan, a public body (cf. table 1.1). IB- 
Groep was not included in the survey of the Netherlands Court of Audit (Algemene Rekenkamer, 1995; see 
chapters 2 and 4) because it was established only after 1993. IB-Groep participated several times in the contest 
organized by Arthur Andersen on the best annual report (see also chapter 2). It won the first prize in 1996 and 
came second a year later.
8 In 1999 an official departmental evaluation was published (Deloitte & Touche, 1999). The results of this evalu­
ation are not incorporated in this case study report. Conclusions of the official evaluation and this case study 
are very similar, despite differences in the availability of data and the methods used for analysis.
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Table 5 .1. Hypotheses, operationalizations, and methods used in the case studies.
No. Hypothesis and 
operationalization
Category in 
case report1
Method of analysis2
2.1(P) Ownership production rights
- right to retain surpluses
- financial arrangements
- fire/hire quangocrats
R D,Q
2.2(P) Competition
- market position
- member of cluster
- specific investments
- commercial activities
O D,Q
2.3 (P) Corporatism 
- composition board
O D
2.4(P) Accountability requirements 
- amount of aemands
A D
2.5(P) Size
- number of personnel
- budget
- size of policy sector
O D
2.6(P) Closeness to politicians
- origin of quango
- number of contacts
- legal position quangocrats
O
P
R
D
Q. S 
D,Q
2.7(P) Risk perception
- wilfingness to take responsibility
- use of sanctions in quango
- initiative to change
P Q,S
2.8P Diversity Pis
- range of indicators
- variation over time
- comparability over time
A D,Q,S
2.9P Clear policy objectives
- mission of quango
- policy objectives
A D
2.10P Emphasis on efficiency, Pis
- emphasis on efficiency
- emphasis on Pis
P Q,S
2. IIP Supervision
- presence of a regulator
A D,Q
1 Categories: A=accountability requirements, P = perceptions, R=production rights,
O = organizational characteristics
2 Methods: D = analysis of documents, Q = interview, S = statements
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1985. These divisions were charged with the implementation of a number of educational 
policies, among which the payment of student grams. Although operating at a physical 
distance, the divisions were still part of the Ministry, and the management of, for 
example, finances and personnel remained the prerogative of the ministry (Kuiper, Van 
Vliet, Boxum, Schreuder, De Ridder & Scheltema, 1992).
In 1986, a new law on student grants came into force. The implementation of this 
law by the division in Groningen created many problems - structural financial deficits and 
much negative publicity - due to the complicated and sometimes incomplete legislation 
(Noordegraaf & Kickert, 1993).9 These problems were an important reason for the 
Department to initiate a structural reorganization in 1988, in which the three divisions 
were integrated into one organization: the Information Bank (in Dutch: 
Informatiseringsbank). The autonomy of the Information Bank was enhanced by the 
incorporation of some managerial divisions of the central Ministry, such as personnel and 
finances (Ter Bogt, 1997).
The Information Bank was an autonomous part of the M inistry of Education, 
located at a distance from the parent department, and with relative freedom in managerial 
matters (in Dutch: zelfbeheer). It was agreed that the Information Bank would be 
responsible for the implementation of policies, while the M inistry remained responsible 
for the development of new policies or adjustments of existing legislation. Negotiations 
would lead to annual management contracts stating the tasks, performance and budget of 
the Information Bank. New policies developed by the Ministry would be examined ex 
ante by the Information Bank on the feasibility of their implementation (in Dutch: uit­
voeringstoets). Despite the semi-autonomous position of the Information Bank, the 
Minister of Education remained formally responsible for all operational activities. In 1991, 
it became clear that the Information Bank wanted more autonomy and preparations were 
made to turn it into a quango.
In January 1994, the Information Bank was hived off and transformed into a quango 
(to be more precise, it became a so-called zelfstandig bestuursorgaan) under a new name: 
Group for Information Management (in Dutch: Informatie Beheer Groep, henceforth IB- 
Groep).10 IB-Groep has a legal personality based on public law, and its statutes are laid 
down in a law (Wet Verzelfstandiging Informatiseringsbank, 1993). Contrary to the (radical) 
reorganization in 1988, the establishment of the quango was an incremental process 
consented by both parties involved (i.e. the Ministry and IB-Groep). It meant legal 
ratification of the semi-autonomous position of the former Information Bank, but no 
significant change of tasks. However, ministerial responsibility no longer included all 
operational activities and became restricted to policy development and supervising IB- 
Groep. Interesting enough, informants of IB-Groep and the parent department 
acknowledge that the change into a quango had more impact on the parent department 
than on IB-Groep, the latter seemed better prepared for the change. The Ministry of 
Education had difficulties adjusting to the limitation of their influence. At first, this led 
to an increased need for information, contrary to the intentions lying behind the esta­
blishment of the quango. This urge has receded, though, and nowadays the relationship
9 In April 1990 the dissension about this law and its implementation finally led to the occupation and 
vandalization by students of the Groningen offices.
10 The change of name was necessary because the use of the word bank is legally restricted.
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between IB-Groep and the ministry is characterized by both parties as good, intensive and 
professional, although some tension has remained, especially about the desire of IB-groep 
to increase its activities for other principals (see also below).
Different factors cóntributed to the choice for a quango.11 First, the hiving off of 
departmental divisions fitted the trend of the 1980s of emphasizing public sector efficiency 
and reducing the size of central government (so-called Great Efficiency Operations). 
Second and perhaps more important, the problems with the implementation of the 1986 
law on student loans became a political threat to the Minister of Education, who was held 
responsible (Ter Bogt, 1997). This is reflected in the statutes where limiting ministerial 
responsibility is mentioned as the primary aim of the establishment of the quango. Third, 
it was expected that an autonomous organization would be able to operate more 
efficiently, as is demonstrated by the following quote from the statutes:
Establishment of the quango is expected to increase the efficiency and decisiveness of policy 
implementation and is meant to ensure impartial and high quality implementation of highly 
regulated decisions. (Source: Rapportage Doorlichting Zelfstandige Bestuursorganen, 1997, part 
11:75 [my translation, SvT])
The transformation of a departmental division into a quango was expected to relieve the 
organization of the strict rules of the Budget and Accounts Act (in Dutch: Comptabiliteits­
wet). IB-Groep does indeed use a different accounting system (accrual accounting) than the 
Information Bank did (cash accounting). Below, we will see that this slightly hinders the 
evaluation of performance over time.
Tasks
Most people only associate IB-Groep with the payment of student grants, because of all 
the publicity this task has generated. However, IB-Groep has other tasks as well, such as:
(i) paying indemnifications for the study costs of children of parents with low incomes;
(ii) collection of tuition fees; (iii) registration and allocation of (prospective) students in 
higher education; (iv) recognition and evaluation of foreign certificates; (v) registration of 
education programmes in higher education; and (vi) logistic coordination of state 
examinations in secondary education. All policies are developed at the parent department. 
In total, the statutes list over forty policies (based on seven laws) that IB-Groep has to 
implement. The payment of benefits to unemployed or disabled teachers used to be a 
responsibility as well, but that task - and the according division - was hived off into 
another quango, called USZO, in January 1996.12
11 The motives given by politicians for the establishment of the quango IB-Groep confirm the assumptions of 
the practitioner theory about expected efficiency gains (cf. section 1.3). Moreover, the reduction of political risks 
for the Minister by hiving off the Groningen divisions corroborates the assumption made in chapter 3 that 
politicians w ill try to prevent loss of political support. The fact that only the implementation of policies was 
hived off, whereas the development of policies remained the prerogative of the Ministry seems in line with 
hypothesis 1.5 about collective goods; because policy development resembles a collective good to a greater extern 
than policy implementation does, policy development is not charged to quangos.
12 The case of USZO is interesting, because it raises the question whether the principal, i.e. the Minister of 
Education, can actually dismiss a quango. When USZO's performance was criticized strongly, the Minister 
threatened to dismiss the quango - but did not do so (De Volkskrant, 1997).
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Policy objectives
The statutes do not explicitly mention a goal of IB-Groep other than the (efficient and 
effective) implementation of the policies mentioned. IB-Groep has reformulated this goal 
as: supplying high quality services to clients, who include students, pupils, parents, 
teachers, the parent department, schools, polytechnics and universities (cf. the mission 
statement in the annual report of 1997). Cost-efficiency is very important but, according 
to informants from IB-Groep and the parent department, not as important as 
improvement of the quality of services.13 Inefficiencies are therefore accepted, provided 
that quality has improved significantly. I shall return to this issue during the discussion 
on the performance of IB-Groep.
Market position
IB-Groep is a monopolist quango, i.e. it is not part of a cluster of quangos14, nor does it 
face any competition with regard to the policies it has to implement. There is no 
organization that could take over IB-Groep's job at short notice because the necessary 
expertise and equipment (including software) are too specialized and expensive to be 
replaced. A transfer of existing tasks would therefore not be profitable to the parent 
department, if only because it would require a change of law.
With regard to new tasks the situation is different, however. The parent department 
is free to charge any organization with new tasks and there are, in fact, some 
organizations capable of executing tasks comparable to those of IB-Groep. The large scale 
processing of administrative information, for example, could be done by the Social 
Security Bank (in Dutch: Sociale Verzekeringsbank), the privatized general pension fund 
for civil servants (in Dutch: Algemeen Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds, ABP), the Tax Bureau, 
insurance companies, and the contract agency of the Ministry of Education charged with 
all financial transactions with schools (in Dutch: Centrale Financiën Instellingen, CFI). 
Informants of the parent department state, however, that the department is satisfied with 
the performance of IB-Groep. This is evident from, for example, the fact that several new 
tasks have been given to IB-Groep. Moreover, the parent department has an interest in 
keeping IB-Groep busy with policy-related tasks because this ensures IB-Groep's 
dedication to the parent department.
IB-Groep is allowed to undertake 'commercial' activities for other principals, but only 
when the minister has approved of those activities.15 Approval is given if the activities
1J Moreover, political pressure often led the parent department to demand from IB-Groep to give priority to 
changes in the implementation process. A number of managerial improvements was repressed or delayed because 
of this pressure..
14 IB-Groep's central office is located in Groningen but there are also 16 regional bureaus (in Dutch: steunpunten) 
where clients can get information and application forms. However, because these bureaus are formally integrated 
in the organizational structure of IB-Groep and have limited responsibilities, they cannot be considered separate 
quangos. Hence, IB-Groep cannot be described as a cluster of quangos.
15 'Commercial' accivities refer to tasks that do not concern the implementation of policies with which IB-Groep 
is charged by the parent department (in Dutch: niet-wettelijke taken). Some examples are: the collection of debts 
from external students (in Dutch: auditoren) on behalf of the University of Amsterdam; the payment of benefits 
to employees at the Agricultural University Wageningen, mandated by the Ministry of Agriculture (until 1996); 
the development of a chipcard for students, which functions as both a credit and a student card; the 
establishment of a foundation charged with the coordination of examinations in adult education; and the
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meet four conditions listed in the statutes: (i) they are strongly related to the official tasks;
(ii) they require the use of the same production means; (iii) only cost-effective prices are 
charged and; (iv) they do not lead to unfair competition against private providers of 
similar services. Commercial activities are senitive to competition because IB-Groep has 
to compete with other organizations for new tasks. So far, IB-Groep has concentrated 
mainly on the educational policy sector when looking for new activities.
Commercial activitities are a subject of dispute between the quango and the parent 
department, and the primary source of tension in an - as described by informants from 
IB-Groep and the parent department - otherwise good relationship. The parent 
department argues that it is not in the department's interest for IB-Groep to spend time 
on the acquisition and execution of activities for other principals. Moreover, the Cohen 
Committee recently cautioned against commercial activities by public organizations, 
because these organizations would have advantages over private ones, such as their 
monopoly and publicly financed starting Capital, which would lead to unfair competition 
(Commissie Cohen, 1997). IB-Groep, however, wants to expand. Here lies a fundamental 
difference of opinion. By increasing the number of tasks, IB-Groep can ensure its survival 
in case the amount of policy-related tasks decreases. The parent department, however, 
generally wants public organizations to be as small as possible, to minimize budgets. 
According to the ministry, if the number of tasks reduce, the organization should 
decrease in size as well. Recently, a new guideline was published on market activities for 
public organizations (Aanwijzingen, 1998), which limit the expansion of IB-Groep into the 
private market.16 Effects of this new guideline and the outcome of the discussion between 
the quango and the parent department cannot be determined yet.
Legal position of employees
All employees of IB-Groep are civil servants. Within the existing legal framework, IB- 
Groep has the right to formulate its own policies on personnel matters, but the regulation 
of salaries is subject to the same rules as the ones that apply to civil servants at the parent 
department.
In 1994, IB-Groep 'took over' all equipment and employees of the former 
Information Bank, including the employees of the regional bureaus. For the large-scale 
production and registration of information, extensive use is made of specialized software 
and large numbers of temporary staff charged with the electronic input of data (cf. Ter 
Bogt, 1997).
Organizational structure and composition of board
With regard to the organizational structure, the statutes only prescribe a Board of 
Supervisors (in Dutch: Raad van Toezicht) consisting of five independent experts 
appointed by the minister17, and a chief executive board (CEB) of three directors charged 
with all daily operations. The Board of Supervisors is the highest ranking body, and chief
development of a registration system of alumni for higher education institutions.
16 In response to the findings of the official departmental evaluation (DeLoitte & Touche, 1999), the Minister 
of Education has indeed formulated stricter regulations on commercial activities by IB-Groep (B riff van  de 
Minister, 1999).
17 The statutes do not explicitly predude the appointment of civil servants from the parent department as 
members of the Board of Supervisors.
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executives account to it for all activities. Most financial and personnel matters have to be 
approved by the Board before they can be implemented. See subsection 5.2.2 for more 
information on the size of IB-Groep (e.g. number of personnel, and its budget).
In 1995, IB-Groep reorganized. The current organizational structure is shown in 
figure 5.1. The CEB consists of three people: the CEO, an executive charged with produc­
tion affairs, and an executive charged with finances. They receive clerical support from 
two units: Concern Control charged with finances, and Strategie and Managerial Support 
(in Dutch: Strategie enManangement ondersteuning). Policy implementation is concentrated 
in three production divisions and one supportive division: Educational Services (in Dutch: 
Onderwijsdiensten), Student Loans and Grants (in Dutch: Studiefinanciering)-, Tuition Fees 
and Indemnifications (in Dutch: Tegemoetkoming Studiekosten en Lesgelden) and Facilities 
(in Dutch: Facilitair Beheer). The 16 regional bureaus of IB-Groep are incorporated into 
the Facilities division.
In 1997, a new reorganization was initiated, which has to be completed before 2001. 
It encompasses a radical change from a product-oriented organization to a process-oriented 
organization, which is why it is preferably referred to as a business process redesign (in 
Dutch: herontwerp). Self-regulating teams will become responsible for a number of clients 
instead of a particular line of products. As responsibilities will be decentralized to the 
teams, a large number of managers will lose their job. In total, 230 full-time equivalents 
will be eliminated (almost 14% of total personnel). The redesign is meant to improve the 
client orientation and the quality of the services of IB-Groep. The parent department has 
shown its support for the redesign by lending money.
Financial arrangements
An important distinction has to be made between programme and running costs. Pro- 
gramme costs refer to the sum of grants and benefits paid by IB-Groep to groups of 
clients (students, parents, teachers). Programme revenues consist of collected fees, debts 
and interest on debts. Running costs refer to operational costs such as salaries, investments 
in and maintenance of computers and software, office space, et cetera. Programme costs 
and revenues are borne fully by the parent department. Running costs were borne by the 
parent department until 1994 and are now borne by IB-Groep. As a quango, IB-Groep 
has the right to retain surpluses of running costs, but it is also responsible for deficits.
The financing of IB-Groep is negotiated annually, and based on expected output and 
costs agreed upon in the management contract. Since 1994 there has been some effort to 
calculate cost-prices, but these are not published, nor used as a management tooi (cf. also 
Ter Bogt, 1997). The parent department relies on IB-Groep to provide the information 
necessary to determine programme costs and revenues from IB-Groep.
The required amount and type of information supplied by IB-Groep is laid down 
in the annual management contracts. Programme costs, programme revenues, and running 
costs are all accounted for in the State Budget of the Ministry of Education. So, eventually 
the Minister can be held responsible in parliament for IB-Groep's running costs also.
Two remarks remain to be made about the financial status of IB-Groep. First, 
although IB-Groep is a legal entity, it is not allowed to borrow money in the Capital 
market. Second, the quango does not have to pay VAT (in Dutch: BTW) for its activities 
because of their public nature. It only has to do so when charging others for commercial 
activities.
Figure 5.1. Organizational structure of IB-Groep. (Source: Jaarverslag Informatie Beheer Groep, 1997)
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Finally, it is important to note that one of the explicitly stated goals of IB-Groep is 
to have only small nett surpluses (i.e. after deduction of Capital reserves and/or 
depreciation costs). The fact that the quango is not after high 'profits' needs to be kept 
in mind when evaluating its performance.
Property rights
The case description shows that when IB-Groep was hived off into a quango, it was given 
more autonomy. For example, it is free to decide on expenditures with regard to 
operational activities (running costs). Furthermore, it now has the right to retain 
surpluses. It is autonomous in hiring new employees, but limited in firing them by the 
regular constraints set by the legal position of civil servants.
IB-Groep has full discretionary authority with respect to production matters and 
equipment. The CEB is responsible for errors in the production process, but the Minister 
remains responsible for legislatory errors and failures in the supervision of the activities 
of IB-Groep. Therefore, ministerial responsibility is limited. Still, the Minister has 
reserved the right to intervene in case of ill performance (see also below).
Accountability requirements
With regard to accountability, the statutes of IB-Groep prescribe an audited account of 
programme costs and revenues, and running costs, as well as an annual report of its 
activities to the parent department. See subsection 5.2.3 for more information on the 
performance indicators IB-Groep uses.
The Minister of Education has reserved the right to intervene in IB-Groep's affairs 
or give additional instructions in case of ill performance. Supervision is charged to the 
board of supervisors and the departmental accountant. Additional investigations and audits 
can be initiated if the Minister wants to.
To meet ministerial responsibility communication takes place between the quango 
and the parent department at regular intervals and at different levels (cf. Kickert et al., 
1998:124). Part of this communication is formalized, for example, between the Minister 
and the Board of Supervisors (two times a year), and between the CEB of IB-Groep and 
the departmental chief executives (four times a year). There are also many non-formalized 
operational meetings on the development and feasibility of new policies with which IB- 
Groep could be charged. In general, all communication between quangos and the Ministry 
of Education is coordinated through an especially established departmental division (in 
Dutch: Relatiebeheer Zelfstandige Organen, RZO).
In case of ill performance, individual clients can file a complaint. This should not 
be confused with the right clients have to appeal against decisions on the payment of 
benefits or grants. Appeals concern the contents of decisions (in Dutch: bezwaarschrift or 
beroep), whereas complaints concern the operative procedures of IB-groep, for example, 
the way in which clients are treated at the regional offices (in Dutch: klacht). In 1998, IB- 
Groep published a Quality Charter that lists the rights of clients (see also below).
Perceptions
As a former departmental unit, IB-Groep still has strong ties with the parent department. 
The frequent meetings and negotiations strengthen the bond, as does the fact that the 
M inistry of Education is the main principal of the quango (over 90% of all activities). 
Responses to the statements used to gather information show a relatively strong sense of
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loyalty to the parent department. Nevertheless, IB-Groep is searching for ways to expand 
its dientele, which fits with it quest for autonomy. IB-Groep cannot be characterized as 
an organization that is afraid to take risks or responsibilities. Not only was it actively 
involved in the process of becoming a quango, it also anticipated this change better than 
the parent department did (according to informants from IB-Groep and the parent 
department). Over time, IB-Groep has shown to be willing to take on more tasks and 
responsibilities, also on behalf of new principals.18 There still exists, however, a strong as- 
sociation of the quango with the parent department, especially in the media, which 
hinders the acquisition of new tasks. Potential principals do not yet see IB-Groep as an 
organization that could fulfil tasks for them. Perhaps this explains why the quango pays 
so much attention to the improvement of the quality of customer service (or 
responsiveness to clients) and the development of performance indicators of the quality 
of services. By building up a good client-oriented reputation, IB-Groep hopes to attract 
new principals.19 The mission statement even explicitly mentions quality of services as a 
primary goal.
IB-Groep has an advanced system of performance assessment. Performance indicators 
(PIs) play an important role in the organization. There is a strong commitment to 
performance assessment, even of those elements of performance that seem difficult to 
quantify. The current PIs have been developed by the quango itself and have been in use 
for many years. At first sight, it seems there is a very large number of performance 
indicators listed in the management contracts. On closer look, it turns out that a 
comparable set of indicators has been developed for all individual tasks (see subsection 
5.2.3 for more discussion).
The focus of IB-Groep seems to be more on quality than on (cost)-efficiency. This 
is evident in, for example, the recently published Quality Charter (in Dutch: 
Kwaliteitshandvest). Informants from IB-Groep state that cost-ineffiencies would not close 
down the quango. Informants from the parent department share this opinion; quality of 
services is at least as important as cost-efficiency (see also section 2.5).
5.2.2. Efficiency and performance from 1990 to 1997
Total performance
As mentioned before, IB-Groep is charged with the implementation of a large number of 
policies. This makes it an important quango in the educational policy sector. Between 
1990 and 1997, approximately 17.8% of the budget of the parent department was spent 
by IB-Groep. Table 5.2 shows some indicators of its total performance, in terms of 
programme costs (table A) and running costs (table B).
Table 5.2A shows that programme costs were relatively stable until 1992, but have 
decreased ever since. The strong decrease in 1996 is mainly caused by the hiving off of 
the division charged with paying teacher benefits. The introduction of the so-called 
prestatiebeurs in mid 1995, which made students' right to a grant or loan dependent on 
their achievements, led to a decrease in programme costs.
18 A special project team was charged with the acquisition of commercial activities (in Dutch: Marketing & 
Verkoop).
15 Some of IB-Groep's current clients (schools, universities) are potential future principals as well.
Table 5.2A. Costs, revenues, personnel and mail IB-Groep, 1990-1997. All costs and revenues are in NLG million, indexed for 1990.
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Programme costs 5328.9 5397.4 5572.2 4789.5 4761.8 4485.8 3661.51 3709.8
Programme revenues 1472.0 1130.8 1132.6 1282.3 1437.6 1136.8 1083.2 1281.2
commercial activities n.a. n.a. 1.9 1.4 9.62 17.2 23.6 23.9
Running costs 170.3 177.2 170.8 166.1 155.5 161.2 158.8 160.3
(% of total costs) (3.1) (3.2) (3.0) (3.4) (3.2) (3.5) (4.2) (4.1)
Surplus running costs -10.3 -0.4 -12.5 -6.4 -1.3 0.2 0.3 0.3
Personnel in fte3 1072.4 1126.0 1154.0 1223.0 1415.02,4 1492.0 1396.01 1679.0
(% absenteeism) ■ (7.4) (6.4) (6.9) (6.3) (6.6) (6.9) (6.4)
(average % absenteeism)5 - - (6.7) (6.7) (6.0) (6.2) (5.9) ■
Incoming calls6 - - - - 3,043.9 3,368.0 4,359.0 4,260.6
(% respons) ■ ■ ■ - (33.8) (47.0) (51.9) (54.4)
Incoming mail6 ■ 4.9 4.6 4.7 4.5 3.6 2.91 3.4
Outgoing mail6 - 15.07 15.07 14.7 13.5 10.1 13.7 13.4
- No (reliable) information available 3 Full-time equivalents, permanent and temporary tenure
n.a. Not applicable 4 Increase caused by take-over employees of regional bureaus
1 Decrease caused by hiving off of a division 5 Average in national government
2 Increase due to take-over OV-Studentenkaart BV  6 x 1000
7 Estimate by IB-Groep
Source: Jaarverslag Informatiseringsbank (1990-1993); Jaarverslag Informatie Beheer Groep (1994-1997).
Table 5.2B. Running costs of IB-Groep, 1990-1997. A ll amounts are in NLG million, indexed for 1990.
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Running costs total 170.3 177.2 170.8 166.1 155.5 161.2 158.8 160.3
Salaries1 66.5 56.1 59.7 58.9 74.82 81.8 73.93 82.4
(% of running costs) (39.0) (31.7) (35.0) (35.4) (48.1) (50.7) (46.5) (51.4)
Material costs total 103.8 121.1 111.0 107.2 80.7 79.5 84.9 77.9
- Automatization4 64.6 51.7 32.1 20.1 16.3 33.15 36.75 49.25
- Managerial overhead6 19.3 13.6 15.1 27.0 18.1 22.7 24.5 31.0
- Communications7 19.9 23.0 26.0 30.8 26.0 14.08 12.58 12.78
- Depreciation n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 8.8 9.7 11.1 10.5
n.a. Not applicable 4 Includes purchase of computerized services
1 Includes salaries and other benefits to all employees 5 Includes costs of hiring external computer experts (formerly included in salaries)
2 Increase caused by increase in number of employees 6 Such as costs of office space
3 Decrease caused by hiving off of a division 7 Includes telecommunications (phone and mail) of regional offices
8 Exludes regional offices
Source: Jaarverslag Informatiseringsbank (1990-1993); Jaarverslag Informatie Beheer Groep (1994-1997).
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Programme revenues rose strongly in 1990 and 1994, due to improvements in 
collection procedures and special collection projects that made early payment of debts 
more profitable to students.
Running costs were highest in the period before 1994 (table 5.2B). Anticipating 
the change into a quango, many investments were made in computers, software, 
telecommunications, the training of personnel, hiring experts and moving into a new 
office. Moreover, a number of reorganizations took place, such as the decentralization of 
budget management in 1991, the centralization of purchasing agents in 1992, and the 
merger of some divisions in 1993. Although in 1994 there was a decrease in running costs, 
IB-Groep still had a small deficit. Since 1995, running costs have been relatively stable, 
resulting in small (nett) surpluses.
The change to a new accounting system in 1994 makes it difficult to compare certain 
running costs over time, such as the cost of salaries. Between 1990 and 1997, the number 
of employees increased by 63.8% (see table 5.2A). However, the extensive use of 
temporary staff and hired external (computer) experts hinders the assessment of costs, 
because as the categories of personnel do not always fall into the same category of costs. 
Therefore, caution is warranted when interpretating the numbers in table 5.2B. It is 
apparent, however, that the percentage of running costs of salaries has increased, from 
39% in 1990 to 51.4% in 1997.20 Despite several attempts, the percentage absenteeism 
among employees is still higher than the national average of civil servants (CBS, 1998g).
Because more running costs come from salaries, the share of other running costs has 
decreased. Table 5.2B suggests, however, that some running costs have increased. Due to 
re-categorizations of running costs, simple conclusions cannot be drawn here. Take, for 
example, the costs of automatization: after 1994, these indude the hiring of experts, which 
formerly feil under the heading of salaries. Communication costs seem to have decreased 
but part of these, namely the costs of the regional bureaus, are now included in 
managerial overhead, which has increased as a result. Depreciation costs first appeared in 
1994, when the new accounting system was introduced, and have been rising ever since.
Table 5.2A shows that IB-Groep is increasingly undertaking commercial activities 
for other principals (in 1997 almost 15% of the company's turnover21). The Ministry of 
Education remains the main principal, though. Typically, commercial activities take place 
within the educational field, probably because of the legal limitations imposed on these 
activities. The activities resulting from the take-over of the organization charged with the 
distribution of the public transport passes for students in higher education (in Dutch: OV- 
Studentenkaart BV) form also part of these activities.
Annually, some 4 million calls are made to IB-Groep's central office and regional 
bureaus, mostly by students. The regional bureaus receive over 300,000 visitors per year. 
Most clients, however, try to contact IB-Groep by telephone. Despite several investments,
20 The development of salaries of employees of IB-Groep equals that of civil servants (cf. CBS, 1998f). See also 
the findings of the Netherlands of Court of Audit study on the development of the costs of salaries for a 
number of quangos (Algemene Rekenkamer, 1995:48).
21 Turnover is the total budget received from principals to execute tasks. The parent department provides budgets 
for both programme costs and running costs, but only running costs are included in turnover.
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the call centre still cannot answer nearly 45% of all calls (cf. table 5.2A).22 Customer 
surveys between 1993 and 1997 confirm that IB-Groep is difficult to reach by phone. 
Customers also complain about the processing time of apllication forms, which are 
distributed by the regional bureaus or the central office in Groningen (for the amount of 
mail, see table 5.2A).
From 1994 on, IB-Groep has undertaken a number of activities to improve its 
reponsiveness. New indicators have been developed of the quality of service. A Quality 
Charter was published, which specifies the right of clients to good customer service, 
expressed in indicators like: the number of days or weeks it takes IB-Groep to respond 
to applications, letters and appeals; the waiting time to being served in the regional offices 
or for the telephone to be answered; clarity of information; complaints procedures, et 
cetera. A study of the Netherlands Court of Audit shows that IB-Groep has invested more 
in customer service than other public organizations have (Algemene Rekenkamer, 
1997:19).
Performance of separate divisions
IB-Groep consists of three policy implementing divisions (cf. figure 5.1). The division 
Student Loans and Grants is the largest of those three. Approximately 38% of IB-Groep's 
personnel works in this division. The division accounts for almost 70% of total 
programme revenues and almost 40% of the total running costs. The policies on student 
loans and grants have been changed over 70 times since 1986, which has complicated 
implementation enormously.
The division Tuition Fees and Indemnifications collects tuition fees and grants low- 
income parents of school children indemnification of schooling costs. It is a small 
division, and spends approximately 10% of the programme costs while it collects almost 
half of the programme revenues. Limitation of the right to a student grant has led to an 
increase in the output of this division.
The division Educational Services is increasingly carrying out tasks for other 
principals than the parent department. It mainly develops and maintains large data bases, 
registering and providing information to other divisions. For further details on the 
performance of the separate divisions, see the case study report (Van Thiel, 1999a).
Changes in efficiency and effectiveness between 1990 and 1997
Figure 5.2 offers a picture of the development of the total output of IB-Groep before and 
after quangocratization. Total output is the sum of the number of awarded grants, loans, 
indemnifications, collected tuition fees, exam candidates, registered and prospective 
students, and granted teacher benefits.23 Total output is contrasted with running costs and 
the revenues from commercial activities, which together equal the company's turnover.
Figure 5.2 shows a decrease in output, which is probably the main cause of the 
decrease in programme costs displayed earlier, in table 5.2A. Because running costs have
22 In the annual report of 1996, IB-Groep states that answering all calls would be too expensive. The aim now 
is to answer 80% of the 2500 calls received per hour within 30 seconds by means of the (automated) voice-mail 
response system (see also Kwaliteitshandvest, 1998).
21 The total number of indemnifications was not available for 1992 and 1997. For 1992, the average number of 
1991 and 1993 was imputed, and for 1997 the value of 1996 was taken. Teacher benefits were included until 1996 
only, because the relevant division was hived off in 1996.
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not decreased as well after 1994 (cf. table 5.2B), it has to be concluded that the costs of 
policy implementation have increased. Cost-efficiency has therefore not improved since 
the establishment of the quango (cf. Ter Bogt, 1997; Van Berkum & Van Dijkem, 1997). 
However, three issues make it difficult to draw simple, straightforward conclusions.
First, programme costs are only one measure of output and, since they are 
determined by policy makers, not necessarily the best indicator of performance of the 
quango. For example, a decrease in the size of the average grant or benefit could also lead 
to a decrease in programme costs. Such effects, resulting from policy changes, should be 
taken into account as well.
Second, the services as delivered by IB-Groep have become more complex because 
of new policies and changes in existing ones24, and of a higher quality. The costs made to 
enable implementation of changes are booked only once, but not separately from other 
programme or running costs. The same holds for the costs of feasibility tests and the 
acquisition of new tasks and/or commercial activities. It is very difficult to single out all 
these costs. Therefore, they are included in the calculation of cost-efficiency. For example, 
the costs of awarding one student grant has increased by almost 10% since 1994, which 
well exceeds inflation.25
Despite the decrease in cost-efficiency, surpluses were obtained (and retained) after 
the establishment as a quango, except in 1994. IB-Groep has explicitly stated that it is not 
after high nett surpluses, because this would not agree with the public nature of the 
organization and its tasks. Indeed, after deduction of Capital reserves and depreciation 
costs, surpluses are small. One cannot help but notice, however, that it is also not in the 
interest of the quango to obtain high surpluses, as this would undermine negotiations on 
the budget for running costs. High surpluses would show that services can be supplied 
much cheaper, which would lead to the parent department deciding to cut budgets. The 
fact that since the establishment as a quango, IB-Groep's deficits have become smaller or 
have even turned into surpluses could be the result of better management, which was one 
of the goals of the hiving off. It is now of more interest to the quango to avoid deficits, 
because the organization has to pay for the itself. It could also be that the new accounting 
system, introduced in 1994, does indeed provide better insight into expenditures and 
projecting budgets, as intended. Informants from IB-Groep claim the latter, but there is 
no way of telling from just the annual reports and annual accounts.
IB-Groep has countered the decrease of policy related activities - for example the 
hiving off of one of its divisions in 1996 - by increasing its commercial activities (mainly 
in the educational sector). Figure 5.2 shows that, in particular between 1994 and 1996, 
revenues from such activities have increased. However, given the limited information in 
annual accounts and annual reports on running costs per division, it is not possible to 
ascertain the profitability of these activities. There will be much discussion on this topic 
between the quango and the parent department, especially considering the new guideline 
on market activities of public organizations. A  further restriction of the possibilities of 
IB-Groep to undertake commercial activities seems likely.
24 Paradoxically enough, most changes made were meant to cut budgets, i.e. to decrease programme costs.
25 In the official evaluation (Deloitte & Touche, 1999:70) an example is shown in which the costs of 
implementing policy changes are separated from the total costs of awarding a student grant. The example shows 
that the nett costs of awarding a grant have decreased, but because of the many changes total (gross) costs have 
increased.
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Figure 5.2. Performance of IB-Groep 1990-1997 in output, running costs and commercial activities (source: annual reports).
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Whereas cost-efficiency may have decreased, the quality of services has increased. 
Since 1994, IB-Groep has made large investments in the quality of customer service (e.g. 
by opening a call centre). There is some evidence to support the conclusion that these 
investments have indeed led to an improvement of the quality of services, such as the 
report by the Netherlands Court of Audit (Algemene Rekenkamer, 1997). Figure 5.3 
summarizes the development of some performance indicators of the quality of services.
Figure 5.3 shows the improvement in the percentage of telephone calls answered and 
a slight improvement in the image of the division Student Grants and Loans (on a scale 
from 1-10). The number of complaints about IB-Groep lodged at the National Ombuds­
man26 has decreased strongly, but more important most complaints are nowadays solved 
more swiftly through mediation. Annual reports show a reduction in the processing time 
of applications for student grants and a decrease in the percentage of registration errors 
(not shown in figure 5.3). Only the number of appeals to decisions about student grants 
has not declined significantly, but this can be due to policy changes.
Conclusions
In sum, after the establishment of IB-Groep as a quango, policy implementation has 
become more expensive, but the responsiveness to clients has improved. Small surpluses 
have been obtained and the number of commercial activities has increased. Both 
informants from IB-Groep and the parent department agree that (small) efficiency losses 
are outweighed by improvements of the quality of customer service. In 1999 an official 
departmental evaluation - prescribed by the statutes -was undertaken by IB-Groep, the 
parent department and a consultancy firm. Regrettably, this was too late for the results 
to be incorporated in this case study. In the interviews, informants from IB-Groep and 
the parent department stated that they would consider the establishment of the quango 
successful, if the official evaluation would lead to the same conclusions as this case study.27
5.2.3. Performance paradox
All conclusions about IB-Groep's performance are based on the information provided by 
the quango itself, mainly annual reports and annual accounts. However, as was argued in 
chapter 3, reports of performance may suffer from a performance paradox (Meyer & 
Gupta, 1994), i.e. performance indicators (PIs) loose their discriminatory value, or only 
concern certain aspects of performance (see subsection 3.3.4 for more explanation)
A performance paradox does not necessarily mean that performance is worse than 
reported, although sometimes information can be misrepresented deliberately. However, 
it is important to try  to ascertain whether a performance paradox is present, because it 
poses a threat to the validity of conclusions about performance. Therefore, this subsection 
deals with the account given by IB-Groep of its performance. Information was obtained 
by analyzing existing documents and from interviews with informants from IB-Groep, the 
parem department and an expert in accountancy (cf. table 5.1; see also Appendix B).
26 Figure 5.3 includes only complaints the Ombudsman found valid.
17 In fact, the main conclusion of the official evaluation is similar to that of the case study. The evaluation report 
states that the effectiveness of policy implementation has improved since 1994. However, the e fficien cy  of policy 
implementation has decreased for those tasks that were subject to numerous policy changes (Deloitte & Touche, 
1999:4-5 [my translation, SvT]).
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No evidence was found that IB-Groep (deliberately) gives an under- or overestimation of 
its performance, but there are some circumstances that could induce a performance para­
dox and warrant further discussion.
The statutes prescribe an audited account of programme costs, programme revenues, and 
running costs, and an annual report of activities to the parent department. Besides these 
documents, IB-Groep regularly compiles reports on its performance for internal use, 
which are discussed with the parent department. Moreover, annually negotiated 
management contracts and so-called information protocols prescribe budget and 
performance requirements in terms of Pis. The previous subsection presented indicators 
used in these documents, such as the number of products (e.g. grants, indemnifications), 
the costs associated with production (both programme costs and running costs) and the 
quality of performance (e.g. the number of appeals, and the processing time of applica- 
tions). Also, some new indicators were constructed, such as the percentage commercial 
activities of total turnover and the percentage running costs of total costs.
The major problem of assessing IB-Groep's performance is that it is a monopolist. 
Not only does this imply a lack of comparable information28, more importantly the only 
supplier of information about performance is the quango itself. This might create 
opportunities to manipulate or hide information damaging to the reputation of the 
quango or its interests. It is not implied here that IB-Groep manipulates information. But, 
when examining the report on performance, it is interesting to see how IB-Groep has used 
its discretionary authority. Most noticeable is the attention paid to the development of 
quality indicators after the establishment of the quango.
A focus on responsiveness fits the mission as formulated by the organization: to 
become the service providing organization in the educational field (cf. annual report 1997, 
p.6 [my translation, SvT]). By stressing the quality of customer service and deploying a 
lot of means to improve that quality, IB-Groep hopes to gain name among potential new 
principals. Thought along this line, the ample attention paid to the development of 
quality indicators is quite logical.
Other aspects of performance have been given less attention. For example, since 1994 
some effort has been put into the development of cost-prices. These are not published, 
however, neither are they used as a management tooi, or in the annual negotiations. 
While, given the complexity and size of tasks, it is certainly not easy to construct cost- 
prices, one cannot deny that IB-Groep also faces some pressures that makes the 
publication of cost-prices unappealing. For example, cost-prices enable the parent 
department or other external supervisors to detect inefficiencies or potential efficiency 
gains the quango has not realised yet. Both effects can influence the annual negotations 
on the terms of the management contract. In particular, the parent department might 
decide to cut budgets, arguing that efficiency can be improved. Moreover, cost-prices 
allow for a comparison with other organizations performing similar tasks. As yet, there 
is no immediate replacement for (the monopolist) IB-Groep, but new technologies could
2! Some comparable information is present, though. For example, in customer surveys (see Appendix C) clients 
have been asked to compare the customer service of the quango with that of other organizations, such as the 
Tax Bureau and private banks (IB-Groep’s performance is rated better than the first organization, but worse than 
the second). Furthermore, clients can file complaints with externally appointed supervisors, such as the National 
Ombudsman (see figure 5.3).
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lead to serious competition in the near future and perhaps loss of tasks by IB-Groep. The 
calculation of cost-prices could therefore have undesired consequences from IB-Groep's 
point of view. By shifting the focus to the quality of service, IB-Groep keeps the parent 
department satisfied; it shares the interest in customer service, and at the same time builds 
a good reputation for itself that might attract new principals.
The monopolist position of IB-Groep has a second major implication for performance 
assessment. Not only does the parent department depend almost entirely on the quango 
for information, it has also little power to force the quango to comply with rules and 
contracts because alternative organizations to perform the tasks in question are lacking. 
111 performance can go unpunished (or perhaps even undetected) for a long time. The way 
in which quangocrats deal with non-compliance with Pis was mentioned as one of the 
causes of a performance paradox (cf. table 5.1). In the case study, questions were asked 
on how errors or failure to meet an indicator were dealt with (see Appendix B).
Without questioning the integrity of the employees of IB-Groep, it has to be said 
that ill performance has little serious consequences. Failures and errors are discussed in 
a relatively open way, but sanctions are seldom imposed. Informants from IB-Groep and 
the parent department agree that errors or failures in policy implementation need to be 
handled with care. It is considered more important that people learn from errors, than 
their being punished for making errors. When detected, ill performance is discussed and 
analysed. However, it is not always easy to ascertain the cause of errors or failures, be­
cause changes in policies can lead to changes in the value of indicators as well. For 
example, when new legal restrictions are imposed on the supply of grants, the number 
of appeals made by clients will no doubt increase. This does not mean, however, that the 
performance of IB-Groep has deteriorated.
After establishing the causes of ill performance, measures are proposed to improve 
performance and, after some time, the effect of those measures is evaluated. This cycle of 
assessment can continue for a long time without performance actually improving.
Two more characteristics of the system of performance assessment are of importance here. 
First, there is a general belief in IB-Groep that all aspects of performance can be measured 
and that PIs are important instruments in the control of the organization and the produc­
tion processes. That in itself creates a risk of measure fixation, i.e. performance is only 
aimed at maximizing the indicators and other aspects are neglected (Smith, 1995) - 
although the open, non-sanctioning culture counteracts this risk.
Second, IB-Groep uses an extensive system of performance assessment. Management 
contracts contain a great number of PIs. Indicators have been developed for each separate 
task and new tasks usually lead to new indicators. There is, however, a great deal of 
overlap between PIs. Box 5.1 shows that five main categories of indicators can be 
distinguished.
This set of indicators was developed by IB-groep in 1989 and subsequent years. Apart 
from a number of new quality indicators introduced after 1994, it has not changed much. 
It measures both quantitative and qualitative aspects of performance. Norms are often 
included, for example, budget information must be delivered within x days, and the 
percentage of appeals should be lower than y. According to an expert on accountability
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1. absolute numbers of input and output
e.g. the number of services that are supplied to clients and principals 
(grants, loans, indemnifications, tuition fees, registration), the 
number of applications (cf. incoming mail), the number of decisions 
about applications (cf. outgoing mail) and the total amount of 
money to be paid or collected (programme costs and revenues);
2. accuracy (or legality) of decisions
e.g. the percentage of (successful) appeals against decisions, the number 
of complaints lodged at external supervisory bodies like the Om­
budsman, and the percentage errors or incompleteness of informa­
tion distributed to clients and principals;
3. timely supply of services
e.g. the processing time of applications, the time needed to respond to 
requests for information from clients and principals, and the time 
necessary to collect debts or fees;
4. customer service (or responsiveness)
e.g. the percentage of calls that is answered, client satisfaction (measured 
on a scale from 1 to 10), principal satisfaction, and the image of the 
organization (compared to other organizations);
5. financial soundness
e.g. auditors' approval of the annual account of divisions and/or IB- 
Groep as a whole.
Box 5.1. Performance indicators used by IB-Groep (based on annual reports and interna 
reports, 1990-1998).
it is a well-developed system of performance assessment2', albeit that most information 
typically concerns client contacts (or: responsiveness) and not the efficiency of the supply 
of services or other internal processes (e.g. running costs per division, service or product). 
Information on those topics is often lacking, as is information on the profitability of 
commercial activities.
Conclusions
IB-Groep provides an extensive account of its performance. The quality of services is 
reported better than cost-efficiency, but besides that there is no evidence of an under- or 
overestimation of performance, either deliberately or unintended. The emphasis on 
quality aspects is consistent with the goal IB-Groep has set itself and approved by the 
parent department. However, more attention for cost-efficiency in the reports on 
performance could improve those reports. The fact that IB-Groep is a monopolist hinders 
comparison of performance with other organizations; there is no benchmark. More
2’ In 1996, IB-Groep won the contest for the best annual report between public agencies and local governments, 
organized by the accountancy and consultancy firm Arthur Andersen (1996). See also chapter 2.
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attention could be paid to IB-Groep's performance as compared to other organizations 
and quangos.
The results of this case study will be summarized and confronted with the theoretical 
expectations in section 5.4. Now we turn to the second case study.
5.3. Case study 2: The Regional Training Centre (ROC)30
ROCs are schools for senior secondary and vocational education, which have come into 
existence through mergers of formerly independent schools. There are 46 ROCs in the 
Netherlands, one of which was selected for this study. The research was carried out in 
1998, two years after the establishment of the selected ROC. In this section, the 
performance of the ROC in 1996 an 1997 is reported and compared to the average 
performance of all Dutch ROCs. The performance of the former schools up till 1996 was 
investigated (see the case study report); the conclusions will be summarized in this section 
as well. Appendix C contains a list of data sources and informants used in the case study.
Subsection 5.3.1 starts with a case description, following the categories that were dis- 
cerned before. Next, the performance of the ROC is described and compared to other 
ROCs (subsection 5.3.2). Finally, evidence will be discussed pertaining the presence and 
workings of a performance paradox (subsection 5.3.3). Results of this case study will be 
confronted with the theoretical expectations in section 5.4.
5.3.1. Case description
Origin
Autonomy for schools has been a major focus of almost all recent educational policies in 
the Netherlands (Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschappen, 1998). In the field 
of adult and vocational education this has resulted in the establishment of Regional 
Training Centres (in Dutch: Regionale OpleidingenCentra, henceforth ROCs).31 ROCs 
resulted from large scale mergers of schools for adult education and senior secondary 
vocational education (in Dutch: middelbaar beroepsonderwijs). Their autonomy is apparent 
from, among other things, the use of lump sum budgets and the relative freedom in the 
development of new curricula. The establishment of ROCs seems to be the end-result (for 
now) of the increased government interest in schools for adult and vocational education 
which first arose in the 1970s.
Government interest in senior secondary vocational education comes mainly from 
its important economic function; to deliver skilled workers for the labour market. 
Following the economic recession in the 1970s, a large number of mergers of schools for 
vocational education took place in the late 1980s, during the so-called sectorization and 
innovation operation (in Dutch: Sectorvorming en Vernieuwing in het Middelbaar beroeps­
onderwijs, SVM). Schools were reorganized to correspond with sectors of industry, such
30 The results of this case study have been reported separately (see Van Thiel 1999b). This section only presents 
a summary.
31 Internationally, the Dutch ROCs can be best compared to the British Training and Enterprise Councils 
(TECs) which have been established from 1980 on (see, for example, Vickerstaff & Parker, 1996). There are 82 
TECs in the United Kingdom (Hall & Weir, 1996:5).
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as electronics, architecture, trade, health services and social work, and economics and ad­
ministration - this to improve the chances of students of graduating and finding a job 
(Boef-van der Meulen, Bronneman-Helmers, Eggink & Herweijer, 1995:120-121). Between 
1988 and 1990, the number of schools was reduced from 1431 with an average of 325 
students to 306 with an average of 1475 students. The introduction of a new budgetting 
system in 1993 was the first step towards more autonomy for vocational schools. This 
new system introduced lump sum budgets, replacing the former system of claiming 
expenses on the parent department. From then on, schools became responsible themselves 
for expenses, deficits and surpluses. The participation of vocational schools in the 
establishment of ROCs, as described below, further enhanced their autonomy.
Adult education dates back as far as the late 1800s (Van Zon, 1990:17-53). 
Government interference was absent, however, until until after World War II. The 
economic crisis of the 1970s increased government interest. While on the one hand the 
economic crisis induced retrenchments, also on education, it created new social problems 
as well. There was an increase in unemployment. Moreover, a large number of migrant 
labourers became permanent residents, and they had to assimilate (e.g. learn Dutch). 
Education could provide a solution for these problems. The government started to heavily 
subsidize schools for adult education, which were - by tradition - often privately founded. 
Following the rise in expenditures on adult education, the government began to develop 
policies on adult education. Because several departments were involved, it was decided 
that, to improve government coordination, adult education had to be organized in a more 
coherent way and eventually be integrated with vocational education for adults (Veld, 
1994:10). Different law proposals were made and accepted by parliament during the 1980s 
(e.g., Kaderwet Volwasseneneducatie, Wet Cursorisch Beroepsonderwijs, Wet op het Voortgezet 
Algemeen Vormend Onderwijs voor volwassenen). However, when these laws were 
implemented in the early 1990s, they were already dated because of new social-economic 
developments, such as a decrease in unemployment and a further increase in the number 
of refugees and immigrants. Therefore it was decided that all existing legislation on adult 
and vocational education would expire in 1996, when the law on vocational and adult 
education would be implemented (Wet Educatie en Beroepsonderwijs (WEB), 1995).
The WEB covers senior secondary vocational education for adults and apprentices, 
and three types of adult education: adult basic education; adult general secondary 
education; and non-formal adult education (in Dutch: vormingswerk). It takes ROCs as 
the basic units of all policies and finances. In other words, schools were forced to merge. 
Schools began hegotiating as early as 1992. Negotiations were completed in 1996, long 
before the prescribed date of January 1998 (cf. Boef-van der Meulen et al., 1995: 129-134; 
for an overview, see BVE-Procescoördinatie, 1997).
Despite that schools had been anticipating the establishment of ROCs, informants 
from the selected organization do not perceive it as a gradual process but rather a radical 
change. This can perhaps be explained by the fact that the initiative to change has almost 
always lain with the government, i.e. the parent department. Schools are reluctant to 
change and would not themselves have come up with the idea of ROCs, even though 
these days they are no longer opposed to it.32
32 This also could be interpreted as a general resistance of schools to change.
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To conclude, one could say that, as a result of growing government interference, in the 
1970s adult and vocational education were hived into the public sector. Schools became 
more and more dependent on government funding and the accompanying legislation for 
the execution of tasks that became more and more important to society.33 The establish­
ment of ROCs in the mid-1990s did not end the dependency of schools on government 
funding, but it gave the schools more autonomy. The establishment of ROCs can thus 
be considered a form of quangocratization.
Compared to the former schools, ROCs are expected to be better able to respond 
to changing societal demands, such as changes in the labour market, technological 
developments, the increasing number of immigrants, et cetera. Moreover, they offer 
students a wide(r) range of educational programmes and unlimited choice of combinations 
of courses and certificates.
There are now 46 licensed ROCs in the Netherlands, mergers of 89% of all formerly 
indepent schools for vocational and adult education.34 The ROC selected for this case 
study was established in 1996 - after two years of negotiation - through the merger of five 
schools: three schools for secondary vocational training, one school for basic- and adult 
education and a centre for non-formal adult education. For reasons of anonymity, it will 
be referred to as "the ROC".
The average number of students in ROCs is estimated at 12,000 (range from 2,500 
to 38,000), which makes some schools even larger than the average polytechnic or 
university. The selected ROC is slightly larger than average and has approximately 14,500 
students (see also below). ROCs are large employers and a major supplier of labour. 
Despite their size, there has been little attention for ROCs from politicians, academics 
and the media. This is partly due to a general lack of interest in particularly vocational 
education, but also to the fact that interest groups of schools, teachers and students have 
been scattered for a long time (Boef-van der Meulen et al., 1995:153-156). It was not until 
1996 - after the completion of the ROC formation - that all interest groups representing 
schools joined one Vocational and Adult Education Council (in Dutch: BVE-raad) to 
represent their interests during the negotiations with the Minister of Education.
Policy objectives and tasks
The main goals of adult and vocational education are: (i) to improve the personal develop­
ment of adults and increase their societal participation, and (ii) to qualify and prepare 
adults for jobs (WEB, article 1.2.1 [my translation, SvT]). Especially the second goal is 
agreed upon by all informants from the ROC and the parent department, and usually
33 There is much disagreement about the question whether schools can be regarded as quangos. In my opinion 
a ll schools - including ROCs - meet the criteria listed in the definition in chapter 1: a public task is executed at 
arm's length but funded by public means. Schools should therefore be considered quangos. However, in the 
study of the Netherlands Court of Audit on Dutch quangos, on ly  pub lic  universities and polytechnics were listed 
(Algemene Rekenkamer, 1995). The disagreement on the position of schools and their relationship with the 
government can be traced back to the school funding controversy (in Dutch: schoolstrijd) of the late 1900s. In 
particular representatives of confessionally based schools strongly resist the idea of their schools being controlled 
by the government, claiming their constitutional right of freedom of education.
34 Independent schools may continue to exist but only under specific conditions. Also, they have far less 
autonomy than ROCs. Thirteen schools have been transformed into professional schools (in Dutch: vakscholen). 
Two schools based on a particular religion are excluded from the obligation to participate in an ROC. Some 
twenty schools are still searching for potential merging partners and have to find one before January 2000.
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coincides with a strong emphasis on the need for education to be accesible to all target 
groups (i.e. participation by minority or students from a disadvantaged background has 
to be improved).
Furthermore, the statutes pay much attention to so-called qualifications, or gradua- 
tion guidelines. National guidelines have been developed for all programmes of vocational 
and adult education to ensure that all graduates of ROCs are trained in a uniform way. 
These guidelines have been implemented in 1997 for vocational education, and in 1998 
for adult education. It is important to note that the uniformity resulting from these 
guidlines inhibits competition.
Market position
The territory of ROCs coincides with regions in which employment exchange agencies 
are active (in Dutch: arbeidsvoorzieningen), this to facilitate the cooperation between 
vocational education and the labour market. In these regions, ROCs offer educational 
programmes in several places. For example, the selected ROC has four main locations in 
the region, but adult education and in particular basic education is also taught at a small 
scale in other places.
From a national perspective, ROCs are clusters of quangos. However, as the inten- 
tion of the government was for one ROC to be established in each region, one could also 
argue that they are regional monopolists. Forty-six schools have been established in 28 
regions. Therefore, in a number of regions there is more than one ROC which leads to 
competition between the ROCs in that region. In the case at hand, not all schools for 
adult education and vocational training in the region have merged into one ROC. There 
are other ROCs operating within and at the borders of the region. So, there is competi­
tion, and not a regional monopoly.
In reality, competition is often limited because ROCs form alliances with each other 
or draw up contracts stipulating which curricula are provided by whom and under which 
conditions new curricula are allowed to be developed. The ROC in this case study has 
also formed such an alliance with its competitors.
Besides competition from other schools, ROCs also face competition from private pro- 
viders of adult and vocational education, especially for commercial activities. ROCs are 
allowed to undertake commercial activities - up to 49% of their total turnover - such as 
providing training programmes to business companies or other organizations. In the 
selected ROC, a special foundation has been established to acquire and carry out com­
mercial activities.
Private providers are allowed - and can be licensed - to offer the same curricula as 
ROCs because they have been incorporated into the same legal framework, a novelty in 
education policy. Opinions differ, however, whether this will lead to more competition. 
Informants from the ROC expect that this w ill lead to a serious increase of competition, 
in particular for vocational education. Not only will companies have more providers to 
choose from, they can also use this position to force ROCs to alter programmes or 
provide in-service training, which is not profitable for the schools because they have 
invested in schoolbuildings and equipment. Experts outside the ROC do not expect that 
private providers will pose a threat, as they cannot offer the same range and quality of 
curricula (see also Vrancken & de Kemp, 1996:23-28).
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Legal position of employees
ROCs have been given full responsibility in matters of personnel. A national collective 
labour agreement has been drawn up as a general framework while details of personnel 
policies, in particular fringe benefits, are subject to internal negotiations. This explains 
why almost all informants from the selected ROC mention labour unions and the works 
council (in Dutch: ondernemingsraad) as a major stakeholder in the organization. Their 
influence has increased strongly since the establishment of the ROC.
Organizational structure and composition of board
The statutes distinguish two types of ROCs: fully integrated institutes (20 out of 46); or 
federations of schools with representatives in one ROC board (26 out of 46). The selected 
case study started out as a federation but is now an institutionally integrated school that 
offers seven different educational programmes, as required by law.35 It employs around 
1,000 people and educates some 14,500 students (BVE-procescoördinatie, 1997).
The legal statutes do not contain any detailed prescriptions regarding the 
organizational structure of ROCs or the composition of the board. In practice, a large 
number of schools has adopted the same organizational structure, as the ROC at hand. 
Figure 5.4 shows the organizational structure that was implemented following the 
establishment of the ROC. The implementation of this structure was completed in 1998.
The Board of Supervisors (in Dutch: raad van toezicht) is the official board of the 
ROC and consists of representatives of all former independent schools. They supervise 
the actions of the Board of Directors (BD, in Dutch: college van bestuur) which is charged 
with the daily management of the ROC. There are three directors in the BD, all former 
directors of vocational schools.
The BD is supported by four divisions: General Management (charged with legal 
matters, public relations and quality care); Personnel; Finances; and Educational Support 
(charged with, amongst others, the proposals for new curricula). In addition, there is a 
separate division called Facilities, which is charged with tasks like the maintenance of 
buildings. From the supportive divisions of Personnel and Finances, employees are 
seconded to four decentralized service bureaus, one at each main location.
All educational matters are the responsibility of the unit directors, who form the 
third level in the organizational structure. Each unit comprises a particular educational 
programme. Eight units concern vocational programmes, divided along the lines of sectors 
of industry: graphics, electronics, mechanical engineering, architecture, health services and 
social work, trade, economic-administrative education, and catering. These eight units 
provide over 350 different courses. The ninth unit concerns adult education and offers 
general secondary and adult basic education. Besides the units, there is a special division 
called the Advice and Training Centre (formerly known as non-formal adult education). 
This centre advises students on their school career, helps drop-outs to return to school 
and assists students to overcome deficiencies.
35 Each ROC preferably consists of at least 7 components: at least three sectors of senior secondary vocational 
education, vocational education for apprentices, adult general secondary education for adults, adult basic 
education and non-formal adult education. The absence of one component is allowed, while the inclusion of non- 
formal education is optional.
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Figure 5.2. Organizational structure of the ROC (source: Handboek Organisatiestructuur, 1997:9)
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Financial arrangements
In 1998, approximately NLG 4 billion was spent by the parent department on secondary 
vocational training and adult education (10.8% of total departmental budget). The bulk 
of this money was spent on ROCs. According to all informants, this budget is low. The 
BVE-raad (1997) estimates that the decentralization of a number of (new) tasks requires 
at least NLG 240 million more, but the Minister of Education has determined that the 
formation of ROCs should be financed from the existing budget. No new funds will be 
made available and no retrenchments will be made.
The procedures for financing vocational and adult education bear a split character. 
The financing of vocational education will change in January 2000. Until then, the existing 
system of lump sum financing is maintained, wherein the lump sum is based mainly on 
the number of students (input). The new system will also use lump sum budgets, but 
output indicators (the number of graduates) will be considered as well when determinating 
budgets. All information necessary to determine budgets is delivered by the ROCs to the 
parent department. Budgets are set annually by the parent department and are meant to 
cover all costs of personnel, use and maintenance of buildings, administration and the 
purchase of services. There is no distinction between programme costs and running costs.
Schools can retain surpluses, but have to pay for shortages when these result from 
their own actions. An accountancy study by Berenschot in 1996, by order of the Minister 
of Education, showed that approximately 23% of all vocational schools have structural 
deficits, paid for by using the schools' reserves. These problems seem to have been caused 
mainly by inadequate financial management and not by insufficiënt lump sum budgets. 
Additional funds have been made available to improve financial management of schools.
An important change, especially for vocational schools, is the transfer of the owner- 
ship of buildings and equipment to the ROCs. Vocational schools need a large amount 
of expensive tools and equipment. In the selected case, costs of equipment and buildings 
are the primary cause of budgetary shortages (see subsection 5.3.2).
The financing of adult education varies with the type of education. In 1994, the 
budgets for non-formal adult education were frozen by the parent department until 2000. 
After 1994, budgets were lump sum payments, no longer based on the number of 
students. The unit for non-formal adult education obtains additional funds from 
commercial activities. Senior secondary general education received lump sum budgets 
from the parent department in the period from 1993 to 1997. However, their budgets 
have been decentralized in January 1997 to (572) local governments, which already used 
to finance adult basic education. The education budgets are based on the number of 
inhabitants, the general level of education and the number of migrants in a municipality. 
Most local governments (89%) join their policies on adult education. A local government 
that does not spend the entire budget has to return the surplus, but ROCs do not have 
to do so.
ROCs have to negotiate with all local governments in their region to obtain budgets. 
In the case study at hand, annual negotiations are held with 16 municipalities. It was the 
legislator's idea that negotiations would increase efficiency, because they allow competitive 
private providers to participate as well. One can doubt if negotiating with large numbers 
of municipalities is really that efficient if it takes up much of the R O C s time and 
attention. Moreover, most local governments have not changed their policy and spend 
their budget entirely on the ROCs, not on other schools.
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Accountability requirements
ROCs have to account for different parts of their performance to different organizations. 
Each ROC has to account for its expenditures by way of an audited annual account to 
the parent department. Activities concerning adult education have to be accounted for as 
well to local governments. The school's performance in terms of the number of students, 
the number of graduates, examination procedures, drop-outs, school counselling, training 
of teachers, and such have to be accounted for in a so-called quality care report (in Dutch: 
kwaliteitszorgverslag), which is audited by the Educational Review Office that is legally 
appointed as supervisor of ROCs (in Dutch: OTiderwijsinspectië). Finally, most schools have 
an internal Board of Supervisors as well (cf. figure 5.4), which has to approve all reports 
and accounts.36
Accountability did not have priority immediately after the establishment of ROCs, 
which meant that in the case study at hand annual reports, annual accounts and quality 
care reports were not always available. Negotiations are underway between the parent 
department and the BVE-raad on the development of a performance assessment system, 
under which ROCs provide the information necessary for the parent department to deter- 
mine budgets and intervene in cases of ill performance. An accountancy firm has been 
charged with the development of a financial monitoring system (Moret, Ernst & Young, 
1998). The BVE-raad wants to use the information from that system to persuade the 
Minister of Education to reduce the financial stress of ROCs (BVE-raad, 1997). More 
information on the accountability of ROCs is given in subsection 5.3.3.
Property rights
ROCs have been given more autonomy than the former schools used to have. For 
example, the financing system of lump sum budgets allows ROCs to make autonomous 
decisions on expenditures concerning personnel, buildings and equipment (which have be­
come their property as well). The right to retain surpluses was already mentioned, as was 
the responsibility for all personnel matters.
Furthermore, ROCs have been given relative freedom of developing new training 
programmes or educational curricula. An application to that end can be sent to the 
Minister of Education who honours it if it does not create inefficiencies at the national 
level, such as an overlap of courses or over-unemployment in certain sectors. All curricula 
are listed in a central register.37 Only curricula that are listed can award legally valid 
certificates or diplomas.
Perceptions
As mentioned before, the idea of establishing ROCs was initiated by the parent depart­
ment. At first schools were apprehensive and perceived the idea as yet another in a long 
line of policy changes. When asked, however, informants now seem pleased with the
56 Between informants, opinions differ strongly with regard to the role of the Supervisory Board. According to 
the statutes, the SB has to supervise the ROC, but informants rather consider it an integral part of the ROC, 
even though it is operating at a distance.
57 The central register (CREBO) is kept by IB-Groep, the first case of this study (see section 5.2). Besides 
curricula, it lists which institutes are allowed to design examinations. In vocational education, 51% of all 
examinations have .to be designed and supervised by other institutes than the ROCs, such as professional 
assocations or the so-called landelijke organen.
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increase in autonomy and would not want to return to the former situation.
The reduction of the number of schools and the autonomy of ROCs have changed 
the relationship with the parent department. Informants from the ROC refer to the new 
relationship with the parent department as professionalized and more business like, 
although ROCs remain, of course, financially dependent. The number of contacts 
between schools and the Ministry of Education has decreased strongly. The BVE-raad, the 
council that represents ROCs, is now the first spokesman. In the department itself, the 
number of departmental divisions dealing with adult and vocational education has 
dropped significantly (as intended; Boef-van der Meulen et al., 1995:135). The department 
is working on the establishment of new ways of consultation and negotiation with ROCs 
and the BVE-raad.
5.3.2. Efficiency and performance since 1996
ROCs are still adapting to their new situation. For example, in 1998 the ROC of this 
study was working on a new organizational structure (see before), a new financial system, 
and the introduction of management contracts between the board of directors and unit 
directors, aimed at decentralizing responsibilities concerning personnel and financial 
management to unit directors. Participants still have to get used to their new 
responsibilities but also to each other. The different types of education now incorporated 
into one organization have different backgrounds, visions and beliefs. Integration will take 
some time.
During the transition, accountability was not a priority. Annual reports and 
accounts have not been published regularly. Collection of information on performance 
was therefore sometimes difficult - even more so, because there hardly exists a tradition 
of using performance indicators and performance assessment systems in vocational and 
adult education (see also subsection 5.3.3). However, two years have passed since the 
ROC's establishment and some effects on performance should be visible, all the more 
because preparations for the merger already began in 1994. Moreover, some of the schools 
that merged had had the autonomy of lump sum financing since 1992.
Among informants from the ROC and the parent department, there is a strong 
belief in the positive effects of the establishment of ROCs in general and that of the case 
at hand in particular. They all think that, in the long run, efficiency gains will be 
obtained and education will become more accessible to students. The latter goal is valued 
even higher than the first.
Total performance
In this subsection, the performance of the ROC since its establishment in 1996 is 
discussed. Three sources were available: the audited annual account of 1996, the quality 
care report (1998) and data collected for the financial monitoring system of the BVE-Raad 
about the performance in 1997 (Moret et al., 1998). To improve our insight into the 
ROC's performance, information from the Ministry of Education on the average 
performance of all 46 Dutch ROCs will be used to compare the total performance of the 
ROC with (Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschappen, 1999). Table 5.3 
presents the information on the performance of the ROC in 1996 and 1997.
The available information mainly concerns financial indicators. Table 5.3 shows
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Table 5.3. Costs, revenues, input and output of the ROC in 1996 and 1997, compared 
to the national averages of all ROCs.
ROC
1996
Average
1996
ROC
1997
Average
1997
Programme revenues1 73.4 77.8 82.2 88.2
Commercial activities’ 2.1 2.8* 2.8 3.32
(% of total turnover) (2.8) (3.5)
Total costs1 76.7 81.8 .
(% spent on salaries) (73.7) (71.6)
Surplus1 -2.5 ■ 0.5 ■
Costs per student3 5.2 8.1* 5.7 8.3*
Number of fte5 650 685 7106 710
(% management) (27.3) (31.0) (27.9) (31.0)
Number of students 14,775 13,375 14,280 13,750
(% in vocational education) (76.3) (67.0) (80.4) (68.0)
Ratio students/teacher7 31.0 28.0 27.8 28.1
Number of curricula 300 - 400 ■
- No (reliable) information available
1 Amounts in NLG million (not 
adjusted for inflation)
2 Additional subsidies for Dutch lessons
to immigrants
3 Costs in NLG 1000
4 Only senior secondary vocational 
education
5 fte = full-time equivalent
6 Increase due to mergers
7 Total number of students divided by 
total number of teachers in fte
Sources: Jaarrekening ROC (1996; 1997), BVE-Monitor (Moret et al., 1998), Kwali­
teitszorgverslag ROC (1998), Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschappen 
(1999).
programme revenues, i.e. the budgets from the parent department, total costs and costs 
per student, surpluses or deficits, and the percentage revenues from commercial activities.38
The selected ROC is slightly larger than average in terms of the number of students 
and employees. Revenues are slightly smaller than average as are commercial activities. 
This last finding could be the result of it being especially adult education that receives 
additional funds for Dutch lessons to immigrants. Because the ROC in question has a 
lower percentage of students in adult education than average (19.6% versus 32% in 1997), 
revenues from commercial activities tend to be relatively low as well. Moreover, a large 
percentage of students in vocational education are apprentices, who have to attend school
38 See Appendix C  for the definitions of the performance indicators used in table 5.3.
142 Chapter 5
only one day a week, which makes their education relatively cheap.
The ROC provides commercial services via two channels: first, through the adult 
education unit and second, a separate foundation that was established to operate in the 
market, and compete with private providers. This foundation employs teachers from the 
units to offer courses to business companies and other organizations. Revenues from these 
commercial activities go to the units that supplied the teachers. ROC informants project 
that eventually 20% of total revenues will be obtained from the activities of the 
foundation.
The main cause of the high total costs, which in 1996 even led to a deficit39, are the costs 
of equipment and buildings, particularly those used for (technical) vocational education. 
Such costs account for approximately 20% of total costs. The average costs per student 
in vocational education (see table 5.3) are also high (over NLG 8,000 per student per 
year). That the costs per student of the ROC in table 5.3 are much lower, is due to the 
fact that these include the costs of students in adult education and vocational education 
for apprentices, both of which are lower. The increase in the number of students in 
vocational education has led to a strong increase of the costs per student, exceeding the 
average increase of costs per student.
The number of students and the number of personnel of the selected ROC are 
higher than average.40 Table 5.3 shows, however, that the average number of students has 
increased, contrary to the selected ROC where it has decreased slightly. This trend 
contradicts the expectation of informants from the ROC and the parent department, who 
expect the number of students to stabilize as a result of the ageing population. The 
increase in the number of personnel between 1996 and 1997 is caused by additional 
mergers with other schools. According to informants from the ROC, a large part of the 
staff is relatively old, leading to high salary costs. They expect centralization of personnel 
policies to bring a solution.
Despite the fact that a higher than average percentage of total personnel is charged 
with non-educational tasks (see the percentage management in table 5.3), the students- 
/teacher ratio is lower than average. It should be noted, however, that this ratio varies 
very with type of education. For example, in 1995 the average ratio in senior secondary 
vocational education was 19.8, while in vocational education for apprentices it was 35.6 
(Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschappen, 1999). The ratios in table 5.3 are 
based on the total number of students and of teachers, and do not take such differences 
between types of education into account.
In 1998, information on the number of drop-outs and graduates were not available 
for the selected case.41 On average, 62.8% of students in vocational education graduates 
(Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschappen, 1999). The average number of 
graduates of adult education was not available.
” The difference between costs and revenues in table 5.3 does not exactly match surpluses, because funds were 
drawn from the Capital reserves as well, and because of interest revenues (not listed in the table).
40 All numbers of personnel and students are rounded off.
,l In 1999, the ROC published a quality care report that does list the number of students and drop-outs for all 
nine units. However, the report did not include information on the number of graduated students.
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Performance offormer schools before 1996
A comparison of the performance of the former schools with that of the ROC is 
hindered by a lack of tradition in making performance assessments at the old schools. 
Schools had to provide different types of information, usually restricted to financial 
indicators. There are also differences in accountability and financing systems. For 
example, vocational education, adult general secondary education and non-formal adult 
education all used to be financed with lump sums, but these were based on different cri­
teria. The budgets for senior secondary and basic adult education are determined by 
external criteria, such as the number of inhabitants and the level of education in the 
municipalities of the region. The schools can exert no influence on these indicators. This 
could account for the lack of information on, for example, output indicators in the 
annual reports and annual accounts of the schools that merged into the ROC in 1996. 
The introduction of national qualification guidelines in 1998 is expected to improve the 
accountability of adult education in this respect.
Information that was available shows that vocational schools already had to cope 
with deficits prior to the establishment of the ROC, due to the high costs of equipment 
and buildings. These deficits were usually paid from the schools' Capital reserves. The 
school for adult education had less financial problems and even allocated money to 
prepare for the merger into the ROC.
Non-financial aspects of performance were underreported. For one, annual reports 
on non-formal adult education do not contain (consistent) information on the numbers 
of students. For adult basic education, the numbers of students are counted, but because 
graduation guidelines were absent before 1998, drop-out rates or the number of graduated 
students are not reported. The numbers of students and graduates that vocational schools 
had to provide to the parent department, had to be drawn up in a particular format, with 
very detailed information that is difficult to aggregate.
Analysis of the available information leads to the following conclusions (see the case study 
report for more details [Van Thiel, 1999b]). Vocational education constitutes the largest 
part of the ROC; it uses 90% of the total budget, and has 80% of all students, and eight 
of the nine units (cf. figure 5.4). Vocational schools already suffered from deficits prior 
to the establishment of the ROC, due to high costs of equipment. This explains the strain 
on the total budget of the ROC, which, in 1996, even led to a deficit. Surpluses and 
additional revenues from commercial activities in the education unit cannot make up for 
the deficits of the vocational education units.
It does not seem likely that budgets are going to be increased by the parent 
department, despite it geneally being acknowledged that budgets are low. To improve 
efficiency, the ROC aims to find other ways to reduce the costs of equipment and 
buildings by, for example, creating one location for all education, and reducing the under- 
utilization of buildings.
Another way for the ROC to improve efficiency would be to expand its commercial 
activities, which are now below average (cf. table 5.3), or to increase its share of adult 
education. An increase of the share of adult education in the ROC will be especially 
important with respect to the new financing system for vocational education, to be intro- 
duced in 2000. The number of graduates will become a major determinant of the budget
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for vocational education. Adult education can attract students from new target groups42 
and prevent vocational education students from dropping out of school. As the situation 
is now (in 1998), only the unit for non-formal adult education has profited from the 
merger. The number of students in this type of education has doubled after 1996.
Conclusions
Based on the available information, it is difficult to draw a simple, clear conclusion on 
changes in the efficiency and effectiveness of the selected ROC after its establishment. 
There is no strong evidence to support the belief of informants from the ROC and the 
parent department that the establishment of the quango will lead to efficiency gains. The 
deficit of 1996 is overcome in 1997 by a small surplus, but the financial strain remains 
high, mainly due to the high expenses on equipment and buildings of vocational 
education. More important than efficiency gains to informants are the expected gains in 
the effectiveness of adult and vocational education, in particular the accessibility of the 
ROC to all students and the opportunities for students to get the education they need. 
In that respect a small improvement is reported for non-formal adult education.
At the moment, the ROC still is in transition. The five former schools have to 
integrate structurally as well as culturally. Investments are being made in, for example, 
a new system of financial management, while at the same time the schools have to 
continue educating students. Besides extra costs, the process of investment also creates a 
double workload for the management and the teachers. As no additional funds have been 
made available by the parent department, and current funding is considered to be low, 
one might expect an increase in costs - and a decrease in efficiency - before efficiency 
gains become visible. Moreover, informants see the increasing centralization as a result 
of the larger scale of the organization as a potential threat to efficiency, because it might 
lead to bureaucratization and loss of commitment of the management to daily activities.
There are two other potential threats to efficiency. First, the staff is on average 
relatively old.43 Moreover, table 5.3 showed that the percentage non-teachers is quite high. 
Not only does this bring higher costs, there is also a risk of more organizational resistance 
to changes, such as the adoption of educational innovations and the exchange of expertise 
between different types of education within the ROC. The centralization of means may 
offers new possibilities for employees in the form of more mobility, and opens the way 
to new policies on, for example, seniority. As the costs of personnel take up a large part 
of the total budget (over 70%), it is important that the ROC deals with this problem.
The second potential threat to efficiency is - paradoxically - the presence of compe- 
titors. ROCs have to negotiate with large numbers of municipalities on the budgets for 
adult education. The time and costs associated with these negotiations make policy 
implementation more expensive. Or non-monopolist ROCs enter 'non-competition pacts' 
with other ROCs operating in or at the border of the region. These alliances are meant 
to avoid overlap (i.e. inefficiency) in the courses schools offer or want to develop. 
However, the negotiations to form such alliances cost time and money as well. So, while
42 On average, 63% of students in adult education belong to an ethnic minority. Most of them are taking Dutch 
lessons.
43 Vrancken and De Kemp (1996:7) also mention the high average age of staff as one of the major causes of in- 
efficiencies in Dutch vocational education.
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the WEB intended competition to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of ROCs, it 
may also increase the costs of policy implementation and reduce efficiency and 
effectiveness.
The lack of information on the performance of the ROC limits drawing conclusions. 
Moreover, ROCs will need more insight into their performance themselves now that they 
have become responsible for the budget. Financial indicators alone are not enough. The 
pending introduction of output-based financing of vocational education requires that 
schools have information on their output as well. The parent department, the BVE-raad 
and the ROCs are working on new accountability systems, to enable ROCs to deliver 
information on their performance, and to allow the parent department to exert 
supervision and determine budgets. Note that this implies a significant change for the 
parent department as well. It has to adjust its relationship with schools in the field of 
adult and vocational education to the new situation. Subsection 5.3.3 will deal more 
extensively with the current and future accountability requirements that ROCs face.
5.3.3. Performance paradox
Table 5.3 listed a number of performance indicators (PIs) to assess the performance of the 
ROC, for example, the amount of revenues and costs, the number of students and the 
number of personnel. In addition, new PIs were calculated using existing information, 
such as the students/teacher ratio or the percentage commercial activities in total turn- 
over. To what extent do these indicators give a valid image of performance? It was noted 
that information on certain aspects was missing (e.g. on the number of graduates in adult 
education), which would imply that performance is under-reported. Chapter 3 identified 
this as a performance paradox (Meyer & Gupta, 1994): reported performance does not 
reflect actual performance (see subsection 3.3.4 for an extensive discussion and examples). 
A performance paradox does not (necessarily) imply ill performance, but it should be 
noted that a paradox can also be evoked intentionally - through manipulation or 
suppressing information - to disguise ill performance. Therefore, the performance 
assessment system of the ROC was evaluated, regarding the amount and type of accounta­
bility requirements, the number and type of performance indicators, the relationship 
between goals and indicators, supervisory activities, et cetera. Data were obtained through 
the analysis of documents and interviews (see table 5.1 and Appendix B).
Analysis of the available information on the ROC's performance shows that it is mainly 
finance-driven. PIs are either of a financial nature (such as revenues, costs, surpluses, 
Capital reserves), or relate straightforwardly to criteria by which budgets are set (e.g. the 
number of students in vocational education) or the units in which budgets are expressed 
(e.g. the number of hours of adult education). Apart from these main indicators, there is 
some minor information on personnel, such as the number of full-time equivalents, the 
number of teachers, absenteeism, and some statistics like the age and gender of teachers. 
Output indicators, such as the percentage of graduates and drop-out rates, are less 
numerous. Non-financial aspects of performance can therefore said to be under-reported. 
It is important to understand that this does not mean that the ROC's performance is 
better or worse than reported, but rather that the information is insufficiënt to obtain a 
comprehensive view of performance. One could argue that there is a performance
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paradox, i.e. a partial under-representation of performance in the annual reports. There 
is no reason to believe that the ROC is any different from other ROCs in this respect. 
Annual reports and annual accounts are drawn up according to legal instructions, given 
by the parent department, which are imposed upon all schools.
There is no evidence that information is withheld on purpose or manipulated. Still, 
schools sometimes present their information in a strategie way. Take, for example, the 
reports on the number of graduates in secondary vocational education. The legal 
instructions of how to deliver information on the number of students, (per year, per cur­
riculum and including the students' progress) have as a consequence that annual reports 
consist mainly of very detailed and complex tables, which makes aggregation of informa­
tion difficult. This allows schools to 'hide' information on total output. Only one 
vocational school offered a summary (see case study report, Van Thiel, 1999b). According 
to informants from this school, the increased responsibilities as a result of the financial 
freedom of lump sum budgets (introduced in 1993/4) made it imperative for the school 
(now one unit) to gain insight into total performance. Other vocational schools and units 
do not present such a summary. While it is not obligatory to report this type of 
information, it has to be acknowledged that schools might be reluctant to give summaries, 
because the average percentage of students that obtains a diploma can be perceived as 
relatively low; approximately 60% - which is not very different from the national average. 
However, the pending introduction of output based financing will force schools to make 
their success rates public.
A second example of strategie presentation of information relates to the deficits 
caused by the costs of equipment and buildings used for vocational education. In several 
instances informants admitted that these deficits could in fact be easily undone by 
'balancing the books', i.e. using Capital reserves. While other ROCs use this (legitimate) 
method frequently, in the case at hand it was preferred to report a deficit in 1996 rather 
than manipulating information. This seems noble, but it should also be pointed out that 
the ROC has a strong interest in reporting deficits because it wants to try  to persuade the 
parent department to increase its budget.
The main cause for the one-sided reports of performance (i.e. focussing on finances) is that 
before the establishment of ROCs there was no need to report more than what was 
legally required. As long as information was available to determine budgets, schools could 
function, and as long as there were no problems, there was no need for intervention by 
supervisors, such as departmental accountants and the Educational Review Office. The 
culture with respect to accountability in the field of adult and vocational education did 
not encompass extensive performance assessment.
The introduction of lump sum financing in 1993/4 made schools more aware of the 
need for knowledge on performance, to be able to make full use of the financial freedom 
they were granted. This need was amplified when ROCs were established, charged with 
new responsibilities, tasks, and more autonomy. It seems reasonable, therefore, to expect 
improvements of the performance assessment system in the field of adult and vocational 
education in the near future, especially when considering the numerous changes in the 
accountability requirements ROCs have to meet, such as the introduction of an obli­
gatory quality care report, the decentralization of responsibilities in personnel matters, 
and of budgets for adult education to local governments. Schools are now obliged to 
deliver, at the least: (i) a quality care report to the Educational Review Office, (ii) an
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audited annual account to the parent department, (iii) an account of the performance of 
adult education to local governments, and (iv) reports on personnel matters to the unions. 
Accountability has thus become fragmented and complex, leading to an increased need 
for ROCs to improve their performance assessment systems.
Performance assessment is, however, still in its infancy. The development of a 
financial monitor, initiated by the BVE-raad, is a first step, although information is 
required on more than just financial matters. The quality care report of the ROC has 
only recently been published and contains mainly plans to improve the quality of 
education, for example, the introduction of national graduation guidelines (the so-called 
qualifications). It w ill take several years before the first results of these activities w ill be 
published.
Other changes in this respect are the newly integrated financial system and the 
pending introduction of management contracts. These contracts between the Board of 
Directors and the unit directors contain agreements on the performance of units, 
expressed in performance indicators and targets. Informants from the ROC expect that 
the contracts will become an important instrument within the organization. They are of 
the opinion that non-compliance with indicators should have serious consequences. 
Dismissal because of ill-performance should, however, only be a last resort.
The current performance assessment system has been in use since 1990 and has not 
changed much since. The question rises if new indicators should be developed and, if so, 
which and by whom. Their limited experience with performance assessment makes it 
difficult for informants to answer this question. Most of them prefer a top-down 
approach, with the BVE-raad taking the lead, drawing up guidelines for all ROCs. Within 
ROCs, the Board of Directors is expected to take the initiative to develop a performance 
assessment system. Ideas for new indicators are scarce. General agreement exists on the 
validity of (existing) indicators, such as the number of students, the number of graduates 
and drop-out rates. Besides these, new financial indicators are expected to become more 
important, such as the costs per student.
Annual reports contain hardly any information on the quality of education. In some 
cases, educational innovations are listed, announced or described, but there is little 
systematic collection or presentation of information.44 The quality care report, which was 
published for the first time in 1998, will have to provide more information on this topic. 
Also, the Educational Review Office is developing a quality inspection system for 
ROCs.45
A final note on performance assessment concerns the need for norms (or targets) and 
comparative evaluations.46 Both serve as a frame of reference for performance indicators, 
without which indicators would only reveal information on one topic at one moment in
44 As an illustration, in the case study report a  number of potential non-finandal indicators are suggested, for 
example: the percentage students from target groups, the percentage of graduates that finds a job -within x 
months after graduation; the satisfaction of employers with graduates; the job satisfaction of teachers; educational 
innovativeness; the quality of examinations, et cetera  (see Van Thiel, 1999b:32).
45 In 1999, the Educational Review Office published the guidelines of the supervision on ROCs (in Dutch:
Integraal Instellingstoezicht).
“  Meyer & Gupta (1994) stress the need for various, comparable performance indicators, to allow for variations 
over time and comparisons between organizations or divisions of the same organization. In this manner, ROG 
units could be compared.
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time (static assessment). Setting targets is often aimed at the future. For example, a target 
could be that the percentage of personnel in management has to decrease by 1%. Such 
targets help organizations to gain insight into their performance and make improvements. 
Comparative evaluations can be made over time, between ROCs, and between units. 
They give insight into the development of, for example, costs and revenues. Comparisons 
between ROCs are necessary to find out whether developments pertain to a particular 
school or are caused by national trends. For example, a decrease in the number of 
students can be caused by the ageing of the population, or by a bad reputation of 
vocational and adult education. So far, the reports of the ROC have not included norms 
or comparative evaluations.
To sum up the main findings, information on the performance of the selected ROC is 
somewhat one-sided, because it concerns mainly financial indicators. There is no reason 
to assume that this is only the case with the ROC in this study. Accountability 
requirements are the same for all ROCs and the results from other studies on the 
performance of vocational education point to similar problems (see Vrancken & De 
Kemp, 1996; BVE-raad, 1997). The focus on financial indicators can be explained by the 
fact that former schools for adult and vocational education used to be required to provide 
this type of information only. Furthermore, because of the long-standing dependence on 
the parent department, there was little or no tradition in extensive performance 
assessment.
The introduction of lump sum financing in 1993/4 triggered the interest of some 
schools in more detailed reports on performance, but the autonomy of ROCs, the 
presence of competitors, the pending introduction of output based financing, mandatory 
national guidelines for graduations, and the quality care report makes comprehensive 
performance assessment even more necessary.
5.4. Comparison of cases
In this chapter two case studies were conducted on the consequences of quangocratization. 
Changes in the efficiency and effectiveness of policy implementation due to the 
establishment of a quango were investigated.
In the case of IB-Groep, evidence was found that the cost-efficiency of policy 
implementation has decreased after the quango was established. However, overall small 
surpluses have been obtained as well. Moreover, the quality of output has increased. To 
conclude, the performance of IB-Groep has improved in some respects and deteriorated 
in others after its establishment as a quango in 1994.
For the case of the ROC, insufficiënt information was available to make a compa­
rison between performance before and after its establishment. The financial strain of the 
costs of equipment and buildings, and the one-off costs of the merger and the current 
transition into a new, integrated school make it unlikely that efficiency and effectiveness 
have already improved significantly since its establishment. Only the unit for non-formal 
adult education displayed an improvement in effectiveness; the number of students 
doubled.
With regard to the presence of a performance paradox, in both cases conditions were 
found that could induce such a paradox. However, there is no evidence to support the 
conclusion that there is indeed a performance paradox. IB-Groep provides an extensive
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public account, but emphasizes some aspects, in particular quality of service, more than 
others, like cost prices and commercial activities. The ROC has little tradition in per­
formance assessment. Available reports provide an under-estimation; financial aspects are 
over-reported while non-financial aspects are not reported or only to a limited extern.
This section seeks to explain these findings, using the hypotheses that were develop­
ed in chapter 3. Table 5.5 confronts the results of the two cases with the hypotheses. The 
limited number of cases makes (statistical) testing of the hypotheses impossible. Below, 
for each hypothesis it w ill be discussed whether the case study results contribute to the 
proposed explanation of the consequences of quangocratization. See also the overview in 
table 5.6 at the end of this chapter. If necessary, recommendations are made for future 
theory development and research.
Ownership of production rights
Ownership of production rights was expected to stimulate the efficiency and effectiveness 
of policy implementation and to prevent the occurence of a performance paradox 
(hypothesis 2.1[P]). The case study results show that both organizations own some of the 
production rights, but not all. Take, for example, financial arrangements. Although both 
organizations own the right to retain surpluses, IB-Groep has more influence on the size 
of its budget than the ROC. The annual negotiations on the management contract and 
the relevant budget are based on the information IB-Groep gives about its performance. 
In the case of the ROC, the parent department unilaterally determines the budgets for all 
ROCs. There are no negotiations between the schools and the parent department. ROCs 
provide only part of the information that is used by the Ministry of Education to divide 
the total budget between the ROCs and the local governments. The budgets for ROCs 
and local governments are included in the departmental budget.
W ith respect to the right to hire and fire employees, the ROC appears to a little 
more autonomous than IB-Groep, whose employees still have the same legal position (and 
salaries) as they had before IB-Groep became a quango. ROC employees fall under the 
new national collective labour agreement, which creates possibilities for each ROC to 
design its own personnel policy. However, the power and influence of the labour unions 
in ROCs have also increased.
The Minister of the parent department has kept the right to intervene in case of ill 
performance. He also has the right to appoint the members of the Board of Supervisors 
of EB-Groep, and he has charged the Educational Review Office with supervision of the 
ROCs (see also accountability requirements below).
How do these findings fit the predictions about efficiency and effectiveness of policy 
implementation? In the case of IB-Groep, it can be argued that the ownership of 
production rights has led to some improvement in performance. Although the costs of 
policy implementation have increased, the quality of services has improved. Small (nett) 
surpluses have been gained and retained since IB-Groep's establishment as a quango. So, 
only after IB-Groep obtained the right to retain surpluses, have these been realized; prior 
to the establishment as a quango deficits were booked and paid for by the parent 
department.
For the increase in the cost prices of goods and services several explanations have 
been forwarded, such as the increased complexity of policies and the additional 
investments made in the quality of performance and client service. However, without
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comparative information, it remains difficult to attribute the drop in cost-efficiency to the 
establishment ’of the quango.
In the case of the ROC, performance does not seem to have improved much. This 
could be explained by the limited influence ROCs have on their financial arrangements. 
Only once budgets have been set by the parent department, do they have any autonomy 
in deciding how to use their money. Furthermore, ROCs have to compete with each 
other for budgets. Therefore they have nothing to gain from reporting surpluses, which 
might induce politicians to reduce their future budgets. To conlude, the restricted 
ownership of production rights, in particular of financial arrangements, has not led to an 
improvement of the efficiency and effectiveness of policy implementation.
In general, it can be concluded that the transfer of production rights when a quango 
is established does not lead to an immediate improvement of performance, it might take 
some time. Moreover, if quangocratization leads to improvement, this may be limited to 
particular aspects of performance. The case study results support hypothesis 2.1 only 
moderately. It is recommended to adjust the hypothesis and include a time lag.
The role that the selected quangos play in the determination of budgets also explains the 
presence of conditions that may induce a performance paradox. The findings in both cases 
are therefore considered to support hypothesis 2.1P. Quangos will report that information 
that gives them the best opportunities to maintain (or even increase) their budgets. For 
example, because IB-Groep has a lot of influence on its budget, it can afford to provide 
extensive information, particularly on aspects of performance, such as quality and 
customer service, that have improved since its establishment. The ROC has less influence 
and will therefore stress financial indicators that confirm deficits and the-need for larger 
budgets. Other aspects of performance are less relevant in this respect and are under- 
reported. The same holds for reporting surpluses; when quangos have less interest in 
reporting surpluses - perhaps because they fear that the budget for next year w ill be cut 
as a result - they will try to report no or only very small (nett) surpluses.
Competition
Competition was expected to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of policy im­
plementation (hypothesis 2.2). However, to survive in a competitive environment, 
quangos might choose to manipulate information on their performance, thus evoking a 
performance paradox (hypothesis 2.2P). The market position of the two selected quangos 
is one of the most striking differences between them.
IB-Groep is a monopolist. Not only does it have a monopoly on the implementation 
of a number of educational policies, it also owns many specific assets, such as knowledge, 
equipment and information. These sunk costs make it very difficult and expensive for the 
principal to resort to another executive agent, let alone that such a transfer requires a 
change of law.
Section 5.2 showed that the performance of IB-Groep improved in some aspects and 
deteriorated in others. This would contradict the expectation formulated in hypothesis
2.2. Yet, it is difficult to reject the hypothesis because of a lack of comparative 
information on the quango's performance. Perhaps the development of its performance 
is part of a general trend in the sector where the quango operates, or of the type of task 
it executes.
The lack of competition also makes it difficult to evaluate the accounts IB-Groep
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gives of its performance, which increases the risk of an (unintended) performance paradox 
(cf. subsection 3.3.4.1). Moreover, with a monopolist quango, the parent department 
depends entirely on the quango for information on its performance, which creates 
opportunities for a (deliberate) performance paradox. On the other hand, because there 
are no alternative executive agents, a monopolist quango has no need to manipulate 
information and report better efficiency or effectiveness than it actually achieves. So, 
monopolist quangos can afford to account for their performance more extensively, and 
spend more means on accountability. This might explain why IB-Groep provides 
extensive reports on its performance; the lack of alternative agents and comparative infor­
mation reduces the risk that inefficiencies will be sanctioned (see also 'risk perception' and 
'emphasis on efficiency' below). This is in line with the prediction formulated in 
hypothesis 2.2P.
The selected ROC is member of a cluster of quangos, and has no regional monopoly. Due 
to a lack of data on performance, no conclusions can be drawn about the effect of 
competition on the R O C s performance. Although all informants firmly believe in the 
efficiency gains that the RO C will make, there is no evidence of that. Hypothesis 2.2 is 
not supported. Moreover, it was noted that one element of the establishment of ROCs 
could pose a threat to the efficiency and effectiveness of policy implementation. The 
introduction of competition means that ROCs have to negotiate with local governments 
on budgets. Negotiation costs will increase the costs of policy implementation. If this is 
indeed the case, hypothesis 2.2 needs to be reformulated.
In theory, the performance of ROCs could be compared between schools. This 
might also reduce the risk of a performance paradox, but not if ROCs agree beforehand 
on what they will report to the parent department. For example, information on the per­
centage of graduates in vocational education was not transparant. Although schools were 
required to give information about this, apparently they feit no need to present 
information in a clear way - except for one school in the selected case - which would 
enable them to make better use of the information themselves. An explanation for this 
behaviour was sought by suggesting that the average percentage of graduates of 
approximately 60% may be considered low, and not something schools would like to 
publish. Such agreements may thus evoke a performance paradox, as predicted in 
hypothesis 2.2P.
A similar agreement has been made to reduce regional competition. Several ROCs 
have entered into alliances with other schools in the same region. This also happened in 
the case study region. Schools have made agreements about which schools are allowed to 
offer certain curricula. Thus these alliances have led to specialization and the reinstallment 
of monopolies (actually, cartels).
Table 5.5 Summary of case study results in terms of the hypotheses about efficiency and effectiveness of policy implementation and about the 
occurence of a performance paradox
Expected effects on: Results
No. Hypothesis Efficiency & Performance 
Effectiveness Paradox
Case study 1 
(IB-Groep)
Case study 2 
(the ROC)
2-l(P) Ownership of
production
rights
+ - ownership of right to retain surpluses, 
budget based on mutual annual 
negotiations but included in state 
budget, quangocrats have secure legal 
position similar to civil servants
ownership of right to retain surpluses, 
budget is determined unilaterally by 
parent department and included in 
state budget, competition for budget 
within cluster, legal position person­
nel laid down in national collective 
labour agreement
2.2(P) Competition + + monopolist, restricted commercial 
activities, highly specific assets
member of cluster, no regional mono­
poly, commercial activities allowed, 
fairly specific assets
2.3(P) Corporatism + +/- board consists of independent experts 
(appointed); many contacts with 
interest groups outside quango
board members from old schools, in­
fluence of unions has increased within 
organization
2.4(P) Accountability
requirements
+ ? annual report and audited account are 
mandatory, frequent contacts with 
parent department, extensive internal 
reports, external scrutiny by e.g. Om­
budsman and judicial courts, high 
profile in media
accountability is fragmented, financial 
reports to parent department and 
local government are mandatory, as is 
educational report to Educational 
Review Office and consultation with 
trade unions
Continued Expected effects on: Results
No. Hypothesis Efficiency &  Performance 
Effectiveness Paradox
Case study 1 
(IB-Groep)
Case study 2 
(the RO C)
2.5(P) Size - + budget is approximately N LG 5 
billion (running costs 4% of total 
budget); number of personnel is 
approx. 1,400 full-time equivalents
budget: approximately N LG 80 
million;
number of personnel: approximately 
1,000 full-time equivalents
2.6(P) Closeness to 
politicians
+ - close to parent department; hived-off 
departmental unit, frequent contacts, 
status quangocrats resembles that of 
civil servants
not close to parent department; hived 
into public sector, few contacts (via 
intermediary), legal position laid 
down in collective labour agreement
2.7(P) Risk perception + - willing to take risks and initiative, 
seldom sanctions for ill performance
passive, seldom sanctions for ill 
performance
2.8P Diversity PIs - diverse and extensive system of PIs on 
output, costs and quality, has been in 
use for some time
limited diversity; little tradition in 
and experience with PIs, mostly 
financial indicators
2.9P Clear policy 
objectives
■ discrepancy between mission and 
official objectives
no discrepancy; mission coincides 
with official policy objectives
2.10P Emphasis on 
efficiency, PIs
+ strong emphasis on PIs, quality more 
important than cost-efficiency
little emphasis on efficiency or PIs; 
accessibility of education is more 
important than either
2. IIP Supervision +/- Board of Supervision Educational Review Office
- = negative effect; + = positive effect; +/- = mixed prediction; ? no prediction
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While this may reduce the overlap in curricula and so decrease the risk of spending means 
in an inefficient way, it also diminishes the accessibility of education because it limits the 
freedom of choice of students in those regions. Because accessibility is an important 
objective of the establishment of ROCs, such forms of cooperation may threaten 
effectiveness. This would contradict the expectation of hypothesis 2.2.
To conclude, while competition may in theory lead to higher efficiency and 
effectiveness, in practice the effects of competition can be counteracted when quangos join 
forces (cf. Flache & Macy, 1996). Such forms of cooperation should get more attention 
in future research. For example, it would be interesting to study the effects of cooperation 
on the competition for budgets in clusters of quangos, or in internal markets.
Corporatism
The participation of interest groups in quangos through, for example, membership of the 
board, was expected to affect the efficiency and effectiveness of policy implementation in 
a positive manner (hypothesis 2.3). Corporatism was expected to increase the chance of 
a performance paradox occurring only if the goals of the participating interest groups 
differ strongly from the the goals of the politicians (cf. hypothesis 2.3[P]).
In neither of the case studies are there interest group members on the company’s 
board, however. The Board of Supervisors of IB-Groep consists of independent experts 
appointed by the minister. IB-Groep does maintain intensive contacts with interest groups 
that represent, among others, students and schools. IB-Groep claims to use these contacts 
to improve its customer service. The impact of these contacts is, however, not measured 
or otherwise substantiated.
The board of the RO C is made up of members of the former school boards. In the 
RO C, the works council, which represents all teachers who are employed by the school, 
has gained an important position after the decentralization of personnel policies. All 
important policy decisions have to be discussed with the work council. It is unknown, 
however, what the effects of this are on performance.
The absence of interest groups in the quangos studied implies that no conclusions 
can be drawn on the influence of corporatism. To investigate the effect of corporatism 
on the performance of quangos, future research could perhaps select cases in different 
policy sectors with different degrees of corporatism (cf. the analyses in chapter 4). Instead 
of testing the participation of interest groups in individual quangos, the focus would then 
be on characteristics of the policy sector in which a quango operates.
Accountability requirements
Hypothesis 2.4 stated that the more accountability requirements are imposed upon 
quangos, the more efficient and effective policy implementation will be. IB-Groep has to 
publish annual reports and audited accounts, which are sent to the parent department. 
Besides these documents, annual negotiations result in management contracts stipulating 
the estimated performance and budgets, both in terms of running and programme costs. 
Moreover, in information protocols agreements are made on the exchange of information 
and the information flow between the quango and the parent department. It can be 
concluded that IB-Groep delivers extensive and frequent reports on its performance. These 
reports are discussed with the departmental management, in order to reach mutual agree- 
ment on IB-Groeps performance.
The accountability requirements imposed on ROCs have increased and are more
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complex than the requirements for individual schools of adult and vocational education 
used to be. ROCs have little experience with such extensive performance assessment and 
will have to develop an assessment system. PIs are expected to become important 
instruments in managing the organization, for example, in the management contracts with 
unit directors. The current information on performance is limited to financial aspects.
The effect of accountability measures on performance is not unequivocal. Reported 
performance does not always reflect actual performance. In the case studies attention was 
paid to conditions that might induce such a performance paradox (see below). The 
findings on these conditions need to be taken into account before conclusions can be 
drawn about the effect of accountability requirements on the performance of the selected 
cases. No conclusion can be derived for hypothesis 2.4.
Size
Smaller quangos were expected to perform more efficiently and effectively, and to be less 
prone to aperformance paradox (hypothesis 2.5[P]). IB-Groep is clearly the larger quango 
of the two cases. The development of the performance of IB-Groep and the RO C both 
show partial improvement; IB-Groep's quality of service has increased and the number 
of students in the ROC's unit for non-formal adult education have increased. In other 
areas, particularly the costs of policy implementation, both cases show a decrease of 
performance. Hypothesis 2.5 is therefore only partly supported by the case study findings.
With regard to the occurrence of a performance paradox, it was found that IB-Groep 
offers a full account of its performance, emphasizing the quality of service. This would 
support hypothesis 2.5P. In the case of the ROC, an under-estimation of performance was 
found. This could indicate the presence of a performance paradox, which would refute 
hypothesis 2.5P. The fact is, though that ROCs in general have little tradition in 
extensive performance assessment. The underestimation of performance will probably be 
found in other schools as well. The BVE-raad, which represents all ROCs, has therefore 
initiated the development of a system of PIs. With the information rendered by such a 
system, ROCs can be compared amongst each other to ascertain the effect of size of a 
quango on its performance. A limited comparison was made in section 5.3, which showed 
that the selected RO C is larger than average and in some respects is indeed less efficient 
and effective than other ROCs (see reported deficits and commercial activities in section 
5.3). This would support hypothesis 2.5. More such comparative research is necessary, 
however, to improve the validity of the conclusions about the effect of the size of 
quangos on their performance and the occurence of a performance paradox.
Closeness to politicians
Closeness to the principal was expected to induce compliance, and hence efficient and 
effective policy implementation (hypothesis 2.6), and reduce the risk of a performance 
paradox (hypothesis 2.6P). Quangocrats in hived off former departmental units were 
expected to be closer to politicians because they used to work at the parent ministry. This 
might also show in the legal position of these quangocrats, in particular when it is the 
same as that of civil servants. Closeness is evident as well if contacts between the quango 
and the parent department are intensive.
IB-groep is a hived-off departmental unit and still has strong ties with the parent 
department, which expresses itself in frequent contacts and negotiations. As both the
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quango and the parent department claim to value quality improvement higher than 
efficiency gains, the strong focus on quality indicators in the performance accounts can 
be perceived as an expression of IB-Groep's desire to please its main principal (this is in 
line with hypothesis 2.6). However, IB-Groep may also be making investments in quality 
and customer service to attract new principals, in its quest for extension of commercial 
activities. According to informants, the acquisition of new tasks is hindered by the strong 
association between the quango and the parent department, especially in the media, with 
IB-Groep coming across as a departmental division. By building a good client-oriented 
reputation, IB-Groep could be hoping to attract new principals. Pis would then be used 
for another purpose than that of pleasing the parent department. Such a condusion would 
point to the presence of a performance paradox and refute hypothesis 2.6P.
Schools for adult and vocational education were never part of the department but 
when they became more dependent on government funding, they were incorporated into 
a legal framework and hived in into the public sector. The relationship with the parent 
department was characterized by an overall dependence of the schools. Quangocratization 
(the establishment of ROCs) offered the schools new autonomy, but the financial 
dependence remained. As a result, the relationship between ROCs and the parent depart­
ment has changed. These days, communication is professionalized and formalized, with 
the BVE-raad representing the interests of the semi-autonomous schools. The number and 
frequency of contacts between individual schools and the department have decreased 
significantly, which explains why informants do not condsider the Ministry of Education 
a major stakeholder in the ROC. Closeness has decreased, but this has not led to an 
overall deterioration of performance (part support for hypothesis 2.6).
Informants from the RO C and the parent department value effectiveness of educa­
tion (in particular accessibility) higher than efficiency. Nevertheless, financial indicators 
are more numerous in reports than non-financial ones. This under-estimation of 
performance points to the presence of a performance paradox and refutes hypothesis 2.6P. 
The under-estimation seems to be caused by tradition rather than intention, however. The 
schools - and the parent department, for that matter - have little tradition in reporting on 
non-financial aspects of performance.
Risk perception
Hypothesis 2.7(P) argued that quangocrats will be inclined to comply with the principal's 
goal as they perceive the risk of getting caught at deviant behaviour higher. Policy 
implementation will then be more efficient and effective, and quangos will not evoke a 
performance paradox. To measure risk perception, attention was paid to, among others, 
the willingness of quangocrats to initiate changes, and the use of sanctions for ill perfor­
mance.
IB-Groep appears to be much less afraid of taking risks than the ROC. For example, 
it was actively involved in taking the initiative to become a quango, it anticipated the 
change even better than the parent department. Over time, it has shown to be willing to 
take on ever more tasks and responsibilities. Finally, IB-Groep wants to expand its 
activities for other principals in the nearby future. The focus on quality indicators can be 
seen as a way to increase customer relations with the current and possible future prin­
cipals and is therefore consistent with this attitude.
To sum up, IB-Groep seems to perceive the risk of getting caught at deviant 
behaviour low. Performance has not - as predicted by hypothesis 2.7 - decreased overall;
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efficiency has decreased, but quality of service has improved. Hypothesis 2.7 is therefore 
only partially supported. The decrease in efficiency is not sanctioned, because the quango 
and the parent department agree that quality improvement is more important (see also 
below on 'emphasis on efficiency and Pis'). Moreover, the principal has no real 
alternatives for IB-Groep, which reduce the risk of sanctioning even further. Hypotheses 
2.7P appear to be supported by the first case study.
Compared to IB-Groep, the ROC takes a much more passive attitude. For example, 
informants thought of its establishment in 1996 as a radical change, even though it had 
been known for four years that ROCs were to become the main unit of policies and 
negotiations to merge were well underway. There is little anticipation on policy changes; 
the dominant attitude is 'to wait and see'. Politicians are considered fickle, changing their 
ideas all the time. That is not to say that the informants want to reverse the merger, 
having gotten used to their new autonomy. Although they claim not to be afraid to take 
responsibility for the ROC's performance, they think there is no need to expand the 
RO C's discretionary authority. Only with regard to financial arrangements does the ROC 
actively seek change; by reporting a deficit - instead of balancing it with Capital reserves - 
it hopes to persuade the parent department to increase its budget. This latter observation 
would refute hypothesis 2.7P. However, it is not the most typical example of the ROC's 
behaviour.
Based on these findings, it can be imagined that the effects of risk perception are 
mediated by other conditions. For example, the more production rights (cf. hypothesis 
2.1) a quango owns (see IB-Groep), the lower it perceives the risk of getting caught at 
deviant behaviour. Or, when competitive quangos (cf. hypothesis 2.2) perceive the risk 
of getting caught to be high, they may decide to join forces rather than compete (as was 
found in the case of the ROC), by making agreements about performance or about their 
reports on performance, These suppositions demand further study.
Diversity of performance indicators
Meyer and Gupta (1994) describe a performance assessment model that is to prevent the 
occurence of a performance paradox. Pis have to be diverse with respect to the range of 
the indicators and have to vary over time, but must be comparable as well (cf. hypothesis 
2.8P). Meyer and Gupta labelled this a paradoxical model of performance assessment. In 
the case studies, attention was therefo're paid to the system of performance assessment, the 
range and variety of Pis and changes in Pis over time.
Since 1989, IB-Groep has developed an extensive system of Pis. After the establish­
ment as a quango in 1994 several new indicators have been added, mainly of the quality 
of customer services. This has led to a slight over-representation of quality aspects, which 
could be considered indicative of a performance paradox (supportive of hypothesis 2.8P). 
However, IB-Groep has a large number of comparable indicators. A comparable set of 
indicators can be found for each policy implemented by IB-Groep. Examples are: output, 
the percentage of errors or appeals, the time required to process information, and the 
number of answered calls (see subsection 5.2.3). This set of Pis has been in use for almost 
ten years now. Both quantitative and qualitative aspects of performance are being measur­
ed. Only information on cost prices and profitability of commercial activities is not 
published.
Contrary to IB-groep, the ROC has little experience of performance assessment. The 
number of performance indicators is limited, has not changed much over time, and
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consists mainly of financial indicators. The reported under-estimation of the ROC's 
performance supports hypothesis 2.8P. The establishment as a quango has forced the 
school to develop a system of indicators. Some first initiatives have been undertaken 
already (see section 5.3).47
Clarity of policy objectives
Executive agents, such as quangos, are often confronted with vague policy objectives, 
multiple goals or even contradictory goals. This creates leeway for quangocrats to diverge 
from the policy objectives as intended by politicians. Moreover, quangocrats can also use 
their discretionary authority to display deviant behaviour, for instance by manipulating 
information to upgrade the account of their performance. Hypothesis 2.9P predicted that 
if policy objectives are not clearly and unambiguously formulated, the chance of a perfor­
mance paradox occurring is relatively high. In the case studies, the mission of the organi­
zations was compared with the official policy objectives as mentioned in the statutes.
IB-groep's mission is to become the service provider in the educational field (cf. 
annual report 1997). Among informants, consensus on this mission is strong. The stated 
mission is, however, not the same as the official goal the statutes mention, which is to 
implement policies in an efficient and impartial manner. Apparently, IB-Groep has re- 
interpreted the official goal to allow it to serve other principals as well. That also explains 
why quality is emphasized so strongly in the accounts of performance (in line with 
hypothesis 2.9P).
There is little divergence between the statutory goals of ROCs and the objectives 
informants specify: personal development, preparation for paid labour and accessibility 
of education to all students are mentioned as the most important goals. However, these 
aspects of performance are less intensively reported on than financial aspects. So, although 
the quango and the parent department agree on the objectives of adult and basic 
education, these are not used to assess the performance of ROCs. Congruence of the 
agent's and principal's objectives is therefore no guarantee that a performance paradox 
will not occur. Hypothesis 2.9P is not supported. Perhaps this can be explained by what 
Torenvlied (1996a,b) refers to as the tolerance level of politicians for deviant policy imple­
mentation. The ambiguity of policy objectives is created deliberately to allow executive 
agents some leeway with respect to policy implementation. In other words, while 
politicians claim to consider particular objectives to be most important, they have other 
objectives when assessing the performance of executive agents.
Emphasis on efficiency, effectiveness and PIs
The more quangocrats value efficiency, effectiveness and PIs, the higher the chance that 
a performance paradox will occur (hypothesis 2.10P). Typically, in both case studies cost- 
efficiency is considered less important than, for example, the improvement of the quality 
of services (IB-Groep) or better accessibility of education to students (ROC). In neither 
cases did informants consider the lack of efficiency gains a reason to limit the quango's
47 In the case study report (Van Thiel, 1999b) some recommendations are made for PIs that could be used in 
addition to existing indicators. Examples are: the number of students as a percentage of the total population of 
eligible students in the region, satisfaction of companies and tertiary schools with graduates, and the cost price 
per student or curriculum.
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autonomy or undo quangocratization. Effectiveness is valued higher. In the case of IB- 
Groep, this is matched by an emphasis on quality indicators in performance accounts. In 
the RO C, the lack of a tradition in performance assessment has led to little interest in PIs 
in general. Doubts are even expressed about the measurability of the quality and 
accessibility of education. Perhaps the implementation of the quality care report will offer 
new opportunities.
The system of performance assessment of IB-Groep being far more advanced than 
that of the RO C, the role of and importance attached to indicators is bigger as well. 
There is a strong commitment to (or belief in) the necessity and possibility of measuring 
performance, even of those elements that seem difficult to quantify such as the quality of 
customer service. Performance is frequently reported and discussed at length. 111 
performance is evaluated and tackled, but sanctions are not imposed.
The development of new indicators in the ROC combined with decentralization of 
responsibilities and budgets are expected to increase the importance of PIs as a 
management tooi. It is the intention of the management of the ROC to also use 
indicators to evaluate performance and, if necessary, sanction ill performance. At the 
moment this is not the custom, however.
To sum up, the case study results give only partial evidence in support of hypothesis 
2.10P. It appears that those aspects of performance which are considered most important 
by the quango and the principal, are also the aspects on which is most extensively 
reported. Therefore, if  efficiency and effectiveness are highly valued (which was not 
unequivocal in the case studies), this will be reflected in the reports on performance. 
Hypothesis 2 .10P should therefore be reformulated into the prediction that if particular 
aspects of performance are considered more important than others, a performance paradox 
can occur, because the aspects that are valued most highly will tend to be over-reported.
Supervision
The presence of a supervisor or regulator makes it more difficult to hide or manipulate 
information (hypothesis 2 .IIP). In both cases, supervisors were present, both within and 
outside of the quango.
Supervision of IB-Groep is executed by the Board of Supervisors (BS) and depart- 
mental accountants. Moreover, the Minister can order additional audits. Such external 
audits have been carried out and annual accounts are scrutinized by independent 
accountants. Interventions by the BS have taken place in the past. An example is the 
support of measures to decrease absenteeism among employees. However, the fact that 
the board is also part of IB-Groep may corrupt its supervisory role. Instead of an indepen­
dent regulator, it could become an intermediary and, in case of a performance paradox, 
an accomplice.
Supervision on the RO C is the task of the Educational Review Office. In addition, 
the Educational Review Office has been given new tasks, in particular the supervision of 
quality care in schools following the introduction of national graduation guidelines. 
However, these activities have only just begun, and the full influence of the Educational 
Review Office cannot be determined yet.
Besides the Educational Review Offices, most ROCs have a Board of Supervisors. 
However, these boards consist of former school board members, who will be less 
independent than the Review Office. Informants from the ROC could not agree on the 
role the Board of Supervisors played in the school.
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Because in both cases the role and position of the supervisor is unclear in some 
respects, no conclusions are drawn with respect to hypothesis 2 .IIP . In this study regu­
lators were not part of the research design. I recommend that they will be included in 
future research.
Tables 5.6 and 5.7 summarize to which extent the case study results have provided 
(partial) support for the hypotheses. If one case provided support and the other case did 
not, it is said that support is mixed. Only when both cases contradict the hypothesis, is 
the hypothesis refuted. It should be kept in mind that a (statistical) test of the hypotheses 
is not possible with the evidence gained from the two cases.
Table 5.6. Degree of support for the hypotheses about the efficiency and effectiveness of 
policy implementation; case study results.
No. Hypothesis Expected effect on 
Efficiency
Support for 
hypothesis
2.1 Ownership production rights + supported
2.2 Competition + refuted
2.3 Corporatism + )
2.4 Accountability requirements + 3
2.5 Size - supported
2.6 Closeness to politicians + supported
2.7 Risk perception + supported
-  - negative effect; + = positive effect; ? = no decision
Some implications of the results have been discussed already, both with regard to the 
theoretical model as developed in chapter 3, and with respect to future research. In 
Chapter 6 the discussion will be continued by integrating the results from chapter 4 and 
5, to find the anwers to the two main research questions of this study.
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Table 5.7. Degree of support for the hypotheses about the occurence of a performance 
paradox; case study results.
No. Hypothesis Expected Perfor­
mance Paradox
Support for 
hypothesis
2.1P Ownership production rights - supported
2.2P Competition + supported
2.3P Corporatism +/- ?
2.4P Accountability requirements *
2.5P Size + mixed findings
2.6P Closeness to politicians - refuted
2.7P Risk perception - supported
2.8P Diversity Pis - supported
2.9P Clear policy objectives ■ mixed findings
2.10P Emphasis on efficiency, Pis + supported
2.IIP Supervision + /- ?
- = negative effect; + = positive effect; +/- = mixed prediction; * = no prediction; 
? = no decision

6. CONCLUSION
This study began with two observations. First, western governments are increasingly 
using quangos1, instead of government bureaucracy, for policy implementation. The 
proliferation of quangos is labelled quangocratization. In chapter 2 this trend was 
shown for the Netherlands. The number of Dutch quangos has increased strongly after 
World War II. They are charged with an ever increasing diversity of tasks and operate 
in all policy sectors.
This study aims to go beyond description, however. It wants to explain quango­
cratization as well. Using a rational actor approach, a theoretical model was developed 
in chapter 3, which indicated under which circumstances politicians choose quangos 
rather than government bureaucracy for the implementation of policies (the first re­
search question of this study). These specified circumstances were assumed to be the 
causes of quangocratization. Hypotheses were developed and tested in chapter 4. 
Below, the main results will be summarized and discussed (for an extensive summary, 
see section 4.6).
The second observation with which this study began concerns the motives 
politicians themselves mention for choosing a quango as an executive agent - that is, if 
politicians do mention motives, for in more than half the cases they do not (cf. Alge­
mene Rekenkamer, 1995:19). Together these motives were called the practitioner 
theory (see section 1.3). Several advantages are ascribed to quangos by politicians. In 
general, the performance of quangos is expected to be better because they operate 
closer to the citizen than government bureaucracy, away from meddling politicians.
From 1980 on, the dominant motive for choosing a quango as an executive agent 
stems from the neo-liberal belief in the superiority of the market. Quangos are 
considered more 'market-like' than government bureaucracy, and hence to be more 
efficient and effective agents. However, there is not much evidence to substantiate this 
claim (cf. section 1.4). This study therefore paid attention to the consequences of 
quangocratization, with a focus on quango performance.
A theoretical model was developed to predict under which conditions quango­
crats - i.e. quango employees - implement policies in the most efficient and effective
' Quango is the acronym of <7«asi-4utonomous non-governraental organization (Barker, 1982). In section 1.2, 
quangos were defined as organizations, which, as their main task, are charged with the implementation of 
one or more public policies. They are funded publically but operate at arm's length of the central govern­
ment, without an immediate hierarchical relationship existing with a minister or a parent department 
(Leeuw, 1992). There are different types of quangos - for example, contract agencies, public bodies, and state- 
owned enterprises - operating under different conditions and having different degrees of autonomy (see table 
1.1). Private organizations can be charged with policy implementation as well by privatization, competitive 
tendering or outsourcing.
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way (the second research question in this study), and in compliance with the intention 
of the politicians who established the quango - or the opposite: when do they deviate 
from the intentions of the politicians?2 Deviant behaviour is assumed to threaten the 
efficiency and effectiveness of policy implementation. Hypotheses were formulated on 
quango performance and put to the test in two case studies (see section 5.4 for an 
extensive summary and discussion of the results).
This chapter concludes the study of the trends, causes and consequences of quango- 
cratization. A separate section is devoted to each of these topics. The research findings, 
possible implications for the theoretical model in chapter 3, and recommendations for 
future research and policy development will all be discussed.
6.1. Trends
Quangocratization has taken place throughout the western world in the past few 
decades. In this study the empirical focus is on quangos of the 'public body' type in 
the Netherlands, between 1950 and 1993. Chapter 2 described the increase in the 
number and variety of quangos. Also, a comparison was made between 
quangocratization and bureaucratization. This section will summarize the main 
findings of chapter 2. Also, the question raised in chapter 1 on how to characterize the 
process of quangocratization (as rationalization or not) will be dealt with below.
For a long time, there was little political debate on or scientific interest in 
quangos. Recently, however, a number of reports on quangos have been published (for 
an overview, see section 1.4). One of these reports was used in this study as the 
primary data source, namely the survey by the Netherlands Court of Audit on Dutch 
public bodies (NCA survey; Algemene Rekenkamer, 1995). In general, the interest of 
politicians and academics in quangos has increased after these reports were published, 
in particular with respect to the accountability of these organizations. In this study, 
ample attention was given to the accountability of quangos. Below a summary of the 
main findings is discussed. This section will conclude with some recommendations for 
future research.
Quangocratization in the Netherlands between 1950 and 1993
In chapter 2 the NCA-survey was used to describe quangocratization in the Nether­
lands. In particular after 1950, the number of quangos has increased. Nowadays, there 
are approximately 600 public bodies, employing more people (130,000) than there are 
departmental civil servants. Almost 20% of the State Budget is spent on quangos. 
Quangos are charged with an increasing variety of tasks, ranging from supervision, 
regulation, quasi-judicature, the granting of benefits, to research and co-ordination. 
Chapter 2 gave several examples of quangos and their tasks, also for other countries 
such as the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and New Zealand (Hood &
2 Three types of deviant behaviour were discerned in chapter 3. First, quangocrats can minimize their efforts 
(shirking; Douma &  Schreuder, 1998:109). Second, they can try to use means to further their own ends, for 
example, to maximize fringe benefits,or manipulate information to hide or upgrade their behaviour. And 
third, quangocrats can implement policies in a way consistent with their own policy position rather than 
those of politicians (cf. Torenvlied, 1996a,b).
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Schuppert, 1988; Modeen & Rosas, 1988; Hall & Weir, 1996; Flinders & Smith, 1999).
Quangos are not new types of organizations, though. In the Netherlands, as well 
as in other countries, such as the UK and Denmark, quangos have been used for 
centuries (Greve et al., 1999). In the late 1970s and early 1980s, quangos were 
rediscovered as instruments of administrative reform (Pollitt, 1999). This led to an 
increase in the number of quangos in many western states, although there were 
differences with regard to the pace, institutional context and the means that were 
deployed to achieve reform (Van Waarden, 1992:158; Unger & Van Waarden, 
1995:11). For example, privatization occurred on a much larger scale in the United 
Kingdom than in the Netherlands. Besides the fact that there were fewer state-owned 
companies in the Netherlands, differences in political tradition and administrative 
system also played a part in this disparity (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000:42).
Trends after 1993
The empirical parts of this study concentrated on the establishment of quangos in the 
Netherlands between 1950 and 1993. At face value, there does not seem to be a decline 
in the use of quangos after 1993 (as claimed by some researchers, see e.g. Hakvoort & 
Veenswijk, 1998:1). However, the publication of reports such as the NCA survey, 
triggered a hot political debate on the desirability of using quangos. Politicians now 
seem more inclined to use less extreme types of quangos, for example, contract 
agencies instead of public bodies, or public bodies instead of privatization (cf. table 
l.l) . 3
The increasing use of quangos and private organizations for policy implementa­
tion has led to a blurring of the boundaries between state, market and society. Conse- 
quently, the national government is rapidly changing from a hierarchical, centralistic 
body to a horizontal, cooperative one. Governments are looking for new ways of 
governance (Kooiman, 1999). For example, in the UK, the Blair administration h'as 
produced a white paper on 'Modernising Government' (1999), which stresses the 
importance of a so-called joined-up government. In collaboration with local govern­
ments, interest groups, executive agencies, and private organizations the government 
aims to improve the quality of policy development and implementation. Such plans do 
not entail a retreat from the use of quangos for policy implementation, however 
(Leeuw, Jenkins &  Van Thiel, forthcoming).
Quangocratization and bureaucratizalion side by side
This study has shown that, contrary to what the practitioner theory claims, the 
increase in the number of quangos has not led to a decrease in the size of government 
bureaucracy. Figure 2.3 showed that, until 1980, bureaucratization and quangocratiza­
tion took place alongside each other. After 1982, the number of departmental divisions
3 The inclination of Dutch politicians to use less extreme types of quangos can be illustrated by two recent 
examples. First, the privatization of the Dutch railroad company (Nederlandse Spoorwegen) has been 
temporarily suspended, awaiting the results of the political debate on this issue (see e.g. De Volkskrant, 
1999b). Second, in November 1999 the Minister of Social Affairs published a new proposal on the 
implementation of social security policies, in particular policies regarding disability and unemployment bene­
fits. In this proposal, the government reinstates her power and reduces the influence of unions, employers 
and the quangos currently implementing social security policies (NRC Handelsblad, 1999).
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has decreased, but the number of civil servants has risen, as have government 
expenditures (adjusted for inflation).
The analysis in chapter 4 confirmed these trends. Tables 4.4 and 4.6 showed that 
quangos are established more often after an increase in the size of government. This 
means that politicians first take on more tasks, and only after that start using quangos 
for policy implementation. One would expect that the use of quangos as executive 
agents reduces the size of the government bureaucracy; quangos take over tasks that 
would otherwise have been carried out by government bureaucracy. Moreover, 
quangos are sometimes hived-off former departmental units, which would mean a 
reduction in governments size has taken place. This expectation was refuted by the 
analysis, however.4 Government bureaucracy will continue to exist. As LeGrand and 
Bartlett (1993:7) predicted, governments will change the way in which policies are 
implemented, rather than abolishing the policies in question.
Rationalization or de-rationalization?
In this study, quangocratization - i.e. the proliferation of quangos - is considered a 
recent stage in the development of western states. In chapter 1 the question was raised 
whether quangocratization could be seen as a next step in the process of 
rationalization, or if it is rather a form of de-rationalization with quangos replacing 
government bureaucracy. I hold the opinion that quangocratization is a form of ratio­
nalization, for the following reasons.
First, the findings of this study show that quangos have not replaced government 
bureaucracy but have become supplementary executive agents. Quangos and 
government bureaucracy exist side by side. Moreover, quangos can be equally 
bureaucratie as government bureaucracy when it comes to, for example, using Standard 
operating procedures (Wilson, 1989:221). Also, in quangos the focus lies more often on 
input than output (see results on performance indicators in annual reports of quangos, 
section 2.3), and in some quangos the legal position of quangocrats is comparable to 
that of bureaucrats (see the first case study in chapter 5). Weber considered 
bureaucracy the most rational form of organization and therefore labelled its 
proliferation rationalization. If quangos have equally bureaucratie features, their 
proliferation could also fit that label (cf. Nonet & Selznick, 1978).
Second, the analysis of the practitioner theory in section 1.3 showed that the 
main motive of politicians for the establishment of quangos is to make efficiency 
gains. This is a typical rational aim (Van der Loo & Van Reijen, 1997:167).5
Third, the transfer of executive power to quangos fits the idea of continued 
specialization, or division of labour, typical of the rationalization process in western
4 In part, this is due to an operationalization poblem. Most quangos (60%) receive their budgets from the 
state, and in a large number of cases (30%) quangocrats are, in fact, seconded civil servants (see section 2.1.3 
for more details). Budgets and the number of employees are therefore induded in counts of government 
expenditures and the number of civil servants. It is even possible that former private organizations that have 
been hived in into the public sector and become quangos, are included; their establishment thus has led to an 
increase in expenditures and the number of personnel, instead of a decrease.
5 For this line of reasoning it is irrelevant whether quangos are indeed more efficient and effective. It is the 
wish of politicians to use more efficient executive agents that makes quangocratization an example of 
rationalization.
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societies. In chapter 1 it was described how citizens transfer part of their individual 
rights to politicians, who provides these citizens, in their turn, with collective goods 
(cf. North, 1981). To implement the policies promised, politicians transfer part of the 
citizens' rights to executive agents. A cascade of principals and agents results from this 
process (see box 1.1). The preference of politicians for executive agents may have 
changed from government bureaucracy to quangos, the continued partitioning of 
rights is typical of a process of rationalization. Therefore, quangocratization is, in my 
opinion, the next step in the process of rationalization.
Despite the rational characteristics of quangocratization, it has led to some 'ir- 
rational' outcomes as well.6 Most notably, as a result of quangocratization in many 
western countries, today's public sector is characterized by a plethora of organizations, 
which impedes a simple and logic ordering of that sector (Leeuw, 1992:20-22). There 
are but few similarities between different types of quangos, although an effort was 
made in this study (see table 1.1) to draw up a typology of quangos. Comparative 
research will remain a difficult task.
Policy developments: the accountability of quangos
In the Netherlands and the UK, reports on the number of quangos and their demo­
cratie accountability (Weir &  Hall, 1994; Algemene Rekenkamer, 1995; Hall &  Weir, 
1996) show that the accountability of quangos is poorly regulated. My study 
demonstrates that many quangos are under no obligation to report on their 
performance. But if they are, reports are often considered incomplete by experts (see 
table 2.6), or tend to concentrate on particular aspects of performance only. This was 
also the case with the two quangos studied in chapter 5.
In response to the reports on the accountability of quangos, politicians have tried 
to reassert their political authority and increase regulation and auditing (Herstel van het 
primaat van de politiek, 1995; Rhodes, 1997:89-93). For example, committees have been 
set up to advise the government on the behaviour of quangocrats (Nolan Committee 
in UK) or the market activities of quangos (Commissie Cohen in the Netherlands). 
Guidelines have been drawn up on the decision-making process surrounding the 
privatization or hiving off of departmental units [Aanwijzingen, 1996), and a law 
proposal is being made on the accountability requirements that should be imposed on 
quangos (Wetsvoorstel Kaderwet Zelfstandige Bestuursorganen, forthcoming). Regulators 
have been appointed for the supervision of quangos and privatized companies in, for 
example, the policy sectors of telecommunications, and water and electricity. Some of 
these regulators are quangos themselves. The effects of these new policies and regula- 
tions are as yet unknown.
An explanation for the lack of interest of politicians in imposing accountability
6 Irrationa] outcomes of a process of rationalization do not undo the rational character of the process. 
Bureaucracy has led to some irrational outcomes as well, such as bureaucratism. Another form of 
rationalization, the McDonaldization of society (Ritzer, 1993), aims at optimal efficiency by designing the 
production process in such a way that as many customers as possible are served in the shortest time possible. 
Irrational outcomes of this process are, for example, the de-humanizing of the work environment, resulting 
in a high degree of absenteeism and the breaking of contracts (Van der Loo and Van Reijen 1997:167).
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requirements on quangos falls outside the scope of this study, although the findings do 
offer some suggestions. For example, policy implementation may be put at arm's 
length by politicians in order to avoid accountability for that implementation. 
Politicians may not want to know what is going on in the quango, because they no 
longer wish to be responsible. Moreover, legally they are not responsible any longer.7 
As long as there are no signs of ill performance - not because ill peformance does not 
occur, but because it is not being reported - there is no need to intervene (Leeuw, 
1995). Without external intervention, this cyde can go on for a long time.
On the other hand, the findings also suggest that in some cases accountability 
requirements are imposed, sometimes even over the full range of the accountability 
scale. It would be interesting to explain such patterns. For example, it was found that 
in years when a large number of quangos is established, more accountability require­
ments are imposed on average (contrary to what was expected; see table 4.7). This 
finding could be attributed to the desire of politicians to minimize monitoring costs, - 
and thus increase the efficiency of policy implementation (for a more extensive 
argument, see subsection 3.4.2.4). If imposing accountability requirements on one 
quango alone is relatively more expensive than imposing them on several quangos at a 
time, politicians will only impose requirements when larger numbers of quangos are 
established. This explanation has not been tested in this study, however.
Another pattern found is that of quangos in corporatist policy fields facing fewer 
accountability requirements (see table 4.7). It was suggested that in corporatist policy 
areas, such as Agriculture and Welfare (see Appendix A), more informal monitoring 
devices are available (because of more intensive contacts between politicians, interest 
groups and executive agents), that can replace the need for formal ones. Further study 
is necessary on such 'soft Controls'.
Future research
Unfortunately, the NCA survey does not contain information on the origin of 
quangos. Although it was established that quangos are seldom abolished (3%), 
reorganizations and mergers do occur in one out of five cases. To improve the 
descriptive research of quangos, more study is necessary on the lifetimes of quangos. 
For instance, information is needed on whether a certain quango has been newly esta­
blished, or results from a merger, has been set up by hiving off a former departmental 
unit, or by hiving in a former private organization into the public sector. Also, 
quangos can change over time from, for example, a contract agency to a public body, 
and vice versa. This is called quango-drift (Greve et al., 1999).
Another option could be to refine the level of analysis to policy sectors, instead 
of confining it to national government level. The number of quangos in policy fields 
varies strongly (see figure 2.6), as does the rate of growth in different sectors. The 
establishment of quangos in policy sector A could coincide with an expansion of the 
size of the parent department in policy sector B, leading to both more quango­
cratization and bureaucratization. By examining one policy sector at a time, such 
counter-effects can be exduded and the nett effect of quangocratization on the size of
7 Politicians do remain responsible, though, for their choice of a quango as an executive agent and also for 
the supervision of these quangos.
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6.2. Causes
The first research question of this study was on the causes of quangocratization. In 
chapter 3, a theoretical model was developed to explain why, under certain conditions, 
politicians will choose quangos as an executive agent. Hypotheses were formulated that 
were tested in chapter 4. In this section the model and the analyses are discussed and 
the main findings summarized. Also, some recommendations for future theory 
development and research are given.
Theoretical model to explain causes of quangocratization
In order to explain quangocratization, a theoretical model was developed to predict the 
choice of politicians for a quango as an executive agent, as opposed to government 
bureaucracy. See chapter 3 for a full analysis and formulation of the model; here, I 
shall confine myself to a basic outline. The model is based on assumptions from 
rational choice theory (Coleman, 1990; Lindenberg, &  Frey, 1993). Politicians are 
actors who aim to maximize particular goals, in the present case, that of getting re- 
elected (public choice theory; Mueller, 1989; Dunleavy, 1991). To achieve that goal, 
politicians will try to please voters by promising them new policies. Implementation 
of these policies is charged to an executive agent. In this study, it is assumed that 
politicians have the choice between a quango and government bureaucracy as an 
executive agent.
The choice for a quango has two advantages to politicians. First, the 
responsibility of politicians for policy implementation by quangos is limited. The risk 
of being held accountable for ill performance is reduced. Second, the establishment of 
quangos offers politicians the opportunity to let interest groups (which represent large 
numbers of voters) participate in, for example, quango boards. This has been labelled 
patronage. However, the establishment of a quango has an important potential 
disadvantage to politicians as well. If policies are implemented in an inefficient or 
ineffective way, politicians have less opportunity to intervene. And, although their 
responsibility is limited, they can, in the end, still be held accountable for choosing a 
quango for policy implementation and supervising it.
In a rational actor model, it is assumed that politicians are able to assess all these 
advantages and disadvantages when choosing an executive agent. Their choice will 
depend on situational characteristics and the potential gain in electoral support. For 
example, when competition for votes is fierce, politicians are expected to choose 
quangos, because of the aforementioned benefits. Also, when policies are considered 
very important to voters, as in the case of collective goods, politicians will not want to 
put implementation at arm's length, which would lead to a situation in which they 
cannot intervene. See table 3.1 for a full overview of all hypotheses.
On the other hand, it does not seem realistic to assume that politicians can size 
up all this information and make the most rational choice. Therefore, the model was 
expanded with some assumptions on bounded rationality. Politicians can use 
information and experience from other politicians to improve their decision-making. 
This is called imitation. Another alternative is to monitor the performance of quangos 
set up in the past. In the latter instance, however, extra costs will have to be made.
government bureaucracy studied.
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These 'monitoring costs' will increase the costs of policy implementation - and 
decrease efficiency.
All hypotheses from the rational actor model and bounded rationality model 
were tested in chapter 4. Below, the main findings are discussed. For a more extensive 
summary and discussion, see section 4.6.
The rational actor model
As explained before, the choice of politicians will be influenced by situational charac­
teristics. Six circumstances (or conditions) were tested on their impact: (i) political 
ideology; (ii) economic conditions; (iii) electoral competition among politicians; (iv) 
corporatism; and the degree to which the policy to be implemented concerns the 
provision of (v) collective goods or (vi) requires many specific investments (hypotheses 
1.1 to 1.6). The results of the analyses were shown in tables 4.3 and 4.4. Below, only 
those conditions are discussed that contributed to the explanation of 
quangocratization.
Political ideology
Contrary to what common sense would suggest, political ideology was not expected to 
be of decisive influence on the choice of politicians for quangos. The advantages and 
disadvantages of choosing quangos were thought to be valid for all politicians no 
matter what their political beliefs are. The analyses confirm this expectation.
Actually, this is not surprising. It was pointed out before that quangos have been 
in use for a long time, and consequently have been established by different political ad- 
ministrations. The increase in the number of quangos in the 1980s was a widespread 
one. Public sector reform took place in countries with conservative governments (e.g. 
the UK) and social-democratic ones (e.g. Sweden). The neo-liberal belief in the market 
has been followed by western governments of all sorts of ideological backgrounds. 
There are, perhaps, differences in the pace of administrative reform and the preference 
for certain types of quangos (Van Waarden, 1992:158; Unger & Van Waarden, 1995:11; 
Pollitt &  Bouckaert, 2000), but quangocratization has taken place throughout the 
western world.
For the Netherlands, it would be interesting to investigate quangocratization for the 
period after 1993. Between 1950 and 1993, cabinet coalitions (left-wing and right-wing) 
were dominated by the christian-democratic party. This may have distorted the analy­
sis. If Christian-Democratic politicians favour quangos for ideological reasons, a lot of 
quangos will have been established in this period, no matter which other political 
party participated in the governing coalition. Christian-Democratic politicians may 
have used their power and resources to force other politicians to take the same policy 
position (Stokman, 1994). In the analyses in chapter 4, such an effect could have been 
ruled out. However, after 1993, cabinets have come into office in which the Christian- 
Democrats do not participate. It would be interesting to see whether this had an effect 
on quangocratization.
Economic conditions
Common sense would probably suggest that politicians will choose quangos more 
often in times of economic down-swing. Politicians expect efficiency gains from the
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use of quangos - at least according to the practitioner theory - and they may wish to 
downsize the administrative system by hiving off departmental units into quangos. 
However, one could just as well argue that in times of economie upswing, when 
government tasks and budget are expanding, more policies have to be implemented by 
executive agents, which include quangos. Therefore, economic conditions were not 
expected to be decisive to the choice of politicians for quangos. The analyses showed 
that quangos are no more (or less) frequently established in periods of economic up­
swing, suggesting that economic conditions indeed are not decisive to the choice of 
politicians for quangos. However, the testing of the hypothesis on economic 
conditions was incomplete due to a lack of data. Conclusions should therefore be 
drawn with some reservation.
It would be interesting to investigate the effect that quangocratization, in its turn, 
has on economic conditions. For example, if the practitioner theory is valid, efficiency 
gains due to quangocratization will lead to a decrease in government expenditures. So 
far, there is little evidence to support this claim (see the overview in section 1.4, and 
the results of case studies discussed in section 6.3).
Electoral competition
In the model, politicians are said to strive after (re-)election. Therefore, it is expected 
that in situations where competition for votes is fierce, for example, in election times, 
politicians will use quangos to enhance their electoral support. The analyses refuted 
this expectation; elections lead to fewer quangos being established. During election 
campaigns politicians promise new policies to voters. These new policies will have to 
be implemented by executive agents, such as quangos. However, policies cannot be 
implemented directly, The development of policies and the passing of laws takes time, 
on average seven years (Algemene Rekenkamer, 1994:6). Therefore, the total number 
of decisions on executive agents, quangos included, is expected to decrease in election 
times and increase in the years after. This could not be tested in this study, because 
only data on the decisions to establish a quango were available.
Tasks of quangos: collective goods and specific investments
Quangos were expected to be charged less often with tasks that require investments in 
specific assets, such as knowledge or equipment. Two drawbacks for politicians were 
identified that could result from putting specific tasks at arm's length (for a more 
elaborated argument, see subsection 3.2.3). First, efficiency losses may occur because 
specific assets can be less easily redeployed by a quango than by government 
bureaucracy. Second, the principal (i.e. politicians) might unwillingly become 
dependent upon the agent due to the sunk costs connected with specific assets. The 
findings do not corroborate these expectations, however (see table 4.6). Most quangos 
are charged more often with specific tasks, such as supervision, certification, quasi- 
judicature and regulation development (see figure 2.4 for an overview of tasks of 
quangos).
Apparently, the drawbacks of charging quangos with specific tasks do not 
outweigh the advantages. Three advantages were listed in section 4.6. First, the risk 
that politicians will be held accountable for ill performance is reduced. Second, the 
risk of high investments in non-recurrent assets is transferred to the quango. And 
third, specific tasks can no longer disrupt the bureaucratie routines of government
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bureaucracy. On the basis of these arguments, a new hypothesis can now be 
formulated: the more specific the investments required for policy implementation are, 
the more likely it is that politicians will choose a quango as the executive agent.
Conclusions with respect to the rational actor model
The rational actor model offers no explanation of quangocratization. Apparently, 
political ideology and economic conditions do not influence the choice of politicians 
for quangos. Quangos are established to implement policies that have been promised 
to voters, in particular policies that require specific investments. This does not, 
however, explain the increase in the number of quangos in the Netherlands between 
1950 and 1993. Below, I shall show that the explanation of quangocratization can be 
improved by using the bounded rationality model.
The bounded rationality model
To reduce uncertainty about the effects of their choice of an executive agent, 
politicians can use two strategies to gain information or experience with agents and 
develop guidelines for decision-making. The first strategy is imitation, or the repetition 
of decisions. By repeating the decisions of other politicians, or previous ones they 
made themselves, politicians gradually obtain more information and experience.
Politicians do indeed repeat their decisions for quangos as executive agents. No 
conclusive evidence was found, however, to support the expected increase in the 
diversity of tasks quangos are charged with and the policy fields they operate in. Only 
in the case of clusters, the rate of establishment has decreased in policy sectors that 
provide collective goods, such as Defence, Finance, Justice and the Home Office. It has 
to be noted, though, that the number of quangos in these sectors is generally low (see 
figure 2.5).
The second strategy politicians can apply is monitoring. Information on the 
performance of quangos can be used to evaluate the effects of past decisions. However, 
monitoring costs inflate the costs of policy implementation, something which is 
considered undesirable by politicians. Therefore, politicians were expected not to 
choose quangos if many investments are necessary for monitoring. This expectation 
was refuted. Apparently, the choice of politicians for a quango is not discouraged by a 
need for monitoring. This seems awkward when remembering the few accountability 
requirements imposed on quangos in general (shown in section 2.2, see also section 6.1 
on the accountability of quangos). Perhaps under certain conditions, politicians can 
make a choice for a quango only if they also impose monitoring demands onto the 
organization. Further study into such conditions is recommended.
To conclude, the bounded rational actor model provides a better explanation of 
quangocratization than the rational actor model. The increase in the number of 
quangos is caused by politicians repeating (or imitating) decisions. Quangocratization is 
indeed a trend, in vogue. This raises the question whether this trend occurs in other 
countries as well. That is a question for future research.
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Future research: convergence or divergence?
Quangocratization is taking place in several western countries (Pollitt, 1999), although 
there are differences in the rate with which quangos are established and the types of 
quangos that result. There is some debate about whether this trend will lead to a 
convergence between western states or a divergence (see, e.g. Unger & Van Waarden, 
1995). To find an answer to this question, more insight is needed into the process of 
imitation. For example, the differences in the rate of establishment of quangos in 
different policy sectors (shown in figure 2.6) are of interest. Imitation could take of 
one policy field by another. One could also go beyond the scope of this study and 
look at imitation between different types of quangos (e.g. agencies and state-owned 
enterprises) or between levels of government (e.g. local government). The focus of 
such imitation studies should be on three issues.
First, there are different types of imitation. Powell and DiMaggio (1991) mention 
three types: coercive, normative and mimetic isomorphism. Coercive isomorphism 
refers to the process in which politically superior bodies oblige subordinate bodies to 
copy decisions or structures. Unger and Van Waarden (1995:21), for example, point to 
the possibility of multinationals using their influence and position to force govern- 
ments of different countries to use the same organizational setting for negotiations. 
They call this type of imitation 'enforcement'. Normative isomorphism refers to 
situations where (professional) norms are copied in order to achieve legitimization of 
ideas or organizational structures. Mimetic isomorphism is the phenomenon of 
organizations copying other organizations that are considered most successful (cf. 
Tolbert &  Zucker, 1982). As a result, organizations resemble each other more and 
more.
A second issue is the source of imitation; who is the first to use quangos? This 
study has suggested, amongst others that imitation takes place between policy fields, or 
between quangos with certain tasks. There are other possibilities as well. Imitation can 
occur between the private and public sector (see Fligstein [1985] on the spread of the 
multi-divisional form of organization).
The third issue to be studied is how the imitation process comes about. Rogers' 
(1995) theory on the diffusion of innovations can be useful. It offers ideas on, for 
example, first adopters and the way in which new ideas or technologies spread 
through networks.
Metbodological problems
The analysis of the causes of quangocratization was hindered by a lack of data on 
decisions to charge government bureaucracy with the implementation of policies (cf. 
the control group in the design). Out of necessity, the analyses therefore focussed on 
the number of decisions to establish quangos per year. In that way, the causes of 
quangocratization could be inferred; if a certain condition caused a large number of 
decisions to establish quangos, it was considered to have caused quangocratization.
However, this research design does not allow the incorporation of individual 
characteristics of decisions to establish a quango. To solve this problem, the number of 
decisions was aggregated for each year. Several weighting formulas were used, in 
particular for the explanatory variables 'corporatism', 'collective goods', 'specific 
investments' and 'monitoring' (see section 4.1.2), which led to some sub-optimal 
operationalizations. The conclusions of this study should therefore be approached with
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some reservation. For example, the complete interpretation of the findings on the 
tasks with which quangos are charged is that quangos are often charged with specific 
tasks. However, it cannot be determined whether quangos are charged more often 
with specific tasks than government bureaucracy, which was the original prediction.
Tbeoretical implications
The theoretical model in this study is but a first step towards an explanation of 
quangocratization. I have made a number of simplifying assumptions. Moreover, the 
model limits itself to only two corporate actors, between whom no interaction is 
allowed. This makes the model rather static and abstract. To improve the model, one 
could add new elements (cf. method of decreasing abstraction; Lindenberg, 1992), in 
particular other actors and by interaction between actors.
There is a number of actors which could be incorporated. The most obvious 
candidates are civil servants and interest groups. Civil servants play an important role 
in the decision-making process surrounding policies and the implementation of 
policies. According to Dunleavy (1991: ch.6) and Christensen (1999), bureaucrats can 
increase their status and acquire more autonomy by, for example, becoming the 
executive of a quango. On the other hand, bureaucrats are expected to act in the 
general interest and serve their ministers. The hiving off of a departmental unit can be 
in the interest of a minister, for instance, if the political risks are high or if hiving off 
is accompanied by budget cuts. If, however, hiving off a departmental unit is not 
advantageous to the minister but has a positive effect for bureaucrats, the latter face a 
conflict of interests. This raises the question under which conditions bureaucrats will 
make a certain choice.
Interest groups were discussed at several points in this study. Politicians were 
expected to use quangos for patronage purposes, for example, by appointing members 
of interest groups as members of quango boards. The fact that interest groups were 
present did not, however, contribute to the explanation of quangocratization. An 
alternative explanation was proposed, which stated that politicians have other means 
than patronage to enhance the commitment of interest groups in corporatist policy 
sectors.8 Frequent contact and membership of official advisory boards can substitute 
patronage by quango board membership. This also enables politicians to do equal 
favour to all interest groups in a particular policy sector - and maxime electoral 
support - instead of giving preference to one group over another (no monopoly rents; 
Mueller, 1989; Tollison, 1997). Therefore, the presence of interest groups may be of im- 
portance for the explanation of the behaviour of politicians and quangocrats, but for 
the study of quangocratization it is not necessary to include these groups as (corporate) 
actors in the model.
Another possibility for adding actors to the model, is to refine the distinguished 
corporate actors (cf. Coleman, 1990:541, Scharpf, 1997:21). For example, no distinction 
was made between politicians from different parties or between politicians in office 
and in opposition. Differences in power position, possible conflicts, and the need to 
compromise and cooperate are, however, important factors in the decision-making
8A similar explanation was offered for the lack of accountability requirements imposed upon quangos in cor­
poratist policy sectors (see section 6.1).
Conclusion 175
process (see, e.g., Bueno de Mesquita &  Stokman, 1994; Stokman, 1994; Stokman & 
Van Oosten, 1994; Stokman & Zeggelink, 1996).
Interaction between politicians and quangocrats could be added to the model by 
including a feedback loop. For example, if politicians have chosen a quango as an 
executive agent, they can use information on its performance to improving their next 
choice of an executive agent. In fact, the imitation and monitoring hypotheses 
implicitly assume such feedback loops already. Section 6.3 will continue the discussion 
on the potential advantages of allowing interaction into the theoretical model.
6.3. Consequences
The second research question of this study concerned the consequences of 
quangocratization, in particular quango performance. A theoretical model was 
developed to explain under which conditions quangos will implement policies in the 
most efficient and effective manner. Hypotheses were formulated and put to the test 
in two case studies (in chapter 5). In this section, the model and the findings of the 
case studies are summarized and discussed. Implications from the findings for both the 
practitioner theory and the theoretical model developed in this study are discussed 
below. Finally, some recommendations are given for future research.
Theoretical model on quango performance
The practitioner theory claims that quangos are more efficient and effective than 
government bureaucracy when it comes to policy implementation. This claim is, as 
yet, not substantiated (section 1.4 gives an overview of the research on quango 
performance up till now). Therefore, this study paid attention to the performance of 
quangos. In fact, the practitioner theory can be said to have been put to the test. To 
that end, a theoretical model was developed to predict quango performance. The 
practitioner theory itself is not used as the theoretical framework. In the theoretical 
model developed in chapter 3, assumptions were used from rational choice theory 
(Coleman, 1990), neo-instutional economics (in particular principal agent theory; Pratt 
&  Zeckhauser, 1991) and public choice theory (Mueller, 1989; Dunleavy, 1991). The 
model was described at length in section 3.3; here I shall only discuss its main features.
Politicians want quangocrats to implement policies in the most efficient and 
effective manner. However, quangocrats may pursue their own goals as well (e.g. to 
gain fringe benefits, social approval, or strengthen their own policy position). If the 
goals of politicians (the principal)" and quangocrats (the agent) diverge, quangocrats 
have to choose which goals to pursue, i.e. whether they will comply with the 
principal's goals or whether they will deviate from those goals in pursuit of their own. 
In the latter case, the efficiency and effectiveness of policy implementation is in danger
- at least from the politicians' point of view.
The choice of quangocrats between compliance and deviance is conditioned by 
situational constraints. For example, the more autonomy a quango has, the more it has 
to gain by performing efficiently and effectively. Autonomy was defined in this study 
as the ownership of production rights, for example, whether quangos can determine 
their own input, output and budget (cf. section 1.2). A quango that has the right to 
retain surpluses will try to perform as efficiently as possible. Another condition that - 
influences quango performance is its market position. Monopolists are expected to be
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less efficient and effective than competitive quangos. A final example of situational 
constraints that influence the choice between compliance and deviance is the per- 
ception of quangocrats of the risk of being caught at deviant behaviour. The higher 
the chance of getting caught, the more inclined quangocrats are to comply with the 
principal's goals. Hypotheses were formulated about the expected effects of these and 
other conditions. See table 3.2 for a full overview.
The model assumes that politicians are able to assess whether a quango is performing 
efficiently and effectively. This need not always be the case, however. Not only can it 
be questioned whether politicians are capable of collecting and processing all 
information on quango performance (cf. bounded rationality), but performance 
assessment itself can be subject to limitations. For example, accounts of performance 
can suffer from a so-called performance paradox (Meyer & Gupta, 1994). Performance 
indicators may - instead of providing good insight into performance and stimulating it
- lead to distorted accounts of performance. Indicators may 'run down' and loose the 
ability to discriminate between good and bad performers. Or indicators can focus on 
certain aspects of performance only, such as easily quantifiable aspects (cf. also Smith, 
1995). In such cases performance is - unintentionally - under-reported. Indicators can 
also be deliberately manipulated to hide ill performance (over-reporting). It is im­
portant to keep in mind that a performance paradox does not necessarily mean that 
performance is worse than reported. It merely indicates that reported performance is 
not an accurate reflection of actual performance. Section 3.3.4 deals with this 
phenomenon extensively, and offers some examples.
A performance paradox can contaminate the information on quango performance 
and invalidate conclusions on the consequences of quangocratization. It is therefore 
important to pay attention to conditions that can evoke such a paradox. According to 
Meyer and Gupta (1994), certain characteristics of the performance assessment system 
are important in this respect. For example, a limited variety of performance indicators 
and a strong emphasis in the organization on using performance indicators can lead to 
a performance paradox, unintended or deliberately. A deliberately evoked performance 
paradox can be seen as a type of deviant behaviour of quangocrats. The conditions 
that were expected to lead to deviant behaviour - mentioned above - can therefore also 
lead to a performance paradox occurring. Hypotheses about the occurence of a perfor­
mance paradox were summarized in table 3.2.
Quango performance was studied by means of case studies (see case study reports [Van 
Thiel, 1999a,b], chapter 5, Appendix B and C). Two quangos were selected for an 
intra-quango comparison of performance, both before and after their establishment as 
a quango. Annual reports and annual accounts were analyzed, and informants from 
the quangos and the parent department interviewed. Based on the results of two case 
studies, hypotheses cannot be (statistically) tested, but the findings were discussed with 
respect to the amount of support they provided for the hypotheses (i.e. analytical 
generalization; Yin, 1994:30). See section 5.4 for an extensive summary and discussion 
of the results of the case studies.
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Consequences of quangocratization: quango performance
The first case study was IB-Groep, a quango established in 1994, which is charged with 
the implementation of a number of educational policies. After 1994, its performance 
has improved with regard to the quality of service, but efficiency has deteriorated 
slightly, because the costs of policy implementation have increased. Similar conclusions 
were drawn in the departmental evaluation of the establishment of IB-Groep as a 
quango, the report of which was published after this case study was done (Deloitte & 
Touche, 1999).
The second case study was the ROC, a school for adult and vocational education, 
established in 1996. A full comparison of performance before and after the R O C s 
establishment was not possible due to a lack of information and incomparability of the 
performance data of the former schools. However, two conclusions could be drawn. 
First, the deficits of the former vocational schools - which make up almost 90% of the 
ROC - strongly influence the RO C total performance. As a result, there has been no 
significant improvement in efficiency since the school's establishment as a quango. 
Second, adult education, in particular non-formal education, seems to have profited 
most from the merger, which is shown by an increase in the number of students. This 
will improve the accessibility of education, one of the main goals of ROCs, and could 
therefore be interpreted as an improvement in the effectiveness of the quango 
(although there are more aspects to effectiveness).
To sum up, both case studies show that the establishment as a quango has not led to 
an immediate or an overall improvement in performance. In chapter 3, eleven 
hypotheses were formulated to explain quango performance or predict the occurence 
of a performance paradox. These hypotheses were tested in the case studies. To 
facilitate the case descriptions, the hypotheses were re-grouped into four categories (see 
section 5.1). These categories will be used here to describe the main findings of the 
case studies.
Unfortunately, not in all cases could clear, unambiguous conclusions be drawn 
with respect to the hypotheses (cf. tables 5.6 and 5.7 for a summary). For example, 
sometimes the findings of the case studies contradicted each other. In other instances, 
there were insufficiënt data or informants disagreed. More research is therefore 
necessary. The discussion below will only deal with conclusions that are clearly 
supported by the case study evidence.
Production rights
It was expected that the more production rights a quango owns, the more it stands to 
gain from efficient and effective policy implementation. For example, one of the 
production rights is the ability to influence the size of budgets and the right to retain 
surpluses. Quangos that own such rights will profit from gains in efficiency and 
effectiveness and will therefore perform better. The case studies confirm this 
expectation.
IB-Groep negotiates with the parent department on its budget every year and can 
thus influence its budget. Consequently, the performance of IB-Groep has improved; 
the quality of customer service has increased and, after its establishment as a quango, 
IB-Groep has obtained - and retained - small nett surpluses almost every year. The 
increase in the costs of policy implementation is considered less detrimental than the a-
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forementioned improvements, both by the quango and the parent department.
The RO C, on the other hand, has little if no influence on its budget. In one 
particular year, this led to the decision to report a deficit rather than using reserves to 
solve the problem. By reporting the deficit, the quango hoped to persuade the parent 
department to increase its budget. It lacked other means to influence budgetary 
decisions.
The more production rights a quango owns, the more autonomous it is (cf. definition 
of autonomy in section 1.2). The case studies prove that autonomy influences which 
aspects of performance are reported on most. The more production rights a quango 
owns, the lesser the need to manipulate information (no performance paradox). This is 
in line with expectations. IB-Groep, which owns many production rights, gives an 
extensive account of its performance. The emphasis it places on the quality of 
customer service is fully approved of by the parent department. Performance assess­
ment in ROCs, on the other hand, was only recently developed. For a long time the 
former schools had little interest in performance assessment. They provided only infor­
mation requested by the parent department, in the pre-scribed format. Because the re- 
quested information concerned only financial indicators, the schools had little insight 
into other aspects of performance. The autonomy obtained after the establishment of 
the RO C - e.g. the ROC is now responsible for shortages itself - has increased the 
need for performance assessment. So, the fewer production rights a quango owns, the 
less information it will provide on its performance (under-reporting).
Organizational characteristics
Two organizational characteristics proved to be important for the explanation of 
quango performance. The first characteristic is the market position of a quango. 
Competition was expected to enhance quango performance. In reality, however, 
quangos face little real competition. IB-Groep is a monopolist, as are many other 
quangos (approximately 139 out of the 545 in the NCA-survey; Algemene 
Rekenkamer, 1995 [own calculations]).
The RO C does face a few competitors in its region, but it has eliminated the 
pressure of competition by entering into an alliance with those competitors. These 
types of cooperation are an unintended consequence of quangocratization. Although 
the absence of competition does not immediately lead to ill performance, the lack of 
comparitive material makes it difficult to assess how efficient and effective policy 
implementation by quangos is. In the case of co-operating competitive quangos, it is 
even possible that the quangos make agreements on what information to report to the 
principal. If that is the case, reports on performance become unreliable; a performance 
paradox is present.
The second organizational characteristic that proved important is the origin of 
the quango, in particular whether it is a hived-off former departmental unit (like IB- 
Groep) or a hived-in former private organization (like the ROC). Quangos established 
through hiving off are closer to the parent department. A close relationship was 
expected to induce compliance, and thus lead to efficient and effective policy 
implementation. The case study evidence supported this expectation. A close 
relationship does not, however, predude the occurence of a performance paradox, 
which was expected to happen. Apparently, how many and what kind of information
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a quango provides on its performance depends on other factors than its relationship to 
the parent department. Autonomy already proved to be important (see above), but 
accountability requirements and the perceptions the quango has of which aspects of 
performance are important proved to be of influence as well (see below).
Accountability requirements
The emphasis that both quangos place on certain aspects of performance (IB-Groep 
stresses the quality of customer service and the ROC financial matters) is reflected in 
the performance indicators they use. IB-Groep employs a large number of quality 
indicators, in an otherwise elaborate performance assessment system. For ROCs, a 
performance assessment system is being developed to replace the current one, which 
confines itself to financial indicators. According to Meyer and Gupta (1994), a more 
diverse system of indicators, with a large variety of comparable indicators, will reduce 
the chances of a performance paradox occurring.
Another probable cause of the performance paradox lies in the clarity of policy 
objectives. The extent to which quangos succeed in reaching the objectives of the 
policies they implement - within budgetary contraints - reflects their effectiveness and 
efficiency. As such, policy goals are important in the assessment of quango performan­
ce. However, policy goals are often vague, multiple and sometimes even contradictory 
(Wilson, 1989:45-48)9, because politicians want to please as many voters as possible. In 
practice, it is up to the executive agent to translate the official policy goals into 
operational ones (cf. Torenvlied, 1996a,b).
In both case studies such a translation has occurred. IB-Groep is charged with the 
implementation of a number of educational policies. IB-Groep itself has formulated its 
mission as offering good customer service (see section 5.2). This explains why such a 
lot of attention is paid in the annual reports to quality indicators. In the case of the 
RO C, full accessibility of education and a high quality of the education offered are the 
goals of the school itself, whereas performance assessment focusses almost entirely on 
financial indicators (see section 5.3). In both organizations, performance indicators 
stress other aspects of performance than the official policy objectives - which does not 
mean that the quangos are performing poorly. The vagueness and multiplicity of 
policy objectives threatens the clarity of performance reports, which could result in a 
performance paradox.
Perceptions
The case studies showed that quangos report most extensively on those aspects of per­
’ For example, quangos often are expected to meet goals such as equitable and efficient distribution of 
particular goods or services, or are confronted with an expansion of the workload and simultaneous budget 
cuts. In the latter case, some quangos decide to carry out only those tasks that will be successful. This 
phenomenon is called cream skimming (LeGrand &  Bartlett, 1993:31-34) or cherry picking. Cream 
skimming can be illustrated by the dilemma of the Dutch Employment Agencies (in Dutch: Arbeidsvoor­
zieningen), whose performance is measured as the number of people for whom they find a job. As a result, 
th agencies tend to focus on those people for whom it is relatively easy to find a job, and skip the 'difficult 
cases' (Volkskrant, 1994). However, employment policies specify that it is precisely the second group on 
which they should concentrate. The agencies face the dilemma of choosing between carrying out the policies 
as intended but performing poorly on the indicators, or doing well on the indicators but carrying out the 
policies ineffectively.
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formance that are considered vital to the continuation of their existence as an 
executive agent. Other aspects of performance will not or to a lesser extent be 
reported on. Therefore, if the focus within a quango is one-sided, its performance 
reports will be so as well, and a performance paradox results. These findings are in 
line with the expectations.
In the case of IB-Groep, the quango considers quality of customer service vital to 
its survival (see the mission statement), which explains the ample attention for quality 
indicator. The parent department agrees with this, because it values quality as well. 
However, the quango wants to use the improvement of customer service to attract 
new principals, in case the parent department reduces the amount of tasks to be 
carried out. The parent department does not agree with those plans and intends to 
restrict the regulations on commercial activities of IB-Groep (Brief van de Minister, 
1999:8).
In the case of the RO C, the emphasis so far has been on financial indicators only, 
despite the general agreement between the quango and the parent department that the 
effectiveness of education (i.e. accessibility to all students) is, in fact, the main objective 
of ROCs. However, the parent department has for a long time only requested 
financial information, and the schools provided only that kind of information. Now 
that schools have been given more autonomy regarding budgets and educational 
programmes, performance assessment will become more extensive. Some first 
initiatives have been undertaken already by, among others, the BVE-raad (the council 
that represents all ROCs) and the Educational Review Office (see section 5.2 for 
further explanation).
Quangos can afford to report only on particular aspects of performance when the 
chance of getting caught at and sanctioned for this kind of behaviour is low. For 
example, in the case of IB-Groep the parent department has no (immediate) substitute 
executive agents. The lack of competitive information reduces the chance of getting 
caught, while the dependency of the parent department on the quango reduces the 
chances of being sanctioned for deviant behaviour. White (1991) referred to this latter 
type of dependency as the 'reversal of control' between principal and agent. In other 
cases, quangos have found ways to avoid getting caught out. For example, ROCs were 
meant to compete, which would enable the parent department to compare the 
performance of ROCs. Instead of competing, ROCs have entered into alliances that 
reduce the pressure from competition. If ROCs also make agreements on the informa­
tion they report to the principal - and thus deliberately evoke a performance paradox - 
alliances can reduce the possibility for comparison of performance as well.
Reversal of control and circumvention of competition are unintended 
consequences of quangocratization. As in the case of a performance paradox, these 
unintended consequences do not necessarily lead to a deterioration of quango 
performance, still, from the politicians' point of view, they pose a threat to the 
efficiency and effectiveness of policy implementation.
Conclusions
To sum up, the case studies show that quangocratization does not automatically, or 
immediately, lead to more efficient and effective policy implementation, as claimed by 
the practitioner theory. Moreover, the case studies revealed a number of unintended 
consequences of establishing quangos. So far, these consequences have been overlooked
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by politicians: reversal of control, circumvention of competition, and performance 
paradoxes. The practitioner theory should therefore be adjusted.
Policy developments: modification of the practitioner theory
The practitioner theory claims that quangos are more efficient and effective than 
government bureaucracy when it comes to policy implementation. This study has 
shown that the establishment of quangos may lead to an improvement in policy 
implementation, as compared to implementation prior to establishment of quangos 
(note: not necessarily by government bureaucracy), but the effect is not an immediate 
one, nor does it concern all aspects of performance, i.e. costs, output, and quality.10 
Therefore, the practitioner theory should be moderated to allow for a transitional 
period. Moreover, the establishment of a quango also costs money. The budget 
restrictions, or even budget cuts, often coinciding with the establishment of a quango 
can undermine the realization of efficiency and effectiveness gains.
The practitioner theory assumed that competition would increase quango 
performance: quangos are forced to beat their competitors in order to acquire budgets 
and their performance can be compared. First of all, this study shows that there is 
little competition among quangos. A large number of quangos are monopolists. 
Secondly, quangos have found ways to circumvent the pressure of competition. This is 
an unintended, and perhaps unforeseen, consequence of quangocratization that needs 
to be taken into account by the practitioner theory.
The case studies suggest that it is not so much competition that influences quango 
performance, but autonomy, i.e. the ownership of production rights. The more 
production rights a quango owns, the more efficiently and effectively it performs. So 
far, this finding is in line with the practitioner theory. Recently, however, politicians 
seem to prefer to establish quangos with lower degrees of autonomy (cf. section 6.1 on 
trends after 1993). The claims of the practitioner theory with regard to efficiency and 
effectiveness of policy implementation should then be mitigated.
Autonomy also strongly influences the manner in which quangos report on their 
performance. Quangos tend to report most extensively on those aspects of 
performance that are relevant to the continuation of their existence as an executive 
agent. This may lead to an over- or under-representation of actual performance. 
Reports on performance-should therefore not be taken for granted by politicians, nor 
by academics for that matter (Leeuw, 1996). The current debate on quango 
accountability (cf. section 6.1 on policy developments) shows that politicians are 
getting more interested in this issue. So far, however, this does not seem to have had 
any consequences for the practitioner theory.
Theoretical implications
A real statistical test of the hypotheses cannot be performed on the basis of two case 
studies. Most hypotheses seem to be supported by the case study findings. Replication 
of case studies is necessary to draw more valid conclusions.
10 The absence of expected efficiency gains means that quangocratization does not lead to the (rational) aims 
politicians had in mind. However, this does not diminish the rational character of quangocratization as a 
process; rationalization can have irrational outcomes (cf. section 6.1 on rationalization).
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With regard to theoretical model, the same remarks can be made as in section
6.2. The model is but a first step towards an explanation of the consequences of 
quangocratization. It is a simple and static model that needs to be elaborated further. 
Two improvements were suggested earlier, which will be discussed again here.
First, the model can be improved by allowing interaction between quangocrats 
and politicians. The case studies gave a number of examples in which interaction led 
to consequences not anticipated by politicians. For example, the co-operation between 
ROCs to circumvent competitive pressure is a typical example of interaction, in this 
case between quangos.11 The case study of IB-Groep showed that the closeness of the 
relationship between the quango and the parent department is responsible for, for 
example, the way in which performance is reported.
The theoretical model developed in chapter 3 assumes that there is no interaction; 
the decision of politicians to establish a quango is followed by the quango carrying out 
its task (or not). Interaction between politicians and quangocrats gives politicians more 
information on the consequences of their decision. Not only can they use that 
information to improve future decisions (as argued in section 6.2), they can also try to 
adjust decisions already taken. For example, monitoring devices may indicate that a 
particular quango is not performing efficiently. Such a quango can be dismissed, at 
least in theory. In practice, there are often no substitute quangos.12 Therefore, it is 
most likely that politicians will (threaten to or) impose budget cuts, or develop new 
regulations for the quango, as was done in the case of IB-Groep.
Nowadays, communication between the parent department and quangos is often 
formalized in so-called interfaces (Verhaak, Bagchus & Van Twist, 1996: 33-37; Kickert 
et al., 1998:17). Interfaces can be contracts or protocols specifying the exchange of 
information on both policy and managerial matters. Interfaces can also be 
departmental divisions charged with all contacts between quangos and the parent 
department, a procedure followed by the Ministry of Education (see section 5.2).
To make the model more dynamic, interface organizations could be included as 
an actor. Appointed regulators could also be incorporated, for that matter. While the 
presence of interfaces and/or regulators is meant to improve quango performance, it 
may also have perverse effects. For example, it limits the autonomy of a quango, 
which - according to earlier findings - can negatively influence performance (see 
above). Moreover, quangocrats may consider the appointment of regulators or 
interface organizations as a sign of distrust and try to sabotage these types of monito­
ring (cf. Breton & Wintrobe, 1982) by, for example, deliberately manipulating 
performance assessment information (i.e. evoke a performance paradox).
Future research: the performance paradox in public organizations 
In the case studies, several strategies were used to try to uncover a performance para­
dox. Besides an analysis of the performance assessment system of the two quangos, in-
11 The co-operation between quangos to reduce the effects of measures taken by politicians is in line with the 
findings of Flache and Macy (1996) on the cohesion of social networks. High cohesion in groups (in this case 
ROCs) may lead to deviance rather than compliance to the principal. See also section 3.3.3.
12 Sometimes, the lack of subsitute agents can force the principal to accept a certain amount of deviant 
behaviour by the executive agent, without being able to take measures against it. White (1991) refers to this 
as a 'reversal of control' between principals and agents.
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formation from external sources was used as well to evaluate performance. For 
example, information from the National Ombudsman on IB-Groep was used and data 
from the Ministry of Education on all Dutch ROCs. Also, new performance in­
dicators were developed, based on the indicators the quangos use themselves. The 
results, however, can be no more than indicative of conditions or mechanisms that 
could evoke a performance paradox. In both cases, such conditions were found to be 
present, leading to an over-estimation of quality aspects of performance in the annual 
reports of IB-Groep and of financial indicators in the reports of the ROC. It proved to 
be very difficult, however, to actually verify the existence of a performance paradox. 
The ambiguity of policy objectives and the lack of competitors - typical characteristics 
of public sector organizations - made it difficult to assess and evaluate performance.
On the other hand, one could argue that the chance of a performance paradox 
occurring is greater in the public sector, as compared to the private sector. A per­
formance paradox is the result of a discrepancy between the policy objectives set by 
politicians and the goals of executive agents (Smith, 1995). The translation of the 
executive agent of official policy objectives into operational goals leaves room for de- 
viations in policy implementation, which can lead to a performance paradox. It should 
be noted, though, that in some cases room for interpretation is given intentionally 
because politicians want to leave implementation to the experts, i.e. the executive 
agents (cf. Torenvlied, 1996a,b). Other factors that could increase the chance of a 
performance paradox in the public sector are the lack of potential bankruptcy 
(dismissal) and the disjunction between costs and revenues (LeGrand, 1991). Both 
factors create leeway for organizations to manipulate information and get away with
More research on the performance paradox in public sector organizations - 
including quangos - is warranted, especially when one considers the amounts of money 
spent on and by those organizations. Because there is still so little information 
available on the performance paradox and its workings in the public sector, I 
recommend that in the first instance, more case studies be done, along the lines of 
those in this study. Next, a meta-analysis could be conducted, after the fashion of 
Meyer and Gupta (1994). Meyer and Gupta compared the performance of numerous 
organizations (e.g. banks, hospitals, nuclear plants) over several decades, using the same 
indicators for all organizations (see also Meyer & O'Shaughnessy [1993] on strategie 
business units of firms). Such a study does, as yet, not seem feasible in the public 
sector. Public organizations are, however, increasingly getting interested in the 
development and application of performance indicators (as was found in both of the 
case studies). In the near future it should be possible to perform this kind of research. 
The problem of incomparability of performance - because of the lack of competition - 
remains an obstacle to benchmarking, though.
6.4. A final word
This study has described and tried to explain quangocratization, in particular in the 
Netherlands. It has moved beyond the case studies done so far by developing a 
theoretical framework to explain the causes and consequences of quangocratization, 
and by using a combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods. More 
theory development and research are necessary, however, and several recommenda-
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tions have been made to that end.
This research has demonstrated that quangocratization is caused mainly by 
imitation,' or repetition of decisions by politicians. Quangocratization is in vogue. The 
motives of politicians for their choice of quangos (i.e. the practitioner theory) are not 
substantiated. An (immediate and overall) improvement in the efficiency and effective­
ness of policy implementation is not found. The lack of interest politicians have 
shown for a long time in the accountability of quangos does, however, seem to 
indicate that politicians are not really interested in whether quangocratization will lead 
to an improvement of the performance. Perhaps the political efficiency of establishing 
quangos is more important to politicians than the economic efficiency.
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Table A .l. Operationalizations of size, corporatism and collectiveness of policy areas.
Policy Area Size (number of
departmental
divisions)1
Corporatism2 
(number of 
advisory boards)
Degree of 
Collectiveness
Foreign Affairs 2.25 (176) 0.85 (7) high
Justice 2.26 (182) 0.95 (9) high
Home Office 2.18 (152) 1.23 (17) high
Education & Science 2.22 (165) 0.85 (7) moderate
Finances 2.28 (190) 0.48(3) high
Defence 2.55 (355) 0.78 (6) high
Housing & 
Environment
2.53 (335) 0.90 (8) low
Traffic & Water 2.43 (268) 0.90 (8) low
Economics 2.28 (189) 1.15 (14) low
Agriculture 2.32 (208) 1.08 (12) low
Social Affairs & 
Employment
2.29 (197) 0.78 (6) moderate
Welfare, Health & 
Culture
2.46 (286) 1.58 (38) moderate
1 size of policy area is operationalized as the log of the number of departmental 
divisions
2 corporatism of policy areas is operationalized as the log of the number of officially 
acknowledged advisory boards
Sources: Algemene Rekenkamer (1995); Staatsalmanak (1993), Carasso et al. (1994).
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Table A.2. Recoded tasks of quangos and their degree of collectiveness and specificity.
Task in NCA survey Degree of 
Collectivity
Degree of 
Specificity
Supervision high high
Granting benefits low moderate
Certification, quality inspection high high
Licensing high moderate
Development of regulation high high
Registration high moderate
Collection of fees low moderate
Quasi-judicature high high
Advice, coordination low low
Research and development low low
Source: Algemene Rekenkamer (1995)
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Table A.3. Operationalizations of the size of the national government (in numbers of 
civil servants), electoral competition (elections and parliamentary majority of cabinet 
in office), and the economic conditions (percentage unemployment of total working 
population) in the Netherlands, 1950-1993.
Year Size of 
govern­
m ent1
Elections Parliamen­
tary
majority
%
economic
growth
% unem­
ployment3
1950 87,400 no .76 11.0 1.6
1951 87,400 no .76 14.5 1.8
1952 87,400 yes .81 4.8 2.8
1953 87,400 no .81 6.7 2.0
1954 87,400 no .81 11.5 1.4
1955 87,400 no .81 12.2 0.9
1956 87,400 yes .81 7.5 0.6
1957 87,400 no ,812 8.5 0.8
1958 87,400 no .51 1.6 1.7
1959 87,400 yes .63 7.0 1.2
1960 97,800 no .63 11.1 0.7
1961 97,800 no .63 5.9 0.5
1962 97,800 no .63 7.1 0.5
1963 97,800 yes .61 8.9 0.6
1964 97,800 no .61 17.6 0.5
1965 97,800 no .71 11.5 0.6
1966 97,800 no .42 8.6 0.8
1967 97,800 yes .57 10.0 1.6
1968 97,800 no .57 10.5 1.5
1969 97,800 no .57 20.3 1.1
1970 115,100 no .57 11.9 0.9
1971 115,100 yes .57 12.5 1.3
1972 115,100 yes .49 13.2 2.3
1973 115,100 no .65 14.4 2.3
192 Appendix A
Continued
Year Size of 
govern­
ment
Elections Parlia-
mentary
majority
%
economie
growth
% unem- 
ployment
1974 115,100 no .65 13.6 2.8
1975 115,100 no .51 9.2 4.0
1976 115,100 no .51 14.6 4.3
1977 115,100 yes .51 9.3 4.1
1978 115,100 no .51 7.6 4.1
1979 115,100 no .51 6.4 3.9
1980 143,900 no .51 6.6 4.3
1981 143,900 yes .73 4.7 6.1
1982 143,900 yes .54 4.7 9.0
1983 143,900 no .54 3.6 11.7
1984 143,900 no .54 4.8 11.2
1985 143,900 no .54 6.4 9.7
1986 143,900 yes .54 2.7 8.6
1987 143,900 no .54 0.6 7.9
1988 143,900 no .54 3.3 7.7
1989 143,900 yes .69 6.7 6.9
1990 147,000 no .69 6.4 5.9
1991 147,000 no .69 4.9 5.4
1992 147,000 no .69 3.9 5.3
1993 147,000 no .69 3.5 6.5
1 years of measurement in bold print
2 in 1957: the number of seats in the Second Chamber changed from 100 to 150
3 data before 1970 was incomplete; extrapolated data for missing years in italics 
Sources: Van der Meer & Roborgh, 1993; Kiezer & Parlement, 1950-1993; CBS, 
1994; 1998d,e.
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Introduction
This appendix contains information on the operationalizations that were used in the 
case studies. An overview is given of the way in which conditions listed in hypotheses 
were measured. Three research methods were used: content analysis of documents, 
interviews with informants within and outside the quangos, and statements put to 
respondents from the quangos. The questionnaire and statements were written in 
Dutch, but have been translated for this appendix. Note that questions and statements 
have not been crossvalidated yet and should therefore not be applied without 
consultation.
Contents of this appendix:
an overview of hypotheses, operationalizations and research methods (cf. table 5.1 
in chapter 5)
the questionnaire used in the interviews
a report of the development of statements that were put to the informants
No. Hypothesis Operationalizations Methods
Content analysis of 
documents
Questions posed in interviews Statements
2.1(P) Ownership of production 
rights
- right to retain 
surpluses 
(yes/no)
- statutes (right to 
retain surpluses)
- annual reports 
(presence of surpluses, 
% of turnover)
- how were surpluses dealt with 
prior to the establishment as a 
quango?
- financial arrange­
ments: way of 
financing (State Budget 
or tariffs/levying)
- statutes (financing 
procedures)
- management contracts 
(budgets)
- (how) is the quango involved in the 
determination of budgets?
- acquisition of budgets 
(competition or not)
- statutes (financing 
procedures)
- management contracts
- determination of ta- 
riffs/levies (by minister 
or by quango)
- statutes (financing 
procedures)
- right to hire and fire 
employees (yes or no)
- statutes (legal position 
employees)
- does the legal position of 
employees differ from that of civil 
servants and in what way?
- right of minister to - statutes 
intervene (yes or no) (accountability requi­
rements)
N o. Hypothesis Operationalizations Methods
Content analysis of 
documents
Questions posed in interviews Statements
2.2(P) Competition - market position - statutes (market - does the quango face any (im-
(monopolist; member position) mediate) competitors?
of a cluster) - NCA study (number - do you know of any other
of quangos with same organisations with a similar task?
task) - which or how many other or­
ganisations can perform the same
task?
- specifity of knowledge - what kind of knowledge and/or
and/or equipment equipment is required to perform
(ranging between very your tasks?
specific to present - which investments are made in
everywhere) development of specific knowledge
and equipment?
- do you know of any other
organisations with similar knowledge
and/or equipment?
- commercial activities - statutes, annual - are commercial activities subject to
(allowed or not) reports (are commercial competition?
activities allowed - how successful have commercial
and/or undertaken? activities been?
N o. Hypothesis Operationalizations Content analysis of Questions posed in interviews Statements
documents
2.3(P) Corporatism composition of board 
(presence of members 
of interest groups: yes 
or no)
- statutes, annual 
reports (composition of 
board)
2.4(P) Accountability number of - statutes
requirements accountability re­ (accountability requi­
quirements rements)
2.5(P) Size - size of budget (in - annual reports (size of
HFL) budget)
- management contracts
- number of personnel - annual reports
(in full-time (number of personnel)
equivalents)
- number of quangos in - NCA study (number
policy area of quangos in policy
area)
- expenditures by - State Budget, CBS
parent department (in (expenditures by parent
HFL) department)
-number of personnel - parent department,
in parent department CBS (number of civil
(in fte) servants)
N o. Hypothesis Operationalizations Content analysis of Questions posed in interviews Statements
documents
2.6(P) Closeness to politicians - loyalty to politicians, - how would you describe the 3 items
or to others relation between the parent depart­ loyalty
ment and the quango?
- commitment to politi­ - who are the main stakeholders in 2 items
cians or to others the quango (minister, supervisor, commit­
clients)? ment
- intensity of contact - how often does the quango contact
between quango and the parent department and vice
department versa?
- origin of quango - statutes, articles (case
(hived off/in) history)
- legal position of - statutes (legal position - does the legal position of quango­
employees (seconded of quangocrats) crats differ from that of civil servants
civil servants, appointed and in what way?
quangocrats)
N o. Hypothesis Operationalizations Content analysis of Questions posed in interviews Statements
documents
2.7(P) Risk perception way of dealing with - are changes incremental and 5 items on
responsibilities and anticipated or radical? risk per­
changes - who takes new initiatives?
- how do you see the future of the 
quango (opportunities)?
- who is responsible for errors in 
policy implementation?
ception
2.8P Diversity of Pis number of Pis per year annual reports, manage­
ment contracts (number 
of Pis
- how many (and which) indicators 
are used?
- can you think of indicators that are 
lacking?
- are the existing indicators satisfac- 
tory?
- repetition of Pis in 
consecutive years
- annual reports (Pis 
over time)
- are different indicators used over 
time and if so, why?
- number of new Pis in 
consecutive years
- by whom are new indicators 
usually developed (divisions, parent 
department, supervisor)?
-number of Pis on 
(non-)quantifiable 
aspects of performance
- annual reports ([non-] 
quantifiable aspects of 
performance)
- how many (and which) aspects of 
performance can be quantified 
(easily)?
2 items 
quanti- 
fiability
No. Hypothesis Operationalizations Content analysis of Questions posed in interviews Statements
documents
2.9P Clear policy objectives -presence of - statutes, annual
organisational goals (yes reports, management
or no) contracts (what are the
goals of quango?)
- formulation of goals - statutes, annual
(global, specific, in reports, management
terms of output) contracts (how are
goals formulated?)
- number of - statutes, annual
organisational goals reports, management
contracts (how many
goals are there?)
- acquaintance of - what are the (main) goals of the
quangocrats with quango according to you? (to be
organisational goals (yes checked with official goals by me)
or no)
No. Hypothesis Operationalizations Content analysis of 
documents
Questions posed in interviews Statements
2.10P Emphasis on efficiency, 
effectiveness and Pk
- importance attached 
to the use of indicators 
by quangocrats (ranging 
from little to much)
- number of indicators 
(ranging from few and 
many)
- statutes, annual 
reports (are indicators 
mentioned?)
- what are the consequences of non- 
compliance with indicators, either of 
individual employees and/or of the 
organisation?
5 items on 
Pis
- importance attached 
to efficiency and 
effectiveness by 
quangocrats (ranging 
from little to much)
- statutes (are efficiency 
and effectiveness men­
tioned explicitly, either 
as a motive for esta­
blishment or as a goal?)
- annual report (is 
efficiency reported on?)
- how important is efficiency/- 
effectiveness for the survival of the 
organisation?
- do you think that quangos are 
more efficient/effective than 
bureaucracy and if so, why?
3 items 
importance 
of Pis
2 .I IP Supervision - presence of 
supervisor(s)
(yes or no)
- interventions by 
supervisor
- statutes (organisational 
structure, supervision, 
accountability)
- who supervises the quango?
- is there an internal division charged 
with supervision?
- how would you describe the 
relation between the quango and the 
supervisor (s)?
- has the supervisor ever intervened?
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Q U ESTIO N N A IRE 
Introduction
Interviews were held in Dutch. Questions in italics were only posed to informants 
from the quango (and not to informants from e.g. the parent department). X  refers to 
the quango to which the informant belonged.
A. The interview started with some introductionary questions on the establishment as 
a quango.
1. Quango X  has been through many changes lately, of which the establishment as a 
quango was an important one. How would you describe all these changes, in particu­
lar the quangocratization: as incremental or radical? Could you illustrate your answer?
2. Who usually took the initiative to make changes?
3. Generally it is assumed that quangocratization will lead to more efficiency and 
effectiveness of policy implementation, because quangos are believed to be more effi­
cient and effective than government bureaucracy. Do you share this opinion and why 
(not)?
4. Was, in your opinion, the establishment as a quango of your organization instigated 
by a desire for more efficiency and effectiveness? Or do you think there were other 
motives involved? What motives were those?
B. Questions about the relationship between quango X  and other organizations.
1. There are many parties involved in quango X. Several groups or organizations have an 
interest, for example: the parent department, the minister, regulators, personnel of the 
quango, clients, etcetera. Which o f these parties do you think are most important to quango 
X  and why?
2. How would you describe the relationship between quango X  and the parent 
department (e.g. mutually dependent, formal or informal, professional, businesslike)? 
And would you consider quango X  completely independent, or autonomous, from the 
parent department?
3. Is there much (informal) contact between the quango and the parent department? 
How often takes contact place?
4. Who supervises quango X? Who is appointed as a regulator? Which supervisor do 
you consider most important to quango X? Is there also an internal supervisor?
5. Who is responsible for errors in the production process of the quango?
C. Questions on the position of quango X  vis-a-vis other organizations.
1. How specific are the knowledge and equipment that quango X  uses in its production 
process? Are there other organizations that have the same ossets and/or a similar task? 
Could you mention any of those organizations? Are these any serious competition for 
quango X?
2. Do you think that those other organizations are capable to perform tasks in the 
same way as quango X? And why do you think so? If you had to compare quango X  
with those other organizations, how do you think quango X  would rate?
D . Questions about the use of performance indicators.
1. What are the most important objectives of quango X?
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2. What do you consider to be the most important indicators to measure quango X's 
performance? How many and what kind of indicators would that be? Could you give 
some examples? Are these indicators currently in use in, for example, the annual 
report?
Do these indicators give good insight into quango X's performance? If not, what 
should be changed? Do you know of indicators that could be important but are 
currently not in use (examples)?
3. For which aspects of performance are the most indicators used and for which the 
least? Are those aspects of performance easily quantifiable or not?
4. Are new indicators being developed regularly (examples)? By whom are these indicators 
developed; is there a division charged with the development of new indicators? Why are 
new indicators developed? Were indicators lacking or were existing indicators insufficiënt?
5. How are PIs used in quango X? To evaluate the performance of individual employees, 
for the annual report only, in negotiations on budgets and contracts, to implement 
organizational changes, or for other purposes?
6. Are PIs also used as performance requirements that employees have to meet? What are 
the consequences of not meeting the requirements? For example, do people get fired when 
they fail, or are divisions sanctioned for ill performance?
E. Some questions about the availability of information on performance.
1. If you would want to evaluate quango X 's performance, which sources would you 
use? And why those?
2. I mainly use annual reports and accounts; do you think that those give a good 
representation of the quango's performance? Why?
3. What would you say is the major function of annual reports (representation, 
accountability, obligation)? Are annual reports used within the organization as well?
4. Do annual reports contain all available information about quango X 's performance; 
which information is lacking and why? Which criteria determine whether or not 
information is included in the annual reports (e.g. legal prescriptions)
5. For different cases different questions: I have found information that was not included 
in annual reports of quango X  and I  would like to show it to you. Why were these 
findings never published?
F. The interview ended with questions about the future of the quango.
1. If you were asked to describe quango X's future, what would it look like? What 
chances or opportunities do you see? And what threats? Do you have particular wishes 
for the quango's future?
2. How important is it for the continuation of the quango's existence that it imple- 
ments policies in the most efficient and effective way? Would inefficiency or ineffecti- 
veness be a reason to undo the establishment as a quango? And if so, who decides 
about that?
3. Suppose that my research would show that policy implementation has not become 
more efficient or effective since quango X  was established (or, worse, that it has be­
come more inefficient and ineffective). What kind of explanation would you give for 
such a conclusion? And do you think that such a conclusion ought to have conse­
quences for quango X?
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STATEM ENTS
A number of conditions were measured by means of statements that were put to 
respondents. These conditions were: closeness to politicians, risk perception, diversity 
of performance indicators and emphasis on efficiency, effectiveness and PIs. In total, 20 
statements were made. Informants were asked to respond to the statements, put in a 
random order, and to determine to which extern, on a five-point scale (ranging 
between: 'very strong', 'strong', 'neutral', 'hardly', 'not at all'), they thought the 
statement applied to their organization. All statements were in Dutch. The translation 
below has not been cross-validated.
Existing statements, for example, about commitment, could not be used, as most 
of these refer to the individual level, whereas in this study informants were asked for 
an evaluation at organizational level. Existing studies on organizational diagnoses were 
used to generate ideas for the development of statements. The small number of 
respondents does not allow statistical testing of the reliability and validity of items. 
Face validity was increased by asking experts for their opinion on the statements. The 
list of statemenst also includes contrasting items to cross-check responses.
Closeness to politicians
'Closeness to politicians' was measured by means of statemens on loyalty and com­
mitment to the principal. Statements focussed on whether quangocrats tend to serve 
the goals of the principal, i.e. the minister of the parent department, or the goals of 
their own organization. For example, loyalty is most apparent in the willingness to 
share negative experiences such as budget cuts. Loyalty is also manifest when 
interdependencies exist, in this case between parent department and quango. Three 
statements were formulated (the expected effect on closeness is in brackets):
L l. If the parent department has to economize, our organization is of course willing 
to cooperate. (+)
(in Dutch: Als het ministerie van onderwijs moet bezuinigen, is onze organisatie 
vanzelfsprekend bereid daaraan bij te dragen.) 1 
L2. Eventually the parent department will no longer be our main principal. (-)
(in Dutch: Uiteindelijk zal het ministerie van onderwijs niet meer onze belangrijkste 
opdrachtgever zijn)
L3. Our organization is an extension of the parent department. (+)
(in Dutch: Onze organisatie is een verlengstuk van het ministerie van onderwijs.)
Commitment manifests itself in having a bond with the principal, i.e. to whom do 
quangocrats feel most obliged or whose interests come first? Commitment can be 
expressed, for example, in the account quangos give of their activities. Quangos have 
several stakeholders, i.e. people or organizations with interests in the activities of the 
quango. Here, the three most important stakeholders are distinguished: clients, the 
parent department and quangocrats. This leads to the following statements:
C l. It is more important to account for our performance to our clients than to the 
parent department. (-)
(in Dutch: Het is belangrijker om verantwoording af te leggen aan onze klanten dan 
aan het ministerie van onderwijs.)
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C2. The interests of our organization always come first, even before the interests of 
the parent department. (-)
(in Dutch: De belangen van onze organisatie gaan altijd voor, zelfs voor de belangen 
van bet ministerie van onderwijs.)
Risk-perception
Risk perception is measured as the way in which quangocrats see or deal with 
responsibilities and change. Risks are expected to be perceived to be high in 
organizations that rely heavily on rules and procedures and leave little room for 
innovativeness, or when responsibility for errors is attributed to others. Risks are 
considered low in quangos that tend to explore the boundaries of their autonomy, for 
example by increasing the commercial activities or anticipating changes instead of 
awaiting them. Five statements are formulated (the expected effect is in brackets):
R l. Our work cannot be done without procedures and rules. (+)
(in Dutch: Zonder procedures en regels kunnen wij ons werk niet doen.)
R2. Our organization is fully responsible for errors during the production process. (-) 
(in Dutch: De verantwoordelijkheid voor fouten in de uitvoering van onze taak ligt 
volledig bij onze organisatie.)
R3. Internal organizational changes may only be implemented if the parent 
department agrees. (+)
(in Dutch: Interne reorganisaties zouden alleen doorgevoerd mogen worden indien 
het ministerie van onderwijs daarmee instemt.)
R4. Preferably, our organization should have more opportunities than it has now to 
increase revenues. (-)
(in Dutch: Het is wenselijk dat onze organisatie meer mogelijkheden krijgt dan ze nu 
heeft om inkomsten te genereren.)
R5. Our organization usually anticipates changes prepared by the parent department.
0
(in Dutch: Onze organisatie loopt meestal vooruit op veranderingen die het 
ministerie van onderwijs wil doorvoeren.)
Emphasis on efficiency and effectiveness
The importance attached to efficiency is shown in, for example, the results of in­
efficiency. If informants consider inefficiency a reason to abolish (parts of) the 
organisation, efficiency can be said to be emphasized strongly. Efficiency and 
effectiveness can be contrasted with other measures of performance, such as quality 
and equity. Five statements were formulated to assess the importance informants 
attach to efficiency and effectiveness (expected effect in brackets):
E l. The quality of our service is more important than its efficiency or effectiveness. (-
) ....................................................
(in Dutch: De kwaliteit van onze dienstverlening is belangrijker dan de 
doelmatigheid ervan!)
E2. Inefficient parts of our organization should be abolished. (+)
(in Dutch: Inefficiënte onderdelen van onze organisatie zouden afgestoten moeten 
worden.)
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E3. If the establishment as a quango has not made our organization more efficient 
and effective, quangocratization should be made undone. (+)
(in Dutch: Als onze organisatie niet efficiënter is geworden door de verzelfstandiging, 
dan zou de verzelfstandiging teruggedraaid moeten worden.)
E4. The legal rights of our staff hinder the improvement of efficiency and 
effectiveness. (+)
(in Dutch: De rechtspositie van ons personeel is een sta-in-de-weg bij het vergroten 
van de efficiëntie.)
E5. Profit is a concept that does not fit our organization. (-)
(in Dutch: 'Winst' is een woord dat niet past bij onze organisatie)
Performance indicators
The use of performance indicators was evaluated in a number of ways in the case 
studies. Attention was paid to, for example, the number of indicators used and 
variations in indicators over time. To measure the quantifiability of performance and 
the importance attached to indicators statements were formulated, two about 
quantifiability and three about the importance attached to PIs (expected effects in 
b rackets):
11. Most aspects or our work can be expressed very aptly by means of quantitative 
performance indicators. (+)
(in Dutch: Het merendeel van ons werk is goed uit te drukken in kwantitatieve 
maatstaven.)
12. The quality of our work cannot be expressed in numbers. (-)
(in Dutch: De kwaliteit van ons werk is niet in getallen uit te drukken.)
13. Employees should be judged on their individual performance. (+)
(in Dutch: Werknemers zouden op hun individuele prestaties beoordeeld moeten 
kunnen worden.)
14. Employees whose performance does not meet set criteria should be fired. (+)
(in Dutch: Werknemers die beneden de maat presteren, zouden ontslagen moeten 
worden.)
15. Our organization provides custom-specific services, which cannot be expressed in 
general measurements. (-)
(in Dutch: Het maatwerk dat onze organisatie levert, is niet in globale maatstaven 
uit te drukken.)
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Introduction
Although keeping case study logs is strongly advized (see Yin, 1994) and more and 
more qualitative researchers report on their methods, there are still no general 
conventions on reporting procedures in case studies (Miles & Huberman, 1994:280­
286). In this appendix, a log is given of the analytic operations of both case studies 
conducted. This serves two purposes. First, it gives a full account of research methods 
and data sources used in the case studies. Doing this in the case study report itself 
would make the report unreadable and distract the reader from the important issues, 
namely the conclusions. Second, an accurate description of research improves the 
opportunities for replication and increases the reliability of this type of research.
The log is based on the documentation form developed by Miles and Huberman 
(1994:283). Five topics will be treated more or less extensively, depending on the 
situation. First, data sources are described. Second, procedural steps are accounted for. 
Third, all decision rules are made explicit. Fourth, analytic operations are described 
regarding processing the data (e.g. ranking the data, computing variables, aggregating 
information, temporal ordering), drawing and confirming those. Finally, some relevant 
research comments are made.
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LOG OF CASE STUDY 1: IB-GROEP 
1. Data sources
1.1. Documents
The statutes of IB-Groep are laid down in a law (Wet Verzelfstandiging In­
formatiseringsbank, 1993). The contents of this law were used in the description of the 
tasks, organizational structure, ways of financing and other organizational characteris- 
tics of IB-Groep. Additional information was taken from earlier studies on IB-Groep 
by Kuiper et al. (1992), Noordegraaf & Kickert (1993) and Ter Bogt (1997).
The primary data sources of performance were the annual reports and the audited 
annual accounts, produced by Informatiseringsbank (1990-1993) and IB-Groep (1994­
1997). Additional information was obtained from the so-called Statistisch Zakboek 
(published by the Informatiseringsbank in 1990, 1991, 1992; published by IB-Groep in
1994) and the Financiële Kerncijfers report (published by Ministerie van Onderwijs en 
Wetenschappen in 1997). Furthermore, information on running costs was obtained 
from preliminary calculations of cost-prices (Overzicht Kostprijsgegevens).
A number of customer surveys were held between 1993 and 1997. Most of these 
surveys report on the image of IB-Groep, in particular the division Student Loans and 
Grants, which includes the regional bureaus (in Dutch: steunpunten). Most of this 
information was confidential and therefore only used as background material (see 
references below).
Management contracts provided information on the performance indicators used 
by IB-Groep. The management contracts of 1996 and 1997 were used as a data source, 
together with the Basic Protocol of 1996-1999. The client charter (Kwaliteitshandvest, 
1998) was obtained from the Internet.
Finally, information was acquired from external sources as well. Information on 
the quality of customer service of IB-Groep was taken from a study by the 
Netherlands Court of Audit (Algemene Rekenkamer, 1997) and several annual reports 
of the National Ombudsman (Jaarverslag, 1990-1997). Finally, from the Central Bureau 
of Statistics (1998) data were obtained on four topics:
a. the percentage of the state budget of the parent department that is spent by IB- 
Groep, i.e. the average percentage of programme costs of the total departmental 
budget;
b. the development of the salary costs of the civil service, which equals the 
development of the salary costs of IB-Groep;
c. the national average percentage absenteeism in the civil service;
d. a price index to adjust all costs and revenues for inflation (indexed at 1990).
1.2. Interviews
Interviews were held with informants from IB-Groep, experts at the parent department 
and an expert in accountancy. Different questionnaires were developed for the 
different types of informants. Interviews were held with (in alphabetical order):
- drs. D. Boersma, MBA; Concern Control, IB-Groep
- dr.ir. C. van Eykelenburg; Chief Executive, IB-Groep
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- drs. M. de Graaf; parent department, Student Grants and Loans
- W.M. de Haan; Strategy & Management, IB-Groep
- dr. W. de Jong; parent department, interface organization RZO
- mr. H.G.M. Oldeniel; director Student Grants and Loans, IB-Groep
- drs. J. Poot, RA.; Arthur Andersen, accountancy & consultancy
After each interview, a list of statements was put to the informants from IB-Groep. 
They were asked to indicate to which degree they agreed or disagreed with the 
statements.
Final list of documents:
Basisprotocol OCenW - IB-Groep 1996-1999. (1996). Groningen, internal document.
CBS (1998). [On-line: www.cbs.nl]:
-Tijdreeksen niet-financiele instellingen: gewone uitgaven rijksfinanciën.
-Tijdreeksen arbeid: CAO-lonen per maand, inclusief bijzondere beloningen, sector 
overheid.
-Tijdreeksen gezondheid en maatschappelijk welzijn: ziekteverzuim overheid. 
-Tijdreeksen economie: consumentenprijsindex.
Financiële Kerncijfers OCenW 1997. Ministerie van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen. Den 
Haag, Sdu.
Imago van studiefinanciering en steunpunten. (1993). Groningen, internal report by 
CBZ/Marketing (research carried out by Telepoint Telemarketing). 
Imago-onderzoek Informatie Beheer Groep 1996. (1997). Groningen, internal report 
(research carried out by AHA! marktonderzoek en marketingadvies).
Jaarcontract OCenW - IB-Groep 1997. (1997). Groningen, internal document. 
Jaarcontract OCenW - IB-Groep 1996. (1996). Groningen, internal document.
Jaarverslag Informatie Beheer Groep. (1994-1998). Groningen.
Jaarverslag Informatiseringsbank. (1990-1993). Groningen.
Jaarverslag Nationale Ombudsman. (1990). Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1990-1991, 22
016, nrs. 1-2. 's-Gravenhage, Sdu.
Jaarverslag Nationale Ombudsman. (1991). Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1991-1992, 22 
550, nrs. 1-2. 's-Gravenhage, Sdu.
Jaarverslag Nationale Ombudsman. (1992). Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1992-1993, 23 
050, nrs. 1-2. 's-Gravenhage, Sdu.
Jaarverslag Nationale Ombudsman. (1993). Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1993-1994 23 
655, nrs. 1-2. 's-Gravenhage, Sdu.
Jaarverslag Nationale Ombudsman. (1995). Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1995-1996, 24 
635, nrs. 1-2. 's-Gravenhage, Sdu.
Jaarverslag Nationale Ombudsman. (1997). [On-line: www.ombudsman.nl]
Kerncijfers 1994-1996 (1997). Informatie Beheer Groep. Groningen.
Kwaliteitshandvest. (1998). Groningen, Informatie Beheer Groep, [www.ib-groep.nl] 
Netten, M. van. (1997). Klanttevredenheidsonderzoek; klanttevredenheid onder de klanten 
van de regiokantoren van de Informatie Beheer Groep. Groningen, internal report. 
Onderzoek onder klanten IB-Groep ten behoeve van het Kwaliteitshandvest. (1996). 
Groningen, internal report (research carried out by AHA! marktonderzoek en 
marketingadvies).
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Overzicht Kostprijsgegevens Informatie Beheer Groep 1994-1997. Groningen, internal 
document.
Rapportage Kwaliteitsmonitor Steunpunten, meting november/december 1994.
Groningen, Internal report.
Rapportage Kwaliteitsmonitor Steunpunten, meting november/december 1995.
Groningen, Internal report.
Statistisch Zakboek. (1990-1994). Informatiseringsbank. Groningen, internal documents. 
Verbetering Telefonische Klantenafhandeling; resultaten 0-meting. (1997). Groningen, 
internal report (research carried out by Lucent Technologies B.V.).
Wet Verzelfstandiging Informatiseringsbank: regeling van de bestuurlijke verhouding tussen 
de Minster van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen en de Informatie Beheer Groep, voor­
heen Informatiseringsbank. Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1992-1993, 23 073, 10. 
Den Haag, Sdu.
2. Procedural steps
2.1. Processing of documents
Based on the statutes and earlier studies, a general description was given of the history 
of IB-Groep and of important characteristics of the current situation. Information 
from the interviews was added to fill in the gaps left after the document analysis.
Next, all information on performance was processed and stored per year. A short 
summary was made of performance in general and - if possible - of the performance of 
separate divisions. The availability of information was also discussed and points on 
which information was lacking were researched by means of other sources. Findings 
were cross-checked with an earlier case study (on the period 1989-1994) by Ter Bogt 
(1997). The current organizational structure was chosen to describe performance. 
Tables were made to display the development of performance indicators over time. 
Most performance indicators were taken from annual reports and management 
contracts. If necessary, new indicators were constructed (see also below).
2.2. Interviews
The interviews had a semi-structured outline, and followed the questionnaire. 
Questions were based on theoretical expectations and the outcome of the analysis of 
documents and earlier Studies. Some questions were aimed at checking information, 
while other were intended to clarify points that had not become clear in the document 
analysis. Finally, some questions concerned issues about which no information could 
be found in the documents.
Each interview lasted approximately 75 minutes. Interviews were not recorded, 
but notes were made. After the interview, a report was drawn up and sent to the 
informant who was given the opportunity to make alterations if his/her opinion was 
not properly described. All information provided by informants and experts was 
treated confidentially and reported in such a way that tracing opinions back to 
individuals is not possible.
2.3. Statements
After each interview, a list of 20 statements was put to the informants from IB-Groep. 
These statements aim to measure particular norms and beliefs of IB-Groep's
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employees. Informants were asked to indicate on a 5-point scale to which degree the 
statement was an accurate description of the current situation at IB-Groep. This task 
took approximately 15 minutes. The responses of all informants together were 
aggregated per statement. Only if a majority of informants were of the same opinion, 
was the information included in the case study report.
3. Decision rules
3.1. Information from more than one source
If information on performance was available from more than one source, it was 
decided to just use annual reports, because they were considered the most official 
source of information. Moreover, annual reports and annual accounts need to be 
approved by the Board of Supervisors and have to be audited by an accountant.
If information was available from more than one annual report, preference was 
given to the most recent one. There are two reasons for this decision. First, if any re- 
calculations have been done after the publication of the initial annual report, these are 
expected to have been done in a uniform matter in the most recent report. The most 
recent reports thus offer more comparable information. Scond, the recent report is 
more informative; it often contains more (accurate) information than the initial report, 
because information that has become available only after the publication of the initial 
report is included as well.
3.2. Comparability of divisions
Information on performance was presented in a way that follows the current 
organizational structure, which arose in 1995 after a reorganization. Several units 
merged into new divisions. Accordingly, information from the annual reports of the 
period 1990-1994 was regrouped. Information about divisions that have merged was 
aggregated to make a comparison possible with current divisions. So, if division X 
resulted from a merger of divisions A and B, the information on the performance of A 
and B for any year between 1990-1994 was aggregated to enable a comparison with the 
performance of division X in 1995 and later. The report explicitly mentions the 
aggregations that have been made.
3.3. Choice of performance indicators
Performance indicators were taken as straightforwardly as possible from the annual 
reports and annual accounts. If indicators were renamed an explanation was given, for 
example: expenses on student grants were added and labelled programme costs.
Performance indicators were included in tables only if they were available for 
most of the years between 1990-1997. If indicators were only available for a limited 
number of years, meaningful comparison was not possible and therefore not 
attempted.
3.4. Development of new performance indicators
In some cases new indicators were constructed, for example, the percentage running 
costs of total costs, or the percentage employees in a division of the total number of 
employees. This was done to enable comparisons over time and eliminate distorting 
effects of absolute numbers (e.g. the total number of personnel is varied over time).
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The construction of new indicators is explained in the appropriate sections.
4. Analytic operations
1. Amounts and numbers were rounded off if necessary; all numbers larger than 0.5 
were assigned a value of 1.
2. Costs were adjusted for inflation, and indexed at 1990. The index is as follows: 
1990=100, 1991=103, 1992=106, 1993 = 109, 1994 = 112, 1995 = 114,
1996=116, 1997=119.
5. Research comments
A thorough analysis of performance requires more than just an analysis of annual 
reports and annual accounts. Organizations use annual reports as a means to promote 
themselves to others. Particular information is not presented, such as the costs 
associated with commercial activities and efficiency losses. A lack of this type of 
information seriously hinders accurate performance assessment. The use of multiple 
sources of information, both meant for internal and external use, is therefore 
recommended.
(Note: after the case study was done, an official departmental evaluation was carried 
out by the parent department, IB-Groep and Deloitte & Touche (1999). In this 
evaluation other sources than annual reports and annual accounts were used as well. 
Although much richer in detail, the conclusions of the official evaluation were very 
similar to the conclusions of my case study.)
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LOG OF CASE STUDY 2: THE ROC
1. Data sources 
1.1. Documents
The statutes of the ROC are laid down in a law (Wet Educatie en Beroepsonderwijs,
1995). The contents of this law were used for the description of the tasks, 
organizational structure, way of financing and other organizational characteristics of 
the ROC. Additional information was taken from the journal published by the 
M inistry of Education (Uitleg), which describes and explains new policies and includes 
several instructions regarding new policies (OCenW-regelingen). Furhermore, a number 
of studies on adult and vocational education were used to obtain more information on 
ROCs in general: Boef-van der Meulen et al. (1995), Vrancken & De Kemp (1996), 
BVE-procescoordinatie (1997), and BVE-raad (1997).
The Primary data sources for the analysis of the performance of the ROC were 
the annual reports and the audited annual accounts, produced by the former schools, 
and later the ROC, for adult basic and secondary education (Jaarrekening Basiseducatie 
1990-1993; Jaarverslag Basiseducatie 1993-1995; Jaarrekening VA VO 1990-1993, Jaar­
verslag VAVO, 1994-1995), non-formal education (Werkplan Vormingswerk, 1990-1995) 
and secondary vocational education (Jaarverslag MDGO, 1991-1995), (Jaarrekening ROC  
1996; Jaarrekening ROC  1997, BVE-monitor 1998, and Kwaliteitszorgverslag ROC
1998).
Finally, information was obtained from external sources as well. The M inistry of 
Education publishes information on adult and vocational education in the Netherlands, 
such as data on budgets and the number of students (Ministerie van Onderwijs, 
Cultuur en Wetenschappen, 1998; 1999). Most of this information was used for 
comparative purposes in the tables in the case study report.
F inal list of documents:
Boef-van der Meulen, S., Bronneman-Helmers, H.M., Eggink, E. & Herweijer, L.J. 
(1995). Processen van schaalvergroting in het onderwijs; een tussenstand. SCP, 
Sociale en Culturele Studies, Cahier 121. Den Haag.
BVE-monitor (1998). Internal document based on Moret et al. (1998). 
BVE-procescoördinatie. (1997). Sprong naar kwaliteit. Bunnik.
BVE-raad (1997). ROC's in de branding. Financiële kaders in relatie tot maatschappelijke 
betekenis. De Bilt.
CBS (1998b). Tijdreeksen economie: consumentenprijsindex.[www.cbs.nl]
Handboek Organisatiestructuur ROC. (1997).
Jaarrekening Basiseducatie (1990; 1991; 1992; 1993).
Jaarrekening ROC (1996; 1997).
Jaarrekening VAVO (1990;1991; 1992; 1992; 1993).
Jaarverslag Basiseducatie (1993; 1994; 1995).
Jaarverslag VAVO (1994; 1995).
Jaarverslag MDGO (1991; 1992; 1993; 1994; 1995).
Kwaliteitszorgverslag ROC. (1998).
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Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschappen. (1998). Ontwikkelingen in het 
onderwijsbeleid in Nederland 1994-1996. Nationaal rapport van Nederland voor de 
International Conference on Education, 45e zitting in Genenve 1996. 
[www.minocenw.nl].
Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschappen. (1999). OCenW in kerncijfers 
1999. [www.minocenw.nl].
Moret, Ernst & Young. (1998). Vragenlijst BVE-monitor, module financiën. Utrecht. 
OCen W-regelingen (1992-1998). Ministerie van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen. Sdu, Den 
Haag.
Vrancken, P.H.J. & De Kemp, A.A.M. (1996). Marktwerking in het secundair en tertiair 
beroepsonderwijs: een verkenning. Instituut voor Onderzoek van 
Overheidsuitgaven, in opdracht van het Ministerie van Economische Zaken.
Uitleg (1990-1998). Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschappen. Sdu, Den 
Haag.
Werkplan Vormingswerk (1990; 1991; 1992; 993; 1994; 1995).
Wet Educatie en Beroepsonderwijs (WEB): wet van 31 oktober 1995, houdende bepalingen 
met betrekking tot de educatie en het beroepsonderwijs. Staatsblad, 1995, nr. 501. 
Zon, W. van. (red.) (1990) Volwasseneneducatie; terreinverkenning en methodische 
uitgangspunten van de basiseducatie. Basisleerboek volwasseneneducatie. Houten/­
Antwerpen, Bohn Stafleu Van Loghum.
1.2. Interviews
Interviews were held with informants within the ROC, an expert at the parent depart­
ment and an expert in accountancy. Different questionnaires were developed for the 
different types of informants. Interviews were held with1:
- director of the support unit Finances
- director of the support unit General Management
- director of the unit for Adult Education
- director of the Advise & Training Center
- directeur of the vocational unit for trade, health services and social work
- J. van der Werf, parent department, director Vocational and Adult Education
- drs. J. Poot, RA.; Arthur Andersen, accountancy & consultancy
After each interview, a list of statements was put to the informants from the ROC. 
They were asked to indicate to which degree they agreed or disagreed with the 
statements.
2. Procedural steps
2.1. Processing of documents
Based on the statutes and earlier studies, a general description was given of the history 
of the ROC and of important characteristics of the current situation. Information 
from the interviews was added to fill in the gaps left after the document analysis.
1 For reasons of anonimity ROC-informants are indicated by their position only.
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Next, all information on performance was processed and stored per year. A short 
summary was made of performance in general, of the ROC and the former schools. In 
the report, the performance of each type of education was described; one vocational 
unit was selected (which coincided with one of the former schools), as were the unit 
for adult education and the AöcTC.
The availability of information was also discussed and points on which 
information was lacking were researched by means of other sources. Tables were made 
to display the development of performance indicators over time. Most performance 
indicators were taken from annual reports and management contracts. If necessary, 
new indicators were constructed (see also below).
2.2. Interviews
The interviews had a semi-structured outline, and followed the questionnaire. 
Questions were based on theoretical expectations and the outcome of the analysis of 
documents and earlier studies. Some questions were aimed at checking information, 
while other were intended to clarify points that had not become clear in the document 
analysis. Finally, some questions concerned issues about which no information could 
be found in the documents.
Each interview lasted approximately 75 minutes. Interviews were not recorded, 
but notes were made. After the interview, a report was drawn up and sent to the 
informant who was given the opportunity to make alterations if his/her opinion was 
not properly described. All information provided by informants and experts was 
treated confidentially and reported in such a way that tracing opinions back to 
individuals is not possible.
2.3. Statements
After the interview, a list of 20 statements was put to the informants from the ROC. 
These statements aim to measure particular norms and beliefs of the employees of the 
ROC. Informants were asked to indicate on a 5-point scale to which degree the 
statement was an accurate description of the current situation at the ROC. This task 
took approximately 15 minutes. The responses of all informants together were 
aggregated per statement. Only if a majority of informants were of the same opinion, 
was the information included in the case study report.
3. Decision rules
3.1. Information in more than one source
If information on performance was available from more than one source, it was 
decided to just use annual reports, because they were considered the most official 
source of information. Moreover, annual reports and annual accounts need to be 
approved by the Board of Supervisors and have to be audited by an accountant.
If information was available from more than one annual report, preference was 
given to the most recent one. There are two reasons for this decision. First, if any re- 
calculations have been done after the publication of the initial annual report, these are 
expected to have been done in a uniform matter in the most recent report. The most 
recent reports thus offer more comparable information. Scond, the recent report is
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more informative; it often contains more (accurate) information than the initial report, 
because information that has become available only after the publication of the initial 
report is included as well.
3.2. Choice of performance indicators
Performance indicators were taken as straightforwardly as possible from the annual 
reports and annual accounts. Sometimes indicators were renamed, for example: 
Programme revenues: annual budget provided by the parent department (lump
sum) or the local government in the case of adult education 
(in Dutch: rijksbijdragen)2 
Commercial activities: all additional revenues, both subsidies from the parent
department and/or local government, or from other 
principals (e.g. private companies)
Surplus/Deficits: deposits/withdrawals from capital reserves (in Dutch:
exploitatie-saldo)
All other indicators, such as the number of students and personnel remained the same. 
However, not all information in annual reports and accounts was included in the 
tables of the case study report. The most important sources of revenues and costs were 
always listed. Output indicators, such as the number of students and the percentage of 
graduates, were listed if available. Moreover, a number of new indicators was 
calculated using existing information (see below).
3.3. Development of new performance indicators
In some cases new indicators were calculated, usually percentages. For example, the 
percentage of costs spent on salaries, the percentage non-teachers of total staffing file, 
and the percentage of commercial activities of total turnover. Such indicators can be 
more easily used for comparisons over time than absolute numbers. Most of these 
indicators are self-evident; if not, they are explained in the case study report.
4. Analytic operations
1. Amounts and numbers were rounded off if necessary; all numbers larger than 0.5 
were assigned a value of 1.
2. The numbers of students and personnel were rounded off to 5- or 10-folds.
5. Research comments
The comparison of the performance of five formerly independent schools with the 
performance of one ROC after 1996 was hindered by the incomparability of annual 
reports and accounts. While some schools had already developed a system of 
performance assessment, other schools had not (cf. the selected vocational unit, a 
former school). Moreover, in 1996 and 1997, not all information was integrated yet; 
the schools were still working on the development of one integrated system of 
performance assessment. Perhaps a more fruitful approach to gain insight into the 
performance of this quango would be a comparison with other ROCs (benchmarking).
2 The parent department does not distinguish between programme and running costs.

SAMENVATTING
In diverse westerse, democratische landen, waaronder Nederland, wordt de uitvoering van 
beleid steeds vaker verzelfstandigd, geprivatiseerd of uitbesteed. Het scala aan organisatie­
vormen in de publieke sector is hierdoor sterk gegroeid. Naast de traditionele overheids­
organisaties zoals de ministeries, zijn er nu ook agentschappen zoals de Immigratie en 
Naturalisatie Dienst, zelfstandige bestuursorganen (zbo's) zoals de openbare universiteiten, 
worden projecten op het gebied van bijvoorbeeld infrastructuur en nieuwbouw van 
woningen gezamenlijk gefinancierd en uitgevoerd door gemeenten en private beleggers of 
projectontwikkelaars (PPS:publiek-private samenwerking), en zijn voormalige overheidsbe­
drijven zoals de PTT en het Algemeen Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds geprivatiseerd.
Al deze organisaties kunnen worden aangeduid met de internationale term 'quango', 
het acroniem voor ^ «asi-dutonome raon-gouvernementele organisaties. De toename van het 
aantal quango's wordt in dit proefschrift gezien als een van de meeste recente fasen in de 
ontwikkeling in westerse staten; na de bureau-cratisering volgt nu de quango-cratisering. 
Overigens zijn quango's in de meeste westerse landen niet geheel nieuwe organisatievor­
men. Verzelfstandiging, privatisering en uitbesteding bestaan in sommige landen al decen­
nia of zelfs eeuwen. Vooral na de Tweede Wereldoorlog is het aantal quango's echter 
sterk toegenomen, omdat ze als instrument werden gebruikt in de hervorming van de ver­
zorgingsstaat in de jaren '70 en '80.
In dit proefschrift wordt de toename van verzelfstandiging in diverse Westerse landen als 
trend beschreven. Daarnaast is geprobeerd een verklaring te vinden voor de toename van 
verzelfstandiging en voor mogelijke gevolgen ervan, met name wat betreft de prestaties 
van verzelfstandigde organisaties.
Onderzoek naar verzelfstandiging is schaars. De meeste onderzoeken hebben zich 
tot nu toe beperkt tot beschrijvende case-studies van enkele organisaties. Ook de theorie­
vorming over verzelfstandiging staat nog in de kinderschoenen. Recent zijn er vanuit de 
neo-institutionele economie eerste aanzetten gegeven tot een verklaring van 
verzelfstandiging. Dit onderzoek probeert zowel op het gebied van theorievorming als de 
toepassing van onderzoeksmethoden verder te gaan. Zo worden in de theoretische 
verklaring van verzelfstandiging ideeën gecombineerd uit de rationele keuze sociologie, 
neo-institutionele economie en politieke economie. Het theoretische model dat op die 
manier ontstaat, is de eerste stap op weg naar een meer omvattende verklaring van 
verzelfstandiging. Qua methoden bevat het onderzoek een combinatie van kwalitatieve 
(case studies) en kwantitatieve technieken (regressie analyse). Dat vergroot de geldigheid 
van de conclusies.
Belangrijkste databron voor dit onderzoek is een onderzoek van de Algemene 
Rekenkamer naar zelfstandige bestuursorganen (zbo's) in Nederland. Dit onderzoek is een 
van de weinige bronnen op het gebied van verzelfstandiging. Gegevens over andere landen 
zijn vaak verouderd of incompleet (zie de beschrijving in hoofdstuk 2).
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Zelfstandige bestuursorganen in Nederland
In 1999 waren er ongeveer 600 zbo's in Nederland. Daar werkten ruim 130.000 mensen, 
die bijna 20% van de rijksbegroting uitgeven. Enkele voorbeelden zijn de Kamers van 
Koophandel, de Ziekenfondsraad, de universiteiten en de Nederlandse Bank. Behalve een 
toename van het absolute aantal zbo's sinds 1950, zijn er nog drie andere belangrijke 
zaken geconstateerd. Ten eerste, zbo's worden voor steeds meer verschillende taken in­
gezet. De verscheidenheid in taken neemt dus toe; van controle en toezicht naar onder­
zoek en coördinatie. Ten tweede, de toename in het aantal zbo's leidt niet tot een echte 
vermindering van de omvang van het ambtelijk apparaat van de overheid. Ten derde, de 
regelgeving over wat zbo's moeten rapporteren over hun prestaties is op veel punten in­
adequaat. Bijgevolg is de kennis over wat deze organisaties doen beperkt.
De verklaring van verzelfstandiging richt zich op twee vragen: (1) waarom kiezen 
politici steeds vaker voor deze andere manieren om beleid uit te voeren dan de tra­
ditionele keuze voor het overheidsapparaat zelf en (2) leidt dit, zoals door politici wordt 
aangenomen, tot een betere uitvoering van publieke taken? Deze vragen betreffen 
respectievelijk de oorzaken en de gevolgen van de verzelfstandigingstrend.
Motieven van politici voor verzelfstandiging
Als politici kiezen voor een verzelfstandigde uitvoeringsorganisatie zoals een zbo, dan 
noemen zij daarvoor motieven die betrekking hebben op de effecten die zij verwachten 
van hun keuze. De meest genoemde motieven zijn (1) een verhoogde doelmatigheid van 
de uitvoering van beleid, (2) een grotere betrokkenheid van burgers bij de uitvoering, (3) 
een meer professionele uitvoering door experts die geen last meer hebben van de 
bemoeizucht van politici, waardoor (4) politici zelf zich beter en meer kunnen richten op 
hun eigenlijke taak: het ontwikkelen van nieuw beleid. Deze veronderstellingen worden 
de beleidstheorie genoemd. De beleidstheorie is geen wetenschappelijke theorie, alhoewel 
zij kan berusten op wetenschappelijk onderzoek, maar dient de legitimatie van de keuzen 
die politici maken. Daarom is deze theorie niet als uitgangspunt genomen in het onderha­
vige onderzoek. In plaats daarvan is een zgn. 'rationeel actor'-model ontwikkeld om de 
keuze van politici voor een quango te verklaren en voorspellen op theoretische gronden 
(zie hoofdstuk 3).
Theoretisch model ter verklaring van keuze van politici
Politici zijn afhankelijk van de gunst van de kiezer om hun beroep uit te kunnen oefenen 
en daarmee status of aanzien te verwerven èn hun ideologieën uit te kunnen dragen. 
Daarom beloven politici kiezers nieuwe beleidsmaatregelen, die vervolgens uitgevoerd 
moeten worden door de uitvoerende macht. In het theoretisch model wordt voorspeld 
wanneer politici zullen kiezen voor verzelfstandiging in plaats van de traditionele 
overheidsbureaucratie (ministeries).
Verzelfstandiging heeft twee voordelen en één nadeel voor politici. Ten eerste, 
politici zijn niet meer verantwoordelijk voor fouten in de uitvoering van beleid na 
verzelfstandiging en lopen daarom minder politieke risico's om op fouten in de uitvoering 
te worden aangesproken. Het tweede voordeel is aangeduid als 'patronage'. Door 
belangengroepen te betrekken bij de uitvoering van beleid door zbo's, bijvoorbeeld door 
ze te benoemen in het bestuur van een zbo, kunnen politici deze groepen aan zich binden 
en zich verzekeren van meer politieke steun. Het nadeel van verzelfstandiging is dat, 
omdat de organisatie op afstand van de overheid staat, de mogelijkheid tot ingrijpen bij
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falen van de uitvoeringsorganisatie kleiner is geworden. Als er iets fout gaat in de 
uitvoering en de efficiëntie en effectiviteit van de beleidsuitvoering in gevaar komt, 
kunnen politici minder makkelijk ingrijpen. Inefficiëntie en ineffectiviteit zijn onwenselijk 
omdat dat betekent dat er minder geld aan ander beleid kan worden besteed, of dat de 
belastingen omhoog zouden moeten. Kiezers zullen daar niet tevreden over zijn en hun 
stem aan andere politici geven.
Politici zullen de genoemde voor- en nadelen moeten afwegen om tot hun keuze te 
komen. Welke keuze ze maken, hangt af van de mogelijkheden en beperkingen die de 
situatie, waarin ze hun keuze maken, met zich mee brengt. Op basis van deze gedachten- 
gang zijn acht hypothesen opgesteld, die vervolgens zijn getoetst.
Methode van onderzoek
De statistische toetsing van de hypothesen werd uitgevoerd op data uit een door de 
Algemene Rekenkamer in 1995 gepubliceerd onderzoek naar alle Nederlandse zbo's. 
Aanvullende data werden verkregen uit secundaire bronnen (zie hoofdstuk 4). Als 
methode werd Poisson regressie-analyse gebruikt. Doordat er alleen informatie beschik­
baar was over besluiten tot verzelfstandiging, kon de analyse alleen maar aantonen welke 
variabelen leidden tot grote aantallen besluiten tot verzelfstandiging. Van die variabelen 
is aangenomen dat zij oorzaken van de toename in verzelfstandiging zijn.
Oorzaken van verzelfstandiging
In tegenstelling tot wat vaak wordt aangenomen, werd voorspeld dat politieke ideologie 
niet van doorslaggevende invloed is op de keuze van politici. De analyse bevestigt dit; 
politici van alle partijen besluiten tot verzelfstandiging, al zou dat best om verschillende 
redenen zijn. Ook economische omstandigheden blijken, zoals voorspeld, niet van door­
slaggevende invloed; er wordt niet meer of minder verzelfstandigd als bijvoorbeeld de 
werkloosheid stijgt, of als de conjunctuur stijgt.
In en rond verkiezingstijd besluiten politici minder vaak tot verzelfstandiging, in 
tegenstelling tot de verwachting. De aandacht van politici in verkiezingstijd is kennelijk 
meer gericht op het doen van beloftefi over nieuwe beleid aan de kiezer dan op de vraag 
hoe dit beleid te zijner tijd dient te worden uitgevoerd.
Ook de verwachting dat verzelfstandiging vaak taken zal betreffen die niet specifiek 
zijn voor de overheid, werd weerlegd. Het zijn juist vooral typische taken als toezicht en 
controle die worden opgedragen aan zbo's. Dat betekent dat zbo's afhankelijk blijven van 
de overheid voor opdrachten want dit soort taken kunnen ze niet vaak ook voor andere 
opdrachtgevers uitvoeren.
Geen bewijs werd gevonden voor de veronderstelling dat er meer wordt verzelf­
standigd in corporatistische beleidsvelden, of dat verzelfstandiging minder vaak de 
voorziening in collectieve goederen betreft.
Bij het ontwikkelen van het theoretische model is er in eerste instantie van uit gegaan dat 
politici alle gevolgen van hun keuze voor een bepaalde uitvoeringsorganisatie kennen. Dit 
is geen realistische veronderstelling. Politici zullen daarom manieren zoeken om op een 
snelle, goedkope manier aan informatie te komen over welke uitvoeringsorganisatie de 
meest efficiënte en effectieve is. Er zijn twee strategieën die politici daarvoor kunnen 
gebruiken: imitatie en monitoring.
Imitatie, ofwel het herhalen van besluiten van andere politici of het herhalen van het
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eigen besluit, stelt politici in staat om ervaring van anderen te gebruiken of zelf ervaring 
op te doen met de keuze van uitvoeringsorganisaties. De toetsing laat zien dat politici 
inderdaad hun keuze voor verzelfstandiging herhalen. De toename in het aantal 
verzelfstandigingen is dus inderdaad (mede) het gevolg van imitatie.
Monitoring geeft politici achteraf informatie over de prestaties van de gekozen 
organisatie. Indien de prestaties als goed worden beschouwd, kan de keuze voor eenzelfde 
organisatie worden herhaald. Monitoring vereist echter wel dat politici voordat een 
organisatie wordt opgericht verantwoordingsvereisten formuleren en achteraf controleren. 
Dat kost extra tijd en geld, hetgeen de uitvoering van taken weer duurder maakt. Politici 
laten zich door deze extra kosten echter niet weerhouden van verzelfstandiging, zo blijkt 
uit de analyses. Overigens moet wel opgemerkt worden dat de regelgeving over de verant­
woordingsplicht van zbo's op veel gebieden tekort schiet.
Samengevat: de toename in verzelfstandiging in Nederland tussen 1950 en 1993 is niet 
veroorzaakt door bepaalde politieke partijen, noch door schommelingen in de 
economische conjunctuur. De toename in het aantal besluiten tot verzelfstandiging is wel 
het gevolg van imitatie; verzelfstandiging is 'in'. Daarbij lijken politici er voorkeur voor 
te hebben om zbo's met specifieke taken te belasten, zoals controle en toezicht. Politici 
laten zich in hun keuze voor verzelfstandiging niet weerhouden doordat (extra) 
investeringen gedaan moeten worden in de monitoring van de zbo's, al gebeurt dit vaak 
in onvoldoende mate.
Marktwerking leidt tot meer efficiëntie en effectiviteit?
Volgens de beleidstheorie leidt verzelfstandiging tot efficiëntere en effectievere uitvoering 
van beleid dan door de overheidsbureaucratie, omdat verzelfstandigde organisaties onder­
hevig zijn aan marktwerking. Er zijn diverse redenen om aan deze veronderstelling te 
twijfelen.
Ten eerste, zbo's opereren zelden in de markt. De meeste zbo's zijn zelfs monopolis­
ten. Ten tweede, de uitvoering van publieke taken dient meestal meerdere doelen die soms 
tegenstrijdig kunnen zijn, bijvoorbeeld efficiëntie en zorgvuldigheid. Welk doel bepaalt 
dan of een zbo goed presteert? Bovendien gaan publieke organisaties (zelden of) nooit 
failliet. Er zijn dus weinig consequenties verbonden aan slecht presteren. Ten derde, het 
meten van de prestaties van zbo's wordt door voornoemde problemen bemoeilijkt; er is 
geen vergelijking en de keuze van maatstaven is discutabel. In de praktijk blijkt bovendien 
dat de verantwoording die zbo's moeten afleggen van hun prestaties onvoldoende is gere­
geld. Tenslotte, er is nog niet veel onderzoek gedaan naar de prestaties van verzelf­
standigde organisaties maar het weinige onderzoek dat er is, toont geen prestatieverbete- 
ring aan en wijst in sommige gevallen zelfs op vermindering van prestaties na 
verzelfstandiging.
Deze redenen waren aanleiding om de prestaties van zbo's te bestuderen. De tweede 
onderzoeksvraag richt zich daarom op de vraag onder welke omstandigheden de 
uitvoering van publieke taken door zbo's efficiënter en effectiever is dan door 
overheidsbureaucratie. Analoog aan de beantwoording van de eerste onderzoeksvraag, is 
een rationeel actor model ontwikkeld om de prestaties van quangocraten (tegenhangers 
van bureaucraten) te voorspellen (zie hoofdstuk 3).
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Theoretisch model om prestaties van quangocraten te voorspellen 
Quangocraten worden geacht hun taak uit te voeren op de manier die is afgesproken, 
zodat de doelen die het beleid nastreeft ook worden gehaald. Maar quangocraten kunnen 
ook hun eigen doelen hebben, die ze liever realiseren. In sommige gevallen betekent dat, 
dat het beleid niet op de afgesproken wijze wordt uitgevoerd. Zo kunnen quangocraten 
proberen om minder hard te werken, zodat ze meer vrije tijd voor zichzelf overhouden. 
Vervolgens kunnen ze proberen om hun gebrek aan inzet te verbergen. In dat geval is het 
duidelijk dat de efficiëntie en effectiviteit van de beleidsuitvoering gevaar lopen. Maar 
quangocraten kunnen ook het beleid volgens hun eigen ideeën uitvoeren in plaats van 
volgens de formele regels van het beleid zelf. Politici zullen dat niet altijd even wenselijk 
vinden omdat het hun eigen bedoelingen doorkruist.
De keuze tussen het beleid volgens de wensen van de politici uitvoeren en daarvan 
afwijken, op welke manier dan ook, hangt af van een aantal factoren zoals: (1) de mate 
van autonomie van de organisatie, (2) de aanwezigheid van concurrenten en (3) de 
verantwoordingsplicht van de organisatie. Hoe meer autonomie, hoe meer concurrentie 
en hoe strenger de verantwoordingsplicht, des te zekerder kunnen politici ervan zijn dat 
de uitvoeringsorganisatie haar taken zal uitvoeren zoals afgesproken.
Dat klinkt echter simpeler dan het is. Met name de verantwoordingsplicht kan tot 
onbedoelde gevolgen leiden, die de efficiëntie en effectiviteit van de beleidsuitvoering weer 
in gevaar brengen. Eén van die onbedoelde gevolgen is de zgn. prestatie paradox. Deze 
paradox houdt in dat prestatie-indicatoren niet altijd tot meer inzicht in prestaties hoeven 
te leiden, of tot betere prestaties. Indicatoren kunnen in de loop van de tijd hun waarde 
verliezen, bijvoorbeeld omdat er geen slechte presteerders meer over zijn, maar mensen 
kunnen indicatoren ook manipuleren door hun prestaties er op af te stemmen. Dan lijkt 
het alsof ze goed presteren, terwijl dat niet per se zo hoeft te zijn. Als de indicatoren 
bijvoorbeeld alleen gemakkelijk kwantificeerbare onderdelen van de prestaties bevatten, 
worden andere onderdelen niet in kaart gebracht of zelfs genegeerd.
Omstandigheden die een prestatie paradox kunnen oproepen, betreffen onder andere 
het systeem van prestatie meting dat wordt gebruikt. Hoe gevarieerder de prestatie 
indicatoren, des te kleiner is de kans dat een paradox zich voor kan doen. In dit 
onderzoek is daarom ook aandacht besteed aan dergelijke omstandigheden.
Methode van onderzoek
Op basis van het theoretische model zijn in totaal elf voorspellingen gedaan, die in twee 
case studies zijn onderzocht (zie hoofdstuk 5). Op basis van analyse van jaarverslagen en 
jaarrekeningen en interviews zijn de prestaties van de twee organisaties in kaart gebracht, 
vanaf een aantal jaar voor de verzelfstandiging tot een aantal jaar daarna, om zodoende 
vast te kunnen stellen of de verzelfstandiging tot een verbetering in de prestaties heeft 
geleid.
De eerste casus was Informatie Beheer Groep, een zbo (sinds 1994) dat onder andere 
belast is met de uitvoering van de Wet op de Studiefinanciering. Voor de verzelfstandiging 
maakte IB-Groep deel uit van het Ministerie van Onderwijs. De tweede casus was een 
Regionaal Opleidingenentrum (ROC) voor volwasseneneducatie en middelbaar 
beroepsonderwijs, opgericht in 1996 uit een fusie van meerdere (voorheen merendeels 
bijzondere) scholen.
Alhoewel het lage aantal cases statistische generalisatie van de resultaten niet toestaat, 
is onderzocht in hoeverre de resultaten van de case studies de hypothesen lijken te
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ondersteunen dan wel tegen te spreken.
Gevolgen van verzelfstandiging
Het onderzoek in de twee geselecteerde organisaties laat zien dat verzelfstandiging niet 
onmiddellijk tot een verbetering van de efficiëntie en effectiviteit van beleidsuitvoering 
leidt. Als zich al verbeteringen voordoen, dan betreffen die vaak maar één aspect van de 
prestaties (bijvoorbeeld de kwaliteit) en niet alle aspecten tegelijkertijd (output, kosten, 
kwaliteit). Eén van de belangrijkste oorzaken hiervoor is dat verzelfstandiging geld kost; 
de overgang van de ene soort organisatie naar de volgende kost tijd en vereist 
investeringen in de nieuwe organisatie.
De aanwezigheid van concurrentie blijkt van weinig voorspellende waarde voor de 
prestaties van de organisaties. In sommige gevallen hebben uitvoeringsorganisaties zelfs 
methoden gevonden om de concurrentiedruk te verlagen, bijvoorbeeld door samen te 
werken met hun concurrenten. In plaats van concurrentie blijkt de mate van autonomie 
en de relatie tot het moederdepartement (afwachtend of initiatief nemend) van belang 
voor de prestaties van de verzelfstandigde organisatie. Terwijl IB-Groep het initiatief 
neemt en kan onderhandelen over haar budget - en dus veel autonomie bezit - moet het 
ROC afwachten wat de minister zal beslissen - en blijft dus sterk afhankelijk. Die houding 
tekent de organisaties, beïnvloedt hun prestaties èn de manier waarop ze over hun 
prestaties rapporteren.
Het evalueren van de prestaties van verzelfstandigde organisaties kent een aantal 
problemen. Zo ontbreekt bij monopolisten (zoals IB-Groep en een groot aantal andere 
zbo's) een referentiekader om de prestaties mee te vergelijken. Bij andere organisaties, 
zoals het ROC, is er weinig ervaring of traditie in het afleggen van verantwoording over 
de prestaties. Dat betekende in dit geval dat de gebruikte indicatoren bijna allemaal alleen 
betrekking hadden op financiële zaken en dat andere (onderwijsinhoudelijke) aspecten 
vaak niet werden gerapporteerd. Het inzicht in de prestaties van de organisatie is daardoor 
onvolledig. Overigens wordt inmiddels aan een uitgebreider verantwoordingssysteem 
gewerkt.
De onervarenheid met verslaglegging onder publieke organisaties lijkt echter vaker 
voor te komen. Een jaarlijks gehouden wedstrijd over het beste jaarverslag van een 
publieke organisaties laat zien dat publieke organisaties vaak wel hun input en output 
laten zien, maar nog niet gewend zijn aan het formuleren van streefwaarden, of het 
maken van vergelijkingen met andere organisaties of over verschillende jaren. Hierdoor 
ontbreekt vaak inzicht in de ontwikkeling van de prestaties van die organisaties.
De problemen waarmee prestatiemeting bij verzelfstandigde organisaties kampt, zijn 
een voedingsbodem voor het ontstaan van onbedoelde gevolgen zoals de prestatie paradox. 
De aanwezigheid van zo'n prestatie paradox is echter moeilijk aan te tonen. In de case 
studies zijn wel voorbeelden gevonden dat de organisaties op bepaalde aspecten van hun 
prestaties extra nadruk leggen en andere aspecten niet of nauwelijks rapporteren. Dit 
onderzoek toont daarmee aan dat er meer onderzoek nodig is naar de prestatie paradox 
in de publieke sector.
Tot slot
In dit proefschrift zijn trends, oorzaken en gevolgen van verzelfstandiging onderzocht. De 
toename van verzelfstandiging (in elk geval van het aantal zbo's in Nederland tussen 1950 
en 1993) lijkt vooral het gevolg te zijn van imitatie of herhaling. Het is dus met recht een
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trend. Politici baseren hun keuzen voor verzelfstandiging op argumenten (de 
beleidstheorie) die niet blijken te kloppen; verbetering van prestaties na verzelfstandiging 
is niet eenduidig aan te tonen. Het gebrek aan interesse van politici voor het laten 
afleggen van verantwoording door verzelfstandigde organisaties lijkt te bewijzen dat ze 
ook niet echt geïnteresseerd in de vraag of hun verwachtingen juist zijn. Dat lijkt erop 
te wijzen dat de symbolische waarde van verzelfstandiging groter is dan de economische 
waarde ervan.
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